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CONCLUSIONS INTRODUCTION 
As  a  result of  the work  of  the  Intergovernmental  conference on  political 
union,  cooperation pol Icy  has  now  taken  Its place  alongside other  Community 
poI I  c les. 
This  decision marks  both  an  end  and  a  beginning. 
An  end  because  what  the  Commission  has  already  been  doing  for  almost  thirty 
years  Is  now  enshrined  In  the  Treaty.  Cooperation  pol Icy  began  fairly 
modestly  with  the first  EDF  In  1958.  Annual  commitments  have  gradually 
risen  from  ECU  100  ml  I lion  to more  than  ECU  3,5 bl I I ion.  Operational 
Instruments  have  become  Increasingly  complex  and  comprehensive  (Lome, 
Mediterranean protocols,  cooperation with  Asian  and  Latin American 
developing  countries,  sundry  budget  headings).  Other  cooperation 
Instruments  such  as  trade  policy  and  scientific or  technical  cooperation 
have  been  used  more  systematically. 
A beginning,  above  all,  because  In  the  preval I lng  situation there  are 
various  reasons  for  reassessing  and  rethinking  the  Community's  development 
policy: 
-the distribution of  Income  worldwide  has  become  even  more  uneQual  In 
relative  terms  In  the  last  few  years.  The  situation  In  the  developing 
countries  Is  far  from  rosy  and  In  some  of  them  Is  marked  by  a  drop  In 
growth  rates,  Increasing poverty  and  a  widening  gap  between  those 
countries which  take off  and  those  which  stagnate or  even  regress; 
-for a  large group  of  developing  countries  (the  less  developed  countries) 
development  efforts have  ended  In  complete  fa I Jure.  For  these countries 
International  development  aid  has  on  the whole  been  Ineffective and  has 
produced  meagre  results  In  relation  to  the  large  amount  of  resources 
mob I I I  zed; 
-the pol ltlcal  upheavals  In  the  International  arena  following  the  col lapse 
of  the  Eastern bloc  have  called  Into  Question  the  traditional  support 
enjoyed  by  the  developing  countries  and  are  In  turn  bringing  about  deep 
changes  In  the  pol ltlcal  make-up  of  these countries; 
-the thrust  of  the  developing  countries·  domestic  pol lcles,  which  are 
directed at  political  level  towards  greater  democracy  and  at  economic 
level  towards  greater  liberal lzatlon,  play  a  vital  role  In  development 
since external  aid  Is  effective only  when  It  backs  sound  development 
strategy; - 2  -
-the emergence of  new  forms  of  Interdependence  between  Industrial lzed  and 
developing countries- In  addition  to  trade,  Investment  and  debt  there  Is 
the  pol ltlcal  dimension  (tensions  and  wars  between  Third  World  countries 
and  their  Internal  pol ltlcal  lnstabl I lty affect  the  Industrial lzed 
countries)  and  aspects  connected  with  the  environment  and  population 
movements  (migration,  AIDS,  drugs).  It  Is  widely  acknowledged  that  the 
developed  world  pays  a  price  for  the  South's  non-development  and  that  the 
North's  I I !-conceived development  can  obstruct  the  South's  sustainable 
development. 
-the headway  made  In  European  Integration- towards  the  single market  and 
economic,  monetary  and  pol ltlcal  union- Is  radically altering  the 
commercial,  financial  and  monetary  make-up  of  the  International  economic 
system  and  means  that  the  Community  already  plays,  and  wl  1 I  do  so  even 
more  In  the  future,  a  leading  role  In  world  affairs. 
Cooperation  pol Icy  not  only  has  Its own  particular  traits and  driving 
force,  It  Is  also a  vital  component  of  foreign  pol Icy.  Although  each 
comes  under  different  sections  In  the  new  European  Union  Treaties,  they 
wl  I I  need  to be  developed  In  paral lei  as  progress  Is  made  towards  pol I tical 
union. 
So  far  the Member  States  have  done  a  great  deal  to assist  the  developing 
countries.  But  although  their  approach  has  generally converged  their 
efforts have  remained  dissipated and  therefore  less effective. 
An  alternative approach  Is  needed  to  tackle alI  these  aspects  and  the 
dissipation of  the  Member  States'  development  ald.  One  possible  way  of 
doing 'this  Is  gradually  to al lgn  and  dovetal I  the  Member  States' 
development  cooperation  pol lcles at  Community  level. 
As  In  other  areas of  Community  action  the  key  I les  In  the  proper 
appl lcatlon of  the  principle of  subsidiarity.  Article  38  of  the  Pol ltlcal 
Union  Treaty states that  " ...  the  Community  shal I  take  action,  In 
accordance  with  the  principle of  subsidiarity,  only  If  and  In  so  far  as  the 
obJectives of  the  proposed  action  cannot  be  sufficiently achieved  by  the 
Member  States and  can  therefore,  by  reason of  the  scale or  effects of  the 
proposed  action,  be  better  achieved  by  the  Community". --- ·-·----~·----·---
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It  therefore  seems  that  the  Member  States'  development  cooperation policies 
should  brought  together  at  Community  level  for  two  reasons: 
(I)  to  cope  better  with  the  challenges  and  external  factors  which  have 
been  generated  by  the  new  forms  of  Interdependence  resulting  from 
the  non-development  of  the  South  and  which  could  not  be  tackled  by 
the  Member  States acting  In  the  same  fragmented  way  as  In  the  past. 
In  this  field  the  Community  development  cooperation  pol Icy  would 
I ink  up  with  other  Community  pol lcles  (such  as  environment  and 
research)  which  are  designed  to  deal  with  these  global  Issues; 
(I I)  to  contribute better,  by  means  of  coordinated,  complementary, 
synergetic and  therefore more  effective action,  to  the  developing 
countries'  development  efforts.  With  this united  approach  Community 
pol Icy  would  make  a  decisive  contribution  to  Increasing  the 
effectiveness of  overal I  development  ald. 
The  Treaty on  European  Union  concluded  In  Maastricht  has  provided  a 
response  and  created  a  framework  for  such  coordinated action. 
To  make  the  change  from  the  current  gamut  of  disparate efforts  to  a  united 
approach  and  action means  going  back  to discussing  the basics- what 
lessons  can  be  learnt  from  past  experience?  What  are  the  common 
priorities?  What  objectives could  reasonably  be  attained?  What  are  the 
most  suitable means  of  action?  This  first  requires  a  general  exchange of 
Ideas  before  moving  on,  on  a  firmer  footing,  to  Identifying  common  action 
such  Is  the  aim  of  this paper. 
Its other  purpose  Is  to  hlghl lght  the  contribution which  the  Community 
could make  to  the  col lectlve  development  aid effort  by  conducting  a 
Community  development  cooperation  pol Icy  with  clear-cut  strategic targets 
capable of  providing  an  effective  response  to  the  developing  countries' 
current  difficulties. 
There  are,  however,  several  major  questions  which  have  been  left  pending or 
unanswered  In  this  paper.  It  Is  not  just  because  of  the  scale  and 
complexity of  the  Issues  at  stake.  It  was  done  deliberately:  Instead of 
providing  a  ready-made  I 1st  of  answers  and  programmes  we  hope  to  spark off 
discussions  and  Ideas.  Our  past  experience of  development  has  shown  us 
that  there  Is  no  writing on  the  wal  I  and  that  the  situations and  problems 
facing  us  are  more  unsettled  and  difficult  than  we  Imagined  even  a  few 
years  ago. --- ------~-------------------------------------
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As  a  result  we  need  to  think  long  and  hard  about  the  future,  a  task  which 
wl  I I  go  beyond  the  confines of  this document. 
To  sum  up,  the  alms  of  the  document  are  as  follows: 
-to take  stock of  the  last  thirty years of  development  and  overall 
development  aid,  In  particular  that  provided  by  the  Community  and  Its 
Member  States; 
-to review  the  changes  that  have  occurred worldwide  such  as  the  new 
challenges  resulting  from  the  global  management  of  the  International 
economic  and  ecological  system  and  Its  lmpl !cations  for  the  developing 
countries; 
-to justify,  In  the  I lght  of  the  development  track  record  and  the  new 
demands  created  by  new  forms  of  Interdependence  and  the  response  provided 
by  the  Treaty on  European  Union,  the  need  to  press  ahead withal lgnlng 
the  Member  States'  and  the  Community's  development  cooperation  pol lcles; 
- to establIsh  the  basis for  a  Community  development  cooperation  pol Icy 
which  can  serve as  a  rallying  point  for  the Member  States'  bl lateral 
policies; 
-to propose  a  methodology  for  defining  and  gradually  Implementing  a  common 
approach  to development  cooperation  based  on  the most  advantageous 
allocation of  the  roles  to be  played  by  the  Community  and  Its Member 
States. - 5  -
I .  ASSESSMENT  ANP  LESSONS  OF  THREE  PECADES  OF  DEVELOPMENT 
A.  The  situation  In  the  developing  countries 
1.  In  the  last  few  years  the  distribution of  Income  worldwide  has  become 
even  more  unequal.  There  has  been  a  sharp contrast  In  trends  In  the 
developing countries- a  group  of  countries  In  Asia  has  achieved  rapid 
growth,  which  even  speeded  up  towards  the  end  of  the  period,  despite  a  less 
favourable  International  cl lmate.  By  contrast,  there  has  been  a 
continuous,  marked  decl lne  In  growth  In  Africa.  Because of  the  slow-down 
In  growth  combined  with  continuing  population pressure,  per  capita  Incomes 
there  have  fallen sharply  In  the  last  fifteen  years.  In  Latin America, 
where  the  average  level  Is  much  higher,  decl lne  has  also set  In  following 
the  debt  crisis.  In  the  two  latter  regions  Investment  has  fallen  even  more 
than  Incomes,  unlIke  In  Asia.  Africa  Is,  however,  the only  region where 
agricultural  production  has  not  kept  pace  with  population  Increase. 
2.  The  "demographic  transition" of  the  developing  countries  to  lower 
fertll lty  rates  Is  taking  a  whl  le  to become  evident.  This  Is  particularly 
true  In  Sub-Saharan Africa  and  In  the  Maghreb  countries.  The  present  world 
population  (5.5  bl Ilion)  could  reach  8.5 bll lion  In  2025,  and  10  bl II Jon  In 
2050. 
This  rapid  growth  In  population  Is obviously exerting considerable pressure 
on  resources,  In  particular  those  available  for  "human  development"  (basic 
health  care,  primary  education,  etc.). 
2a.  Over  the  long  term,  admittedly,  all  the  social  Indicators  have  shown  a 
marked  Improvement  but  the  poor  countries  have  not  caught  up  and  these 
Indicators  have  actually worsened  In  Africa  and  Latin America  In  the  last 
ten  years.  The  proportion of  poor  people  has  fallen,  but  not  their 
absolute  number,  at  least  In  South  Asia  and  Africa.  The  distribution of 
Income,  which  Is more  even  In  Asia,  Is  extremely  uneven  In  Latin America. 
3.  The  International  cl !mate  has  had  an  adverse  effect  In  the  last  few 
years:  slow-down  In  growth  In  the  Industrial !zed  countries,  relative drop 
In  the  price of  commodities  after  the  end  of  the  Inflation period,  debt 
crisis and  reversal  of  net  financial  flows  after  ten  years  of  too  easy 
loans.  Very  generally  In  Latin  America,  but  also  In  Africa,  aval lab! I lty 
of  foreign  exchange  has  become  the  main  brake  on  growth. - 6  -
4.  Most  of  the Asian  countries  have  escaped  these difficulties by 
successfully  redirecting  their  exports  towards  manufactures  (over  70%  of 
the  total  at  the end  of  the  period).  The  same  shift  Is  being made  In  Latin 
America  whereas  It  has  scarcely begun  In  Africa.  The  Mediterranean 
countries are experiencing widely differing economic  situations;  some  are 
starting to attract  Investment  to a  significant  degree  and  others are 
having  difficulties  In  applying  economic  reforms  In  ful I. 
5.  Development  policies are also  responsible  for  these  differences.  At 
the outset  they were  virtually uniformly  directed  towards  Industrial lzatlon 
based on  the  domestic market  and  broadly  dependent  on  the state and  Its 
protection pol Icy.  They  were  then gradually diversified with either 
agriculture being given  Increasing priority,  or  the  economy  being  opened  up 
to  facl I I tate exports of  manufactured  goods. 
6.  Following  the  1982  financial  crisis a  growing  number  of  countries,  at 
the  same  time  as  having  to cut  domestic  demand,  embarked  on  a  process of 
radical  reforms  to restore macroeconomic  order  {publ lc  finances,  monetary 
pol Icy,  exchange  rates),  reduce  administrative controls and  the  role of 
publ lc sector  undertakings,  liberalize  the  price system,  particularly for 
agricultural  products,  Improve  public sector  management  and  open  up 
economies.  The  backdrop of  depression against  which  these  reforms  were 
undertaken,  pol ltlcal  opposition,  social  costs and  the difficulty  In 
changing  attitudes and  behaviour  quickly mean  that  these  pol lcles  have  not 
yet  produced  the  hoped-for  results. 
Sa.  New  environmental  challenges on  a  global  scale  (greenhouse effect  and 
cl lmate  changes,  deterioration of  the ozone  layer,  movement  and  disposal  of 
toxic waste)  have  pointed up  the  need  to take greater  account  of 
environmental  concerns  In  development  strategies.  The  developing  countries 
have  to  find  solutions  to the growing  phenomena  of  desertification,  sol I 
erosion,  declining water  resources  and  the ecological  consequences of  the 
exploitation of  tropical  forests,  particularly from  the  point  of  view of 
the  protection of  biodiversity. 
B.  The  effectiveness of  International  aid 
7.  The  overal I  volume  of Official  Development  Aid  (ODA)  has  more  or  less 
kept  pace  with  real  Income  trends  In  the  donor  countries,  at  least  with 
those  In  the  Development  Assistance Committee  (DAC)  which  provide  most:  It 
accounts  for  the  same  proportion of  GNP  In  1988  as  In  1970  (0.35%).  In 
absolute  value  and  In  real  terms,  overall  ODA  Increased  by  2.8%  per  year 
over  that  period.  This  figure must  be  set  against  a  population growth  of 
2.1%  per  annum  In  the  developing countries.  ODA,  however,  accounts  for 
only  part  of  the  resources made  available  to  the  developing  countries.  In 
addition  there  are  public or  private  loans  and  direct  Investment  by  the 
private sector. - 7  -
8.  The  aid  provided  by  the  Community  and  Its Member  States accounts  for  a 
growing  share of  total  world  ODA  (some  40%  In  1988-89).  Community  aid 
remains  firmly  focused  on  the  ACP  States and  In  particular  sub-Saharan 
Africa.  With  the  Member  States  the  Community  contributes  56%  of  total  aid 
to this  region.  This  should  be  considered  In  terms  of  the  Importance  of 
aid  for  the  region,  which  represented more  than  10%  of  Its  GNP  during  the 
period  1988-89  and  financed  over  half  Its  Investment. 
9.  However,  In  terms  of  overal I  financial  flows,  official  contrlbutl Ions 
barely offset  the  current  servicing costs of  past  private  loans.  Regional 
differences  here  are  very marked- Africa  south of  the  Sahara  and  South  and 
East  Asia  enjoy  positive net  flows  whereas  Latin America,  quantitatively 
the most  Indebted,  has  negative  flows. 
10.  An  objective evaluation of  aid  Is difficult.  On  the  plus  side  there 
Is  for  example  the  progress  achieved  In  the eradication of  major  epidemics, 
the  development  of  Infrastructure,  "productivity  leaps"  such  as  the  green 
revolution  In  South  Asia  or  the  development  of  agriculture  based on  cotton 
In  the  Sudanese  belt of  Africa  and  so on.  It  Is  none  the  less clear  that 
If  overal I  results are  compared  with  the  amount  of  financing  committed  the 
general  Impression  which  emerges  Is of  mediocre  results. 
11.  This  can  be  put  down  to a  number  of  factors.  On  the  part  of  the 
developing  countries'  governments  the  lack  of  a  clearly defined  development 
strategy,  administrative weakness  and  the  nature of  the established  regimes 
have  often been  the  cause of  Ineffectiveness.  In  addition,  these 
governments,  rather  than  coordinating  donors'  aid,  have  exploited 
competition  between  them  In  order  to  reap  the  short-term benefits. 
12.  On  the  part  of  the  International  community  there  Is  no  denying  the 
fal lure of  development  models  conceived outside  the  developing  countries, 
for  which  ODA  has  been  an  active means  of  promotion,  and  also  the often 
diverging  Interests of  donors.  The  East-West  confl let  has  been 
particularly  harmful  In  that  International  cooperation has  been  dominated 
at  least  as  much  by  a  concern  to keep  countries  In  one  or  other  camp  as  by 
a  concern  to contribute  to  their  development. 
13.  The  same  goes  for  the  aid  provided  by  the  Community  and  Its Member 
States.  From  a  Community  point  of  view,  col laboratlon  between  the 
European  Institutions and  the  Member  States on  the  design,  monitoring  and 
thrust of  their operations,  which  Is  Increasingly  seen  as  a  sine  aua  non  of 
effectiveness,  has  not  been  close enough  to give  Community  ODA  the  Image  of 
a  concerted,  consistent  and  efficient  pol Icy.  A dissipation of efforts has 
been  more  the  rule  than  the  coordination of  pol lcles. (3) 
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I I.  THE  NEW  STAKES  IN  NORTH-SOUTH  RELATIONS 
A.  The  changes  in  the  world  pol ltlcal  arena 
14.  Because of  the  col lapse of  the  Eastern  bloc  and  the  end  of  the  co!d 
war,  the  developing  countries  are  no  longer  of  geo-strateglc  interest  to 
opposing  factions.  The  unconditional  support  which  they  could  expect  from 
either  camp  no  longer  exists.  The  contribution of  ODA  donors  wi  1 I  now  be 
Increasingly  subject  to criteria  for  assessing  the efficiency of  the  aid 
granted.  This  requirement  wl  I I  become  even  more  stringent  as  aval lable 
resources  become  scarcer. 
15.  The  rut lng  el ltes of  the  developing  countries  have  been  undermined  by 
these  pol ltlcal  upheavals  and  also  by  the  pressure exerted  by  the  people 
following  the  disappearance of  the  regimes  which  had  hitherto acted  as 
guardians  and  protectors.  Here  and  there,  with  varying  degrees  of  speed 
and  ease,  democratic  systems  are  emerging  which  are  In  a  better  position  to 
accommodate  the  aspirations of  their  people  and  manage  the  economy  for  the 
common  good.  The  conditions are  thus  gradually  emerging  in  the  developing 
countries  for  more  effective cooperation  In  a  renewed  International 
framework. 
B.  New  forms  of  lnterdeoendence 
16.  The  traditional  forms  of  Interdependence which  have  for  a  long  time 
prevailed  In  North-South  relations  have  changed  considerably or  become 
weaker  In  the  last  few  years.  Thus  apart  from  losing  their  role  as  "relay 
stations"  In  the  cold war  context,  the  countries of  the  South  now  no  longer 
play  such  a  strategic  role  as  In  the  past  In  supplying  the  countries of  the 
North  with  commodities. 
17.  North-South  Interdependence  has  therefore  taken  on  other  guises  In 
which  It  has  been  particularly noticeable  In  the  last  few  years,  making  its 
importance  to  the  International  community  alI  the  more  visible. 
Competition  In  almost  alI  the  vital  sectors  for  the  economic  expansion  of 
the  countries of  both  the  North  and  the  South  now  has  a  worldwide 
structural  framework.  Similarly,  other  dimensions  of  North-South 
Interdependence  have  emerged  which  wl  I I  assume  Increasing  Importance  In  the 
next  decades,  for  example,  population  and  environment  Issues,  drugs  and 
major  endemic  diseases  such  as  AIDS.  Without  proper  management,  the  new 
forms  of  Interdependence  between  North  and  South  could  be  seen  by  developed 
countries  Increasingly  In  terms  of  risks,  and  even  be  reduced  to matters of 
security,  Instead of  being  an  opportunity  for  greater  sol ldarlty. 
18.  It  Is  therefore  Important  that  partners  In  both  the  North  and  the 
South  should  become  Increasingly  aware  that  the  North  has  to  pay  the  cost 
of  the  south's under-development  and  that  the  economic  models  obtaining  In 
the  North  weigh  heavl ly  on  the  South  and  diminish  their  prospects  of 
sustainable  development. - 9  -
C.  The  growing  Integration of  the  Community 
19.  By  completing  the  Internal  market  and  creating  economic  and  monetary 
union,  the  Community,  which  Is  already  the  developing  countries'  main 
trading  partner,  Is  significantly  changing  the  structure of  international 
economic  relations,  forcing  Its partners  Into major  adjustments  and 
enjoying  growing  Influence  In  the  world  economic  arena  and  In  particular  In 
Its  relations with  the  developing  countries. 
20.  At  Institutional  level,  Title  XVI  I  of  the Maastricht  Treaty  enshrines 
development  cooperation as  a  Community  pol Icy  which  supplements  Its Member 
States'  development  pol Icy.  The  Treaty  defines  the obJectives 
(Article  130u)  and  the methods  (Article  130v  and  Article  130x).  The 
Community  therefore  has  a  framework  and  guide I lnes  for  reviewing  and 
revamping  Its present  cooperation  pol Icy,  taking  Into  account  the  lessons 
learnt  from  the  past,  the  developing  countries'  new  International  and 
domestic situation and  the  new  forms  of  Interdependence. 
I I I.  THE  NEED  FOR  AN  INTENSIFIED  COMMUNITY  DEVELOPMENT  COOPERATION  POLICY 
A.  The  shortcomings of  the  oresent  situation 
21.  The  main  features  of  the  present  situation are  the  disperion of  the 
Member  States'  and  the  Community's  efforts and  the  existence of  three  major 
handicaps  affecting  the  Implementation of  a  truly coordinated  pol Icy:  the 
"coordination shortfal I"  between  national  and  Community  development 
cooperation policies;  the  "linkage or  cohesion shortfall"  between 
cooperation  pol lcles  and  other  Community  pol lcles or  other  aspects of  the 
Community  Integration  process;  lastly  the  fact  that  the  Community  does  not 
speak  with  a  single  voice  and  does  not  provide  the  necessary  Impetus  In 
International  forums  or  yls-a-vls other  suppl lers of  funds. 
22.  This  situation  Is  prejudicial  first of  alI  to  the  developing  countries: 
they  do  not  benefit  from  the  considerable  Impact  which  a  coordinated  pol Icy 
on  the  part  of  the  Community  and  Its Member  States could  have  and  they  are 
often  tempted  to  play  on  Internal  rivalries  In  order  to  derive  immediate 
benefit.  In  the  face  of other  International  partners,  the  developing 
countries  cannot  always  rely on  the  Community  to act  firmly  and 
unanimously. 
23.  This  situation  Is  also prejudicial  to  the  Member  States:  the  failure 
to  coordinate,  speak  with  a  single voice  and  take  Initiatives maintains 
rivalries within  the  Community,  In  some  cases  to  the  detriment  of  the 
Member  States'  own  Interests,  and  weakens  their  positions  vis-a-vis  their 
Immediate  competitors. 
24.  The  situation  Is,  lastly,  prejudicial  to  the  Community  as  such:  the 
fa I lure  to  achieve  I lnkage  and  unanimity  of  expression  and  to  provide  an 
Impetus  does  not  help  recognition of  Its  Identity on  the  world  stage. - 10-
B.  The  conseayences  of  the Maastricht  Treaty 
25.  Over  and  above  the  definition of  the objectives of  Community  pol icy, 
the  Treaty  urges  that  account  be  taken of  these objectives  "In  the  policies 
that  It  [the Community]  Implements  which  are  I lkely  to  affect  developing 
countries"  (Article  130v).  An  expl lclt  recommendation  Is  therefore made  to 
the effect  that  the  lack  of  I lnkage  should  be  remedied. 
26.  It  Is  stated  In  Article  130x(1)  that  "the Community  and  the  Member 
States shal I  coordinate  their  pol lcles on  development  cooperation  and  shal 1 
consult  each  other  on  their  aid  programmes,  Including  In  International 
organizations  and  during  International  conferences.  They  may  undertake 
joint  action.  Member  States shal I  contribute  If  necessary  to  the 
Implementation of  Community  aid  programmes."  This  provision concerns  the 
lack of  coordination. 
27.  This  same  Article  130x  (text  above)  cal Is  on  the  Community  and  Its 
Member  States  to step up  their  coordination within  International  forums, 
and  so  react  to  the  tal lure  to  speak  with  one  voice  and  provide  Impetus. 
C.  The  comparative  advantages 
28.  The  powers  attributed  to  the  Community  and  the  consequences of  economic 
and  monetary  union  show  that  new  forms  of  North-South  Interdependence 
(trade,  environment,  population,  drugs  and  AIDS)  could  not  be  dealt  with 
effectively  by  each  Member  State at  bl lateral  level.  Some  of  these 
subjects  by  their  very  nature go  beyond  the  national  context  (environment), 
In  others  the  powers  already  devolved  on  the  Community  mean  that  they  come 
within  Its sphere of  competence  (trade)  and  In  yet  other  cases  the 
consequences of  European  Integration  wl  I I  of  necessity ental I  coordination 
(e.g.  free  movement  of  persons  and  Immigration  pol Icy,  to which  the 
cooperation  pol Icy  can  make  a  contribution),  or  more  simply  the greater 
Impact  and  coordination  resulting  from  the  dovetal I log  of  the  pol lcles  and 
resources  of  the  Community  and  Its Member  States would  make  them  more 
effective.  Thought  should  be  given  to proper  appl !cation of  the  principle 
of  subsidiarity  to  each  of  these subjects. 
D.  The  forthcoming  dead I lnes 
29.  The  first  Financial  Protocol  under  the  fourth  Lome  Convention  covers 
the  period  1990-94.  The  guldel lnes  laid  down  by  the  Councl I  for 
Latin  America  and  Asia  wl  I I  expire  In  1995.  The  Mediterranean  protocols 
expire  In  1996.  From  1994  to  1996,  the  Community  wl  I I  therefore  have  to 
review,  to  an  extent  It  will  have  to  define,  Its  relatIons with  all  the 
developing  countries.  Preparations should  be  made  for  these  dead! ines  by 
defining  a  coordinated  framework  for  the  development  cooperation  pol Icy. 11  -
IV.  THE  BASIS  FOR  A COMMUNITY  DEVELOPMENT  POLICY 
A.  The  basic  principles 
30.  Like  any  other  Community  pol Icy,  the  cooperation  pol Icy  wl  I I  have  to  be 
based  on  the  fundamental  values  which  underpin  the  Community's  very 
existence:  the  promotion  of  world  peace  and  the  settlement  of  confl let 
through  dialogue,  the  development  and  consol !dation of  democracy  and  the 
constitutional  state,  and  the  observance of  human  rights  and  the 
fundamental  freedoms.  These  values  are  set  out  In  Article  130u  of 
Title  XVI  I  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty. 
31.  With  regard  to  development  cooperation  pol Icy,  as  sol ldarlty  Is  one  of 
the  values  forming  the  cornerstone of  the  Community,  It  would  be 
Inconceivable  for  It  not  to  be  exercised  as  effectively outside  as  Inside 
the  Community,  with  only  I lp  service  being  paid  to  It  beyond  the 
Community's  frontiers. 
32.  It  should  not,  however,  be  forgotten  when  promoting  these  humanistic 
values  that  the  development  cooperation  pol Icy  forms  part  of  the  more 
general  context  of  the  Community's  external  relations.  This  pol Icy 
contributes  to  the  protection of  the  Community's  Interests  by  taking  Into 
account  the  mutual  interest  of  the  parties concerned.  This  consideration 
comes  Into  play  in  the  granting of  trade  fact I ltles and  economic 
cooperation. 
33.  Lastly,  a  Community  development  cooperation  pol Icy  must  help  to  enhance 
the  Community's  presence  on  the  world  stage,  thereby  furthering  the 
recognition  of  the  Community's  Identity  by  other  countries  and  within 
International  organizations. 
B.  The  oblectlves 
34.  Within  the  I lmlts of  Its  resources,  the  development  cooperation  pol Icy 
wl  I I  endeavour  to  encourage  the  consol !dation of  democracy  In  the 
developing  countries,  within  the  framework  of  political  stability.  It  will 
also  pursue  the  objectives  Indicated  In  Article  130u(1)  of  the 
Maastricht  Treaty,  namely: 
-sustainable economic  and  social  development  of  the  developing 
countries,  and  more  especially of  the  least  advanced; 
-the gradual,  smooth  integration of  the  developing  countries  into  the 
world  economy; 
-the campaign  against  poverty  In  the  developing  countries. - 12  -
35.  The  consol !dation of  democracy  In  the  developing  countries:  reform  of 
the  state and  the  pol ltlcal  system. 
- Whl  le  democratization  remains  the  key  word,  no  real  process  can  be 
Initiated on  a  lasting  basis without  an  economic  fabric:  it  is  the 
creation of  this  fabric  which  should  be  sought  through  active support 
for  any  operation which  places  responslbl I lty on  the  shoulders of  the 
recipients  by  Involving  them  directly  In  the  management  of  the  aid 
(development  through  participation). 
-The revision of  the  pol !tical  structures must  go  hand  In  hand  with 
far-reaching  reform of  the state's administrative structures and 
resources,  to which  many  different  operations  can  contribute  (review of 
the state's tasks,  so  that  It  concentrates on  its essential  functions, 
decentral lzatlon of  the  decision-making  and  administrative machinery, 
and  an  ongoing effort  to  train  and  motivate  clvl I  servants,  etc.). 
-At  the  same  time,  support  for  the  private sector  and  decentral !zed 
cooperation  wl  I I  contribute  towards  a  stronger  economic  fabric. 
36.  Sustainable economic  and  social  development:  the  prime objective  wi  11 
to  be  rebul ld  the  economic  foundations  for  growth,  whl  le  ensuring  that 
growth  takes  a  form  compatible  with  environmental  requirements,  by 
-restoring the major  macroeconomic  balances,  through  a  stabi 1 lzation 
phase  the  length  and  cost,  particularly social  cost,  of  which  have 
often  been  underestimated; 
-then a  further-reaching operation  to  restructure  the  economic  fabric, 
the  main  component  of  which  Is  the  I iberal lzatlon of  economic 
activities,  which  must  be  achieved  In  a  coordinated way  at  domestic 
le~el.  Although  the state  Is  cal led  upon  In  this way  to  drop  Its  role 
of  direct  Investor,  It  must  not  neglect  Its  role  In  creating  the 
physical  and  regulatory  environment  which  business  needs  In  order  to 
Invest; 
-constant attention  to  the  long-term  conditions  required  for  sustainable 
development:  pol lcles on  faml  ly  planning  and  education  so  that 
population  growth  can  be  restrained,  compatlbl I lty of  economic 
development  with  the  rational  use  of  natural  resources  In  keeping  with 
the  major  environmental  balances,  and  the  development  of  human 
resources.  The  role of  long-term  programming  should  be  strengthened 
accordingly. - 13  -
37.  Integration of  the  developing  countries  In  the  world  economY 
One  of  the  essential  objectives of  the  structural  adjustment  pol lcies 
implemented  by  the  developing  countries  Is  to make  them  an  Integral 
part  of  the  world  economy,  participating  In  expanding  activity and 
trade  and  in  the  attendant  economic  and  technical  progress.  Foreign 
trade,  which  is  the  main  source of  external  financing  for  most 
developing  countries,  Is  of  crucial  importance  to  development.  Access 
to  the  industrial lzed  countries'  markets  Is  consequently  an  essential 
prerequisite  for  these  countries'  development. 
In  order  for  the  developed  countries'  markets  to  become  more  open  the 
to I I  owIng  Is  ca I I  ed  for: 
greater  competitiveness on  the  part  of  the  exporting countries, 
otherwise  the  improved  market  access  wl  I I  have  no  effect:  this  Is 
why  an  appropriate  Institutional  and  regulatory  framework  should  be 
establ lshed,  with  more  transfers of  technology  and  Intensified 
Industrial  cooperation; 
the  Community  should  give  thought  to  how  It  should  Itself  reorganize 
In  order  to open  up  more  to products  from  the  developing  countries; 
account  should  be  taken of  the  fact  that  the  developing  countries 
wl  I I  benefit  very  unevenly  from  the opening-up of  the  markets,  owing 
to  their  different  degrees of  competitiveness;  some  countries may 
even  lose  out  If  they  are  not  helped  along.  The  transition  from  the 
national  to  the  regional  dimension  may  for  many  developing  countries 
be  the  first  stage  In  the  widening  of  their  economic  area.  The 
Community  should,  on  the  basis of  Its own  experience,  continue  and 
step  up  the  Initiatives  It  has  already  taken  in  renewing  Its 
cooperation  agreements. 
38.  The  campaign  against  poverty 
A return  to growth,  the  establ lshment  of  viable  economic  structures  and 
the  Ironing-out  of  lnequal ltles are  the  three  essential  components  of 
any  strategy  to  reduce  poverty,  which  now  affects one-third of 
humanIty. 
The  reforms  advocated  can  bear  fruit  only  gradually,  in  the  long  term. 
Development  cooperation  pol Icy  must  support  targeted operations  to 
rei leve  certain  forms  of  poverty  and  to offset  the  social  costs 
resulting  from  reform  and  economic  restructuring  pol lcies.  Priority 
must  be  given  to alI  the operations which  contribute  to  human 
development,  In  particular  basic  health  care  and  education  schemes. - 14  -
V.  FOMULATION  OF  COMMUNITY  DEVELOPMENT  POLICY 
A.  Basic orlncloles 
39.  Article  130u  of  the  Treaty of Maastricht  lays  down  that  Community 
pol icy  shal I  be  "complementary  to  the  pol lcles  pursued  by  the  Member 
States".  There  Is  therefore  no  question of  simply  concentrating at 
Community  level  alI  the  means  currently  deployed  by  the  Community  and  its 
Member  States.  On  the  contrary,  the  principle of  subsidiarity must  govern 
the  analysis  undertaken  to  formulate  Community  pol Icy  and  the  choice of  the 
degree  to  which  Member  States'  bl lateral  pol lcles are  Integrated  Into  the 
coordinated  pol Icy. 
The  degree  of  Integration chosen  may  vary  In  I lne  with  the  need  to make 
good  the  three  shortfal Is  discussed earl ler  (see  point  21). 
This  analysis  wi  I I  be  supplemented  by  a  geographical  weighting  since 
differences  among  developing  countries  and  the  diversity of  the  Community's 
Interests mean  that  each  case  wl  I I  require  a  response  tal lored  to  Its 
particular  requirements. 
B.  Different  levels of  ool Icy-making 
A common  comprehensive  approach  to  development  problems  transcends  the 
confines of  development  cooperation  pol Icy  In  the strict sense  and  should 
be  seen  by  the  Community  and  Its Member  States  as  a  way  of  making  good  the 
three shortfal Is  mentioned  earl ler  regarding  coordination,  pol Icy  I lnkage 
and  the  voicing of  pol Icy. 
40.  In  Its  own  sphere of  competence  the  Community  needs  to  Improve  the 
I lnkage  between  development  pol Icy  and  the  common  policies  (e.g.  the  common 
agricultural  pol Icy,  the  common  fisheries  pol Icy  and  the  common  commercial 
pol Icy),  taking  ful I  account  of  their  beneficial  and/or  negative 
lmpl !cations  for  the  developing  countries. 
By  the  same  token,  development  cooperation  pol Icy  must  be  formulated  and 
Implemented  In  such  a  way  as  to  further  the objectives of  other  Community 
pol lcles  (environment,  security,  population movements,  etc.)  as  wei  I  as 
achieve  Its own  primary  goals  (of  combating  poverty,  above  al 1). 
such  synergy  between  Community  pol lcles may  be  generated  around  a  number  of 
specific  themes  (environment,  population movements,  AIDS,  debt,  the 
developing  countries'  Integration  Into world  markets,  etc.)  that  Involve 
Issues  that  transcend or  run  paral lei  to  the  area of  appl lcatlon,  strictly 
defined,  of  a  number  of  common  pol lcles or  bl lateral  pol lcies  pursued  by 
the  Member  States. - 15  -
The  Commission  wi  11  carry  out  a  systematic  review of  such  themes  to 
Identify  those  which  best  lend  themselves  to  such  an  approach.  The 
Commission's  proposals on  immigration offer  a  useful  i I lustratlon of  such 
an  approach.  The  Commission's  communication  on  the  matter  (SEC(91)1855) 
emphasized  the  need  for  greater  coordination of  national  and  Community 
development  pol Icy  and  Incorporation of  this  dimension  In  future 
cooperation  agreements  wherever  necessary.  It  went  on  to  Identify certain 
types  of  projects  that  could  be  promoted  under  development  cooperation 
pol Icy  to  help  resolve  Immigration  problems.1  These  proposals  contributed 
to  a  concerted  Community  approach  to  the  Issue. 
41.  In  the  context  of  Its  International  economic  relations  the  Community 
must  seek  to  remedy  Its weakness  when  It  comes  to speaking  with  a  single 
voice  and  taking  initiatives  through  a  general  approach  on  three  fronts. 
-The economy  and  International  economic  cooperation:  the  aim  here  wl  I I  be 
to  Improve  the  representation of  the  developing  countries  In  multi lateral 
Institutions and  to stimulate  world  growth.  The  Community  can  contribute 
to  the  latter  through  Its own  efforts  (single market,  EMU)  and  by 
persuading  Its  two  main  partners  (the  United States and  Japan)  to  improve 
their  budgetary  and  trade  pol icles. 
-Trade:  the  goals  here  are  to bring  the  developing  countries  Into  the  GATT 
and  to  proceed  with  trade  I lberal lzation whl  le  taking  Into  account  the 
special  situation of  the  least  developed  countries  and  the  trade 
arrangements  justified by  this situation. 
-Aid and  other  financial  flows:  the  Community's  aim  here  should  be  to 
Increase  total  ODA  flows  thanks  to greater  burden-sharing  between  the 
Industrial lzed  countries  and  to  Improve  the  qual lty of  aid  (grant  element 
and  untying). 
42.  As  regards  direct  aid  and  cooperation with  the  developing  countries, 
the  Community  has  to make  good  the  coordination  shortfal I  In  Its  relations 
with  Individual  countries  and  bl lateral  relations  between  Its  Member  States 
and  those  same  countries. 
The  Community's  relations with  developing  countries  wl  I I  cal I  for  the 
coordinated  Implementation of  existing or  (depending  on  the  case)  new 
financial  instruments,  of  which  there  are  already  a  wide  range:  trade 
preferences,  various  forms  of  aid  (humanitarian,  food,  technical,  aid  for 
projects,  programmes  and  pol lcles,  non-project  aid,  etc.),  systems  for 
compensating  losses of  export  earnings,  mutually  beneficial  economic 
cooperation,  aid  for  combating  drug  trafficking  and  environmental 
conservation. 
i  SEC(91)  1855,  points  48  and  49. (4) 
------------------·--· 
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In  this concerted  bl lateral  action  by  the  Community  and  the  Member  states 
the  pursuit  of  the  Individual  developing  country's  development  goals  must 
go  hand  In  hand  with  detal led  consideration of  specific  themes  that  may  be 
relevant  (see  point  40). 
These  Instruments  must  be  used  In  the  context  of  a  common  development 
strategy  that  can  be  adapted  to  the  conditions,  circumstances  and  needs  of 
each  developing  country or  group  of  developing  countries. 
C.  Geographic  weighting 
43.  Developing  regions  each  have  Individual  characteristics  that  justify 
the  Community's  playing  an  active  role.  In  terms  of  development 
cooperation,  however,  the  extent  to which  Community  pol Icy  has  the 
potential  to exert  real  Influence  on  development  varies  from  reg:on  to 
region.  The  degree of  Influence  Is  determined  by  the  "weight"  of  the 
Community  and  Its Member  States  in  the  aid  total  (  the  "relative mass"  of 
Community  aid)  and  the  scale of  the  aid  In  relation  to macroeconomic 
aggregates  (e.g.  GOP,  budget).  It  also  depends  on  the  recipient  country's 
capacity  to  use  the  aid  In  pursuit  of  appropriate  pol lcles. 
For  reasons  of  history,  geographical  proximity or  pol ltlcal  priority,  the 
volume  of  Community  ODA  is  uneQually  spread  amongst  the  different  regions 
of  the  world,  and  Is  I lkely  to  remain  so. 
44.  The  developing  countries'  needs  vary  according  to  their  degree of 
development.  There  are  a  number  of  Internationally  recognized 
classifications of  developmant,  based  for  the  most  part  on  economic 
criteria  (e.g.  per  caolta GNP)  and  social  Indicators.  Such  a  typology  of 
the  developing  countries,  taking  Into  account  the  considerations  discussed 
above,  can  guide  us  in  the  formulation  of  a  pol Icy  mix  suited  to  each 
country  and  region.  The  granting of  aid  should  be  subject  to  performance 
criteria so  that  the  recipient  countries are  those  that  wl  I I  draw  the 
maximum  benefit  from  lt. 
45.  The  priorities  for  each  region of  the  world  can  be  briefly summed  up  as 
fo I lows: 
Sub-Saharan Africa:  economic  restructuring,  administrative overhaul  and 
democratic  reforms  should  be  a  priority  for  Community  ald.  Such  reforms, 
however,  which  are  a  long-term  process,  wl  I I  cal I  for  a  "contractH  of  true 
partnership  between  Africa  and  the  Community. 
Other  cooperation activities must  go  hand  In  hand  with  reform  measures  to 
deal  with  Africa's  long-term  problems- food  security,  environmental 
protection,  population  growth,  development  of  human  resources  and  basic 
Infrastructure. - 17  -
Integration  Into  the  International  economy  Is  a  much  longer-term objective 
for  most  African  countries.  Development  priorities for  the  Immediate  future 
would  appear  to  be  the  stable working  of  commodity  markets  and  aid  for 
bringing  about  greater  regional  cooperation. 
Uedlterranean:  here  the major  problems  are  pol ltlcal,  environmental  and 
social  (emigration).  Aid  should  be  Increased  and  refocused on  faml  ly 
planning  programmes,  technical  assistance  for  institutions with  the  aim  of 
supporting  reform,  regional  cooperation  and  economic  cooperation. 
Latin America:  special  Importance  wl  I I  be  accorded  to  a  pol Icy  dialogue  In 
alI  appropriate  forums  and  to  Investment  promotion  and  the  private sector, 
without,  however,  neglecting  the  need  for  Increased  ODA  for  the  poorest 
countries.  In  the  present  circumstances,  commercial  and  financial  support 
for  the  economic  and  pol itlcal  reform  under  way  In  most  Latin  American 
countries  is essential  to  prevent  discouragement  and  relapse.  The  efforts 
already  made  to  help  these  countries  to  take  better  account  of 
environmental  concerns  In  their  development  strategy  (pi lot  programme  for 
the  Amazonian  forest  In  Brazl I,  for  example)  must  be  continued. 
Asia:  this continent  presents widely  contrasting situations.  The  overal 1 
objective should  be  to  boost  the  Community's  economic  presence  (exports  and 
Investment)  In  the most  dynamic  region of  the world,  whl  le  ensuring  that 
the  region's  economic  dynamism  does  not  result  In  greater  environmental 
damage.  The  means  should  be  adapted  to  the  areas  and  countries  concerned. 
The  least  developed  countries  wl  I I  continue  to  receive  development  aid of 
the  traditional  type. -----------------------· 
- 18  -
CONCLUSIONS 
The  record of  three  decades  of  development  and  development  cooperation 
reveals  that  the  role of  domestic  pol lcles  and  of  trade  and  the 
International  economic  context  (growth,  Interest  rates)  Is  essential  to  the 
(differentiated)  performance  of  the  developing  countries. 
Consequently,  the  role  of  aid  must  be  clarified and  measured  In  relative 
terms.  Aid  Is  more  important  for  some  regions  than  for  others,  and  It  is 
much  more  effective when  used  in  bl lateral  relations as  leverage  for  the 
Implementation of  good  economic  and  pol It leal  reforms  (restructuring,  good 
governance,  democratization)  and  slanted  towards  sustainable  development. 
Aid  cannot  make  up  for  a  lack  of  good  domestic  pol lcles or  commercial 
outlets. 
Pol lt!cal  dialogue  with  the  developing  countries with  a  view  to  the 
adoption of  pol ltlcal  and  economic  reforms  Is  absolutely essential. 
This  dialogue  wl  II  be  credible only  If  backed  up  by  action on  the  part  of 
the  Industrial lzed  countries,  not  simply  In  the  form  of  aid  but  also  as 
regards  trade  and  the  establishment  of  a  favourable  International  economic 
context. 
(I)  In  tr~de,  rapid  conclusion of  the  Uruguay  Round  of  negotiations  Is 
the  main  priority.  In  any  event,  the  various  commercial  policy 
Instruments  must  be  used  In  a  way  which  ties  In  with  our  pol Icy 
towards  the  developing  countries. 
(I I)  As  regards  the  general  economic  environment  (growth,  level  of 
Interest  rates),  the  Community  could  play  alI  the  more  effective  a 
role  as  It  neared  ful I  economic  and  monetary  union). - 19  -
To  conclude,  the  Community's  relations with  the  developing  countries,  a  key 
element  of  which  Is  development  cooperation,  need  to  be  reviewed  In  the 
I lght  of  the  radical  changes  taking  place on  the  International  pol ltlcal 
scene  and  considerations  such  as  the  developing  countries'  role  In  the 
world  economy,  the  need  to  harness  the  new  forms  of  Interdependence 
globally  and  effectively,  growing  European  Integration  and  the  deadl lnes 
the  Community  has  set  Itself  In  coming  years.  The  objectives of  a  common 
pol Icy  on  development  cooperation  and  the  methods  for  achieving  them  are 
set  out  in  Title  XVI  I  of  the  Treaty of Maastricht. 
The  purpose  of  this  communication  Is  to  flesh  out  these objectives  and 
methods.  On  approval  of  these  guldel lnes  by  the  Councl I  and  Part lament, 
the  Commission  wl  I I  take  appropriate steps  to  Implement  them,  In  accordance 
with  Article  130x(2)  of  Title  XVI  I  of  the  Treaty  of  Maastricht. 
Annex:  paper  on  the  Community's  relations with  the  developing  countries  In 
the  I lght  of  pol I tical  union. COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
~SEC(92) 915  final  /2  Brussels·,  16  September  1992 
CORRIGENDUM 
Traduction  de  I 'annexe  jointe 
inltialement  en  francais 
(Concerne  toutes  les  versions  I inguistiques 
sauf  francais) 
CommunI cat I  on  from  the  Comm I  ss·l on  to  the  Counc t r 
and  Par II ament 
DEVELOPUENT  COOPERATION  'POLICY  IN  THE  RUN-UP  TO  2000 
(The  Community's  relations with  the  developing 
countries  viewed  In  the  context  of  pol ltlcar  union) 
The  consequences of  the Uaastrlcht  Treaty Annex  to  the  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  and 
Parliament  on  development  cooperation  policy  in  the  run-up  to  2000. 
THE  COMMUNITY'S  RELATIONS  WITH 
THE  DEVELOPING  COUN~RIES 
VIEWED  IN  THE  CONTEXT  OF  POLIT.ICAL  UNION 
DISCUSSION  PAPER - 1  -
VT II/479/92-EN 
1.  ASSESSMENT  AND  LESSONS  OF  THREE  DECADES  OF  DEVELOPMENT 
1.1.  THE  MACROECONOMIC  BACKGROUND 
1.1.1.  OVERALL  GROWTH  OF  THE  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  some  individual 
successes  ag~inst a 
backdrop  of  ~risis. 
Since  the start  of  the  sixties, the  growth  rate ·of  third world  economies 
would  seem  at first glance  to  have  outstripped  ~hat of  the  OECD  membe~s; 
But  this  observation  needs  to be  shaded,  as  Table 1's breakdown  by  ·region 
and  by  period  shows.  The  breaks  between  the  sub~periods chosen  coincid~ 
'with  the  two  oil crises. 
Table  1  Annual  average  growth  rate of  GOP,  in  constant  dollars  1 
65-73  73-80  80-89 
OECD  members  4.7  3.0  3.0 
Developing  countries  6.5  4.7  3.8 
of  which: 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  4.8  '3.2  2.1 
Eastern  Asia  8.1  6.6  7.9 
Southern  Asia  3.6  4.2  5.1 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  6.5  5.0  1.6 
Source:  World  Bank,  World  Development  Report  1990  and  1991 
Gr.owbhiinthe  developing  countries  as  a  whole- as  indeed  iri  industrialized 
countries- slowed  down  considerably after the first oil crisis, and  failed 
to pick  up  afterwards  beca~se the  reversal  of  financial  flows  which  6ccurred 
from  1982  onwards  forced  the Third World  into austerity programmes  which 
resettet1· ·  in  lower  demand. 
The  situation has  not  been  the  same  for  all  regions  however~  There 
been  a  continuous,  marked  decline  in  the  growth  rate  in sub -Saharan 
and  Latin America;  in contrast, the  GOP  has  risen  in  eastern Asia. 
in  the sixties, southern  Asia  was  the  only  region  where  growth  was 
the  Level  of  the  industrialized  countries,  it  has  climbed  steadily 
thr~e sub-periods  we  are  Looking  at. 
has 
Africa 
While, 
well  below 
in  the 
1The  heading  "developing  countries"  used  here  includes all  those  countries 
classified as  low- or  medium-income  countries  by  the World  Bank,  i.e. those 
in the four  regions  mentioned  in  the  table  plus  the  eastern  European,  Middle 
Eastern,  and  North  African  countries •  .  ,, 
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When  population growth  is brought  into  t~e equation,  the  contrasts  which 
emerged  in Table  1 are further  heightened  (Table  2). 
Table  2  Per  capita  GNP  (in 1989  dollars) 
Annual  average  GNP/inhab. 
growth  rate 
65-73  73-80  80-89  1980  1989 
OECD  3.8  2.3  2.4  10  750  19  090 
Developing  countries  4.2  2.5  1.5  700  800 
of  which: 
Sub-Sah.  Africa  1.  7  0.6  - 1.2  380  340 
Eastern Asia  5.2  4.7  6.3  310  540 
Southern  Asia  1.2  1.9  2.9  260  320 
Latin America  4.7  2.3  - 0.5  2 000  950 
Source:  World  Bank,  World  Development  Report  1991 
Widely  differing trends  can  be  noted.  In  eastern Asia,  strong  economic  growth 
coupled  with  a  steady diminution  of  the  population growth  rate  have  resulted 
in a  significant rise in per  capita  income.  In  southern Asia  the  trend  towards 
higher  per  capita  incomes  reflects the  success of the green  revolution plus 
substantial  industrial development,  which  in this part of  the  world  has  offset 
still-rising population growth.  In Latin America  on  the other  hand,  the 
situation has  steadily worsened  during  the period analyzed.  This  is due 
rather  to the debt  crisis and  the failure of  adjustment  measures  to  cope 
with  external  forces  than  to demographic  pressures,  which  have  in fact  eased. 
In  sub-Saharan  Africa,  increasing population growth,.  combined  with  external 
forces  and  economic  policy that  has  not  dealt  adequately with  the  problem, 
have  produced  a  dramatic  fall  in per  capita  income • 
. The  trend of  per  capita  consumption  follows  the  same  curve  as  income  and 
reveals growing  poverty  in  some  parts of•the world  leading to increasing 
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1.1.2.  OVERALL  SECTORAL  TRENDS:  weak  agricultural  reco,very  and  de-indust-
- ---------------- rialization  in  the  developing  countries 
..  'To  form  a  clearer picture  of  the .situation, even  in  a  fairly brief  analysis  like  · 
·  this, it  is  important  to  point  out  the  diverging  trends  exhibited  by  the  various 
economic  sectors  (Table  3).  The  growth  i~ industrial  output  has  remained  very 
high  in  eastern  Asia  and  has  accelerated  conti'nually  in  southern  Asia,  while 
the  lack  of  investment  and  imported  inputs  h~ve put  a  brake  on  growth  in  Latin 
America  and  Africa.  The  slow-down  in  growth  that  was  a  feature  of  the  second 
. of  the  sub-periods  we  have  chosen  had  a  negative effect  on  agricultural  prod-
uction  in all the  regions  save  Latin America.  This  has  been  followed  everywhere 
by  a  period of  recovery,  particularly noticeable  in.~frica where  structural 
adjustment  has  been  specifically aimed  at  boosting this ·sector.  The  third 
sub-period  has  seen  a  significant  contraction of  the  service  sector  in  the  regions 
that :haQe  suffered  from  the  largest  drops  in per  capita  income  and  where  the 
strictest  structural  adjustment  policy  has  been  adopted. 
Table  3  Sectoral  growth  rates 
65-73  73-80  80:..89  as  % (1989) 
OECD 
Agriculture  - 2.5  1.3  3%1 
Industry  10.9  1.7  2.2  31%1 
Services  12.6  0.6  3.1  66%1 
Developing  countries 
Agriculture  3.0  2.5  3.3  19% 
.  Industry  8.3  4.9  4.5  38% 
Services  7.3  6.4  3.5  43% 
Sub-Saharan  Africa 
Agriculture  2.4  11.1  2~0  32% 
Industry  10.4  4.3  0.7  27% 
Services  3.4  4.2  2.3  41% 
Eastern  Asia 
Agriculture  3.2  2.5  5.2  24% 
Industry  12.4  9.4  10.4  44% 
Services  9.8  7.2  7.7  32% 
Southern  Asia 
Agriculture  3.1  2.2  2.9  32% 
Industry·  3.9  5.5  6~7  26% 
Services  4.0  5.3  6.3  42% 
Latin  America 
Agriculture  2.8  3.3  1.9  10%1 
Industry  7.5  5.4  1.6  37%1 
Services  7.5  5.8  1.6  53%1 
Source  :  World  Bank,  World  Development  Report  1991. 
11987. 1.1.3. 
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TRADE  :  slump  in  commodities  exp:>rts,..  continued  growth  for  manu-
factured  goods 
For  the developing  countries  as  a  whole,  exports  of  manufactures  have  grown 
noticeably  faster  than  commodity  exports.  They  have  not  been  as  vulnerable, 
either, to  fluctuating  conditions  (Table  4). 
~n eastern Asia,  industrial  exports  increased by  leaps  and  bounds  during.th~ 
first  two  sub-periods  and  then  settled down  to  a  steady  rhythm  that  still 
outpaced  that  of  any  other  geographical  area.  .·During  the  second  sub-~eriod, 
manufactures  from  southern  Asia  started. to  carve  out  a  real  portion  of  world 
markets,  and  this  they  have  managed  to  retain.  The  pattern.ofAsian  exports  is 
coming  ~ore and  more  to  resemble  that  of  the  OECD  me~bers. 
Manufactured  goods  account  for  a  smaller  share  of  Latin  American  exports, ·becau~~ 
of  the  predominance  of oil  and  minerals  in  some  countries'  exports.  During  the 
~first sub-period,  however,  they  expanded  rapidly.  This  growth  Later  subsided, 
·as  a.  reflection of  lower  industrial  output.  It is clear that  the  industrial 
base  has  been  eroded  in this part of  the  world  by  the drop  in  investments  caused 
by  hyperinflation and  the  sub-continent's  enormous  debt.  A comparison  with 
figures  for  sectoral  production  shows  that it ts  industry geared  to  the-
domestic  market  that  has  been  hardest  hit; exports  of manufactures  have  grown 
four  times  as  fast  as  industrial output  in  the third sub-period. 
·While  in  the three  regions  mentioned  above,  exports  of  manufactures  make 
a  Large  contribution to  the  favourable  growth  rate  for  total exports,  in 
~~~Saharan Africa,  they  come  nowhere  near  making  up  for  the decline  in 
commodity  exports. - 5  -
Table  4  Growth  in  and  pattern of  export.volumes 
65-73  73-80 
OECD  9.5  5.4 
Manufactures  10.6  5.2 
Commodities  5.7  6.4 
Developing  countries·  5.1  3.5 
Manufactures  10~9  13.0 
Commodities  4.0  1.2 
of  which: 
Sub-Sanaran  Africa  14.2  - 0.2 
Manufactures  5.8  9.7 
Commodities  14.7  - 0.8 
. Eastern Asia  10.6  9.4 
Manufactures  28.3'  17.1 
Commodities  8.4  5.0 
Southern Asia  - 0.2  4.5 
Manufactures  1.1  6.3 
Commodities  1.8  3.1 
· Latin  America  - 0.4  2.2 
. Manufactures  16.7  9.5 
Commod-ities  - 1.9  0.2 
11980-88 
,, 
Source  :  World  Bank,  World  Development  Report,  1991 
80-89 
3.8 
4.0 
2.6 
5.3 
7.3 
2.9 
- 1.0 
1.0 1 
- 1.2 1 
9.4 
12.8 
3.9 1 
6.1 
6.8 1 
3.0 1 
4.0 
7.0 
2.8 
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as  %'.(1989) 
81% 
19% 
53% 
47% 
11% 
. 89% 
69% 
31X 
70% 
30%. 
36% 
44% 
On  the  demand  side, it is interesting to note the effects of  the  policy of 
industrialized countries. 
The  proportion of  manufactures  imported  has  grown  more  quickly  among  members 
of  the  OECD  than  among  developing countries.  This  is a  measure  of  the growing 
industrialization of  the  latter  (as  well  as  the  result of  the  relocation of  some 
of  the OECD's  industry outside  their own  zone). 
Table  5  indicates that, as  a  purchaser,  the  US  looks  set  to  become  a  larger  and 
larger market  for  goods  from  the developing  world.  HoW~ver, from  Table  5a, it 
can  be  seen  that,  for  the developing  countries, especially  those of  the  M"edi-
terranean and  sub-Saharan  Africa,  the  European  Community  is still a  vital outlet 
for  their goods. - 6  - VIII/479/92-EN 
.·Table  5  Developing  country  exports 
· To:  us  Japan  EEC  us  Japan·.·  EEC 
USD  (1989)  billion  Annual  average  growth1 
rate 1967-89 
Total  exports 
Sub-Sah.  Africa  9.9  1.3  16.3  3.5  - 5.2  - 1.4 
Asian  NIC2  70.6  31.6  34.3  . 12.9  12.2  11.1 
·.Other  Asian  30.2  34.2  24.6.  8.6  8.1  5.3 
Latin  American  54.6  7.2  25.2  3.9  2.9  i '1.0 
,•, 
lndu~trial exports 
Sub-Sah.  Africa  0.6  0.6  4.4  3.7  - 3.9  - 1.9 
Asian  NIC2  68.9  23.6  32.9  . '13.4  16.3  12.7 
Other  Asian  23.9  11.4  17.4  11.9  10.9  9.~7 
Latin  American  29.9  3.1  8.9  10.9  9.6  4.2 
Arab  countries 3  0.5  0.7  5.7  8.2  23.1  8.6 
TOTAL  109.4  34.8  61.3  12.5  11.6  7~8 
Industrial products  as  % of  total. e:xpefts,  1989  TOTAL 
us  Japan  EEC  ·3 markets 
Sub-Sah.  Africa  6.3  44~7  27  ·20.4 
Asian  NIC  97.6  74.5  95.8  91.8 
Other  Asian  95  54.8  88  81.4 
Latin American  54  42.7  35.1  48.1 
TOTAL  82.6  59.8  72.5  74.7  ..  .  , 
TOTAL  (without  NIC)  67.7 
Source  :  CEPII  database 
IMF,  International Statistics 
1  The  annual  average  growth  rate, at  constant  1967-89  prices,  has  been  calculated 
by  least  squares  regression. 
2Korea,  Hong  Kong,  Taiwan,  Singapore.  3Includes North  Atrican  and  Middle  East  countries 
Table  Sa 
Sub-Sah. 
A  hi  ca 
51.9 
Community  share of  ex_e()rts  __ ~f ..aoods  from  these  countries  in  1989  (as  %) 
Mediterranean 
and  Middle  East 
35.3 
Southern  Asia  Eastern Asia  Latin  America 
28.7  15.6  24.1 
The  tncrease  in  the  share of  manufactured. goods  from  Asian  and  Latin  American 
'countries  is mirrored  by  a  change  in  the  pattern of  trade,  mainty  benefiting  the 
mechanical  and  electrical  sectors.  Trade  amongst  countries  of  the  South,.however, 
is still modest,  only  accounting  for'14%  of  the  total  for  Asia,  11%  for latin 
America,  and  a  mere  6%  for~ub·-Saharan Africa. - 7  - VIII/479/92-EN 
We  can  get  an  idea  of  the  terms  of  trade  by  comparing  the value  of  the developing 
countries'  exports  with  the  value  of  OECO  exports  of  manufactures,  the  latter 
providing  an  indication of  how  the value  of  the .develciping  countries'  non-energy 
imports  has  varied. 
We  are  thus  able  to  conclude  that  the  developing  countries•  terms  of  trade,  after 
improving  in  the first  sub-period,  have  declined since 1973  (excluding oil). 
The  same  is  true  for  manufactured  goods,  either because  more  rapid  market  pene-
tration  has  been  achieved  through  lower  price  increases,  or  because  a  different 
pattern  has  emerged  inside  the  heading,  to  the detriment  of  the  labour-intensive 
products  in  which  the developing  countries  specialize. 
Table  6  Value  of  exports  and  terms  of  trade 
Average  annual  growth  rates 
1965-73  1973-80  1980-88 
Value  of  developing 
countries•  exports 
Manufactures  5.8  6.8  0 
(10.9)  (13.0>  (8.0> 
Food  products  5.9  8~3  -0.5 
...  (2.5)  (4.9)  (2.3) 
Metals  and  minerals  2.7  4.(J  1.1 
(6.6)  (5.6)  (- 2.1) 
Other  re.w  materials  3.1  9.8  - 0.9 
(2.4)  (3.'1)  (1.3) 
Energy  products  9.0  29.5  - 10.3 
(5.3)  (- 0.8)  (2.5) 
Value  of  OECO  exports 
of  manufactures  4.6  10.7  2.4 
1rigures  in brackets  refer to growth  rate of. export  volumes. 
Source  World  Bank,  World  Development  Report  1991 
Note  however  that  IMF  price  indexes  would  give  slightly 
different  results. 1.1 .4.  FINANCIAL  FLOWS 
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after a  ten-year decline,  a  few  signs 
of  recovery 
Until  the  start of  the eighties,  net  financial  flows  (direct  investment, 
commercial  borrowing, official aid  and  concessionary  loans,  minus  amort-
ization and  repayments)  enabled  domestic  spending  to outstrip 
national  domestic  production. 
During  the first  period  (  1965-73),  we  see official  a~d playing  a  leading 
role, even  though  it gradually dropped  from  1.7%  to  1.2%  of  Third  World 
GOP,  with  direct  investment  playing  a  subsidiary  role  (0.5%  of  the GDP). 
The  second  sub-period  (1973-80),  during  which  petrodollars were  recycled, 
saw  a  substantial  volume  of  private  borrowing  and  hence  an  accumulation of 
debts  to  banks.  In 1982,  this borrowing  still represented 2.8%  of  these-
countries'  GDP,  but  from  1984  flows  of  this  type  were,  on  average,  in  the 
outward  direction  •  .  • 
T~~ strong growth  seen  up  until  1973  was  helped  by  gr~wth in earnings,  then 
bi increasing  recourse  to  loans  in  a  context  of  abundant  petrodollars  and 
very  low  real  interest  rates.  Latin  American  and sub-Saharan African 
countries entered the eighties in unstable  conditions  (inflation, problems 
of  public  finances,  exchange  rates  and  the  current  account)  which  made  it 
~  . particularly difficult to adapt  to the  rise in  real  interest  rates; 
the  result  was  a  slump  in  investments  and  a  return to  rates, as  a  percentage 
of  GOP,  lower  than  those  of  the sixties.  The  countries of  Asia,  especially 
of  eastern Asia,,on the other  hand~ were  able to pursue  a  more  ambitious 
investment  policy allowing  production  and  exports. to be  maintained  at  the 
same  level, or even  increased. 
Followipg\~he1982 crisis, triggered by  the  recession  in the  industrialized 
countries, the value  of  the developing  countries'  exports, which  had  shot 
up  in the seventies, dropped  oft causing  a  shortage of  foreign  exchange. 
Explained  another  way,  real  interest  rates  (nominal  rates deflated by 
prices paid  for  their exports), which  had  been  negative for  nine out  of  the 
ten previous  years,  suddenly  became  positive.  Debt  repayment  became  increas-
ingly difficult and  banks  no  longer  wished  to  lend  ~on~~-Table  7  Gross  investment 
A.  Average  annuaL  growth rate  as  % 
OECD  members 
Developing  countries 
·  of  which: 
Sub-Sah.  Africa 
Eastern  Asia 
Southern  Asia 
Latin  America 
- 9  -
65-80 
3.5 
8.2 
8.6 
11.4 
4.3 
8.1 
80-89 
4.3 
2.0 
- 3.9 
9.9 
4.1 
- 2.3 
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B.  Gross  investment  as  % of  GOP  (averages"for  t~e period) 
65-73  73-80  80-89 
Sub-Sah.  Africa  16.2  20.8  15.9 
Eastern  Asia  24.2  29.7  30.4 
Southern  Asia  17.1  19.9  22.2 
Latin America  20.7  23.9  20.0 
Source  :  World  Bank,  World  Development  Report,  1991. 
The  developing  countries  (apart  from  the Middle  East  lending ones), which  till 
then bad  been  ab(e  to pay  for  import  surplus~~ (still, in 1982,  standing at 
USD  49  billionl:Here obligedto  cut  down  on  their purchases,  with  the  result 
that  capital  expenditure was  cut.  In  recent  years, the  developing  countries  have, 
as  a  whole,  been  able  to get  rid of  their balance-of-payments deficits,. thanks  · 
to "voluntary"  loans  (as  opposed  to money  that  has  been  lent "involuntarily", when 
debtors default)  and  to transfers1 which  only  cover  two  thirds of  the  interest· 
due,  the  balance  being  made  up  from  a  surplus of  goods  and  services,  and 
by  Letting  arrears  accumulate. 
·The  result  of  this  reversal  of  financial  flows  has  been. to  make  the  countries· 
concerned  spend  less  than  they  ea~n.  This  means  that austerity has  been 
forced  on  them,  at  least  as  far  as their  relations with  the outside  world 
are  ~oncerned <on  the  domestic  level,  countries  can  always  take  refuge  in 
inflation, the  creation of  surplus  demand  and  the  transfer  of  the  burden  of 
a  reduction  in  real  resources  to other  social  groups}~\ 
The  IMF's  stabilization programmes  should  therefore be  viewed  primarily  as 
a.means  of  managing  an  inevitable austerity situation  (and  of  alleviating its· 
. effects  somewhat  by  foreign  Loans)  instead of  as  the  a·c'tual  ·cause  of  the. auster-
ity.  ·The  objective  is to bring  about  a  reduction  in .spending,  while  trying 
to minimize  some  of  the effects, e.g.  fall-off  in  production,  increased poverty, 
and  having  to  go  without  much-needed  capital purchases. - 10  - VIII/479/92-EN 
The  objective  has  not  always  been  attained,  however.  It  should  be  noted that, 
from  1990,  according  to World  Bank  projections, net flows  of  resources  to  the 
· developing  countries  would  seem  to be  improving  both  quantitatively  (net. 
flows  were  USD  116  billion in 1982,  USD  82  billion in  1986  and  USO  144  billion 
in 1990)  and  qualitatively,  in that  their  composition  is  now  closer  to what 
i~.  was  in  the  sixties and  the start of  the seventies, as  opposed  to the sit-
u~tion at  the end  of  that  decade,  when  bank  loa~s were  eicessive. 
This  improvement  is  the  result  of  an  increase  in  ODA,1  official  loans  <espec-
ially  f~om multilateral  lenders)  and  a  recovery  in 'direct  investment  from  abroad. 
This  has  steadily expanded  since 1986,  but  is still principally concentrated 
on  the  newly-industrialized countries  of  Asia  and,  more  recently,  on  a  few 
Latin American  countries. 
··Inward financial  flows  nevertheless  remain  far  below  the  requirements  of  a 
Large  number  of  countries. 
1official Development  Assistance - 11  - VIII/479/92-EN 
1.1.5.  THE  DEBT  :  a  crisis with  as  yet  no  satisfactory end  in sight 
Third  World  indebtedness  has  continued  to  rise  in  recent  years.  Although  some· 
of  th~  Largest  debtors  (Mexico,  Korea,  Chile  and  Venezuela)  have  su~ceeded 
in  reducing  theirs, the total still rose  by  more  than  USD  200  billion 
between  1986  and  1990,  by  which  time  it stood.at  USD  1  300  billion, according 
to  the  IMF  (the World  Bank  puts the  figure at  USD  1  400  bi·llion).  Part  of 
the  increase  is the  result  of  the falling  value of  the dollar  vis-~-vis the 
ecu  and  the  yen.  The  IMF  estimates that  th~ cost  of  serviting this .debt  in 
1990  was  USD  170  billion  (compared,  for  example,  with Official  Development 
Assistance  which  was  probably  below  USD  50  billion).  Debt-servicfng  costs 
··mor~ and  more  each  year,  and  the measures  to  limit  this bill  ~ave  li~tle 
practical effect.  It  is true that  worldwide, ·increases  in exports  have  done 
something  to  reduce  this  cost  <causing  it, as  a  percentage of  foreign  · 
exchange  earnings,to drop  from  22%  to 16%  between  1986  and  1990).  These  overall 
figures,  however,  mask  the  deterioration  in many  individual, or ·even  regional, 
situations.  • 
Thus,  while  the  worst  year of  the  debt  cr1s1s  in Latin America  was  1982,  when 
no  more  "voluntary"  loans  were  granted,  sub-Saharan Africa's debt  doubled 
between  1982  and  1990  <when  it was  estimated at  USD  160  billion, almost 
.  USD  55  billion of  it in private debt).  In 1982,  this part  of  the  world  was 
· able  to pay  80X  of  the debt-servicing it had  contracted .for, but  the proportion 
has  fallen  to  less  than  40%  in  the  last three years  {which  covered  almost  all 
. of  the multilateral debt-servicing,  less than  20%  of  the bilateral government 
,  debt,  and  more  than one  third of  the private debt., charges).  Rescheduling  is 
.  , mainly  aimed  at  capitalizing arrears of  interest payments  and  reimbursements; 
· .. ··inevitably,,:·.this  results  in  lower  short-term charges,  but  higher  long-term 
<commitments~  At  present, five  Afdcan countries all have  debts  that  are  twelve- · · 
~-fold greater  than the  value  of their exports  (the avetage  for  all  countrie~ in ·the 
·region is 3.5  times  their export  earnings).  In other words,  if they were  to 
.repay their debts,  almost  their entire earnings from  trade would  be  absorbed. 
·.An  extreme  case  is Sudan:  donors  are  spending  USD  800-900  million a  year mainly 
.  t~ prevent  a  part  of  its population  from  dying of  hunger;  its export  earnings,· 
of  around  USD  500  million are partly spent  on  arms  purchases to continue 
the civil war,  and  the debt,  which  has  stood at more  than  USD  13  billion 
since 1989,  is  increasing  by  over  USD  1 billion a  year,  through  capitalization 
of  the  unpaid  interest.  Other  cases,  though  less dramatic,  are equally 
·disturbing. 
In  1989,  the  countries ofsub,-Saharan Africa actually paid more  than 
USD  7· billion  in  interest.  The  concessionary part of  the  bilaterally-contracted 
off~cial debt  {unlike  the multilateral debt)  has  dropped  from  50%  in 1986 
to 41X  in 1990,  under  the  effect of  rescheduling,  which  has  converted 
previously  subsidized  interest  into unsubsidized  capital, i.e. debt  cancellation 
has  only  been  carried out  in  respect  of  loans  on  special  terms. · Although 
·creditors are  beginning  to  tackle this problem  with  rather more  common  sense, .there 
is still little change.  The  World  Bank  has  calculated, for  · 
·example,  that  the  average  terms  of  the Toronto  Agreement  will  reduce  sub-
~saharan Africa's  annual  charges  by  a  mere  USO  300  million  ~nd its total debt 
·by  USD  2  bi l.l ion  {and  then  only  by  the year 2000).  Such  figures  pale  into 
insi~nificance by  the  side of  those  me~tioned  above. - 12  - VI II .4  79/92-EN 
In  North  Africa,  the most  serious  case  was  Egypt,  where  the  repatriated earnings 
of. migrant  workers  (many  of  them  in  the Gulf)  represented  almost  twice  as  m'uch 
as  earnings  from  the export  of  goods,  while  ~he USD  49  billion debt  was  more 
than  seven  times  these earnings.  This  case  has  now  largely  been  settled,  but 
for  sub-Saharan  Africa,  effect~ve measures  still have  to  be  taken.  Th~ OK's 
·proposals  CTr:inidad  conditions  ...  Sept~mb~r.199'J)  have  nnt  yet  been.a<;lopted. 
Since  1988;.  the  World  Bank  has,been applying  interest-rate subsidies  on 
money  owed  tp it by  certain borrowers,  but  similar measures  have  not  been 
. b~ought  into play  by  the African  Development  Bank  or  for  Arab  Funds.  The  World 
Bank  aiso set  up  a  spe~ial fund  for  buying  up  commercial  debts  in 1989,  but 
up  until  July 1991,  the only  time  the  fund  has  been  osed  has  been  in  the  case 
of  Niger,  where  a  debt  of  a  little over  USD  100  million was  repurchased  at 
18%  of  its nominal  value.  This  type of  debt  (considered  as  the most  onerous) 
is thought  to amount  to  USD  55  billion for sub-Sahar•n  Africa.  The  examples  given 
sugg~st that  forms  of  effective action do  exist, but  that  the  problem  is first 
and  foremost  one  of  political  will  on  the  part of  creditor ·countries. 
1.2.  SOCIAL  TRENDS  ..._ _________ _  overall progress,  b~t·with m~ny situations 
where  extreme  poverty sti(l persists 
The  effects of  development  cooperation  policies on  people's well-being  cannot 
be  assessed solely by  means  of  economic  indicators.  Since  such  well-being 
is the  ultimate  goal  of  development, it would  seeni  vital, in order  to measure 
the effects of  cooperation policy in this period, to take  account  of  trends 
in social  indicators. 
T~e social  parameters  set  out  in Table  8  show  general'progress for all  the 
developing  countries  and  all the indicators.·  life ex~~ctancy, for  example, 
has  risen from  '•6  years  in 1960  to 63  years  today,·'while  infant mortality has 
fallen  from  233  to 116  for  1  000  live births;  the  literacy rate of  the adult 
-population has  1ncreased from  46%  to 60%,  and  schooling  for  young ·people  from 
·55%  in  1970  to ;·ox  in 1987.  · - 13  - VIII/479/92-EN 
Despite these  indications  of  progress,  the  table  shows  some  very  sharp 
contrasts.  Substantial  gaps  remain  between  ~eveloping and  industrialized 
countries •.  Poverty  rates  have  worsened  during  ~he past  decade  and  there 
is  a  tendency  for  situations of  inequality· to  become  entrenched. 
Table 8  Indicators of  human  development 
Industr.  . D.cs.  S-S  A.  Eastern  Southern  Latin 
countries  Asia  . Asia  America 
Life expectancy 
at birth* 
1960 
1990 
Daily  calorie 
intake1  * 
1965 
1985 
Infant  mortality 
per  thousand* 
1960 
1989 
% of  popln.  with 
access  to health  care 
X of  popln.  with 
drinking water access 
1975 
85-87 
% of  popln.with 
access  to sanitation 
Enrolment  in 
primary/secondary 
schools  (%)* 
1970 
1987 
Adult  literacy 
(%  of  over-15s) 
1970 
1985 
% of  popln.  below 
the poverty  line2  ** 
1985 
1  as % of  normal  intake. 
69 
74 
114 
132 
45 
18 
46 
63 
90 
107 
233 
116 
61 
35 
55 
32 
55 
70 
43 
60 
33 
40 
52 
92 
91 
284 
179 
45 
24 
37 
26 
45 
26 
48 
47 
2  . 
the  poverty  line  is  fixed  at  USD  370  per  c~pita~ 
47 
68 
86 
112 
198 
57 
75 
48 
51 
.65 
81 
67 
71 
20 
44 
58 
88 
100 
279 
151 
56 
32 
54 
11 
45 
60 
31 
41 
51 
56 
67 
100 
115 
157 
72 
61 
58 
73 
60 
68 
84 
72 
83 
19  -
Sources  Without  asterisk,  UNDP  Human  Development  Report  1990 
* - UNDP  Human  Development  Report  1991 · 
**  - World  Bank,  world  development  Report  1990 - 14  - · VIII/479/92-EN 
1.2.1.  POVERTY  AND  UNEQUAL  DISTRIBUTION:OF  INCOME 
According  to the World  Bank  report  on  th~ subject,  there  were  more  than 
1.1  billion people  in  the world  living  below  the poverty  line  i~ 1985. 
By  tar the greatest  proportion  of  them  live  in  southern  and  eastern  Asia 
(800  million altogether, of  which  420  million  were  in  India,  210  million 
were  in  China  and  60  million in Bangladesh).  The  n~mber of  poor  in  sub-Saha-
ran  Africa  was  180  million,  representing  47%  of  the population- a  percentage 
almost  as  high  as  the  55%  in  India  and  Bangladesh,  but  against  a  background 
of  even  less  favourable  social  indicators.  In  Latin America  (including 
the  C~ribbean), numbers  and  proportions  are  much  lower  (70  million below 
the  poverty  line, i.e.  19%  of  the  population)  and  other  indicators are  also 
better. 
In  all  the  countries  for  which  data  ~xist~, poverty  is essentially 
a  ~ural phenomenon.  It is particularly striking  in Africa  - in  CBte  ~·Ivoire, 
for .example,  the  incidence  is  9%  in the  towns  and  44%  in  rural areas.  But 
pockets  of  urban  poverty are  becoming  more  and  more  common. 
It would  be  a  long  and  difficult exercise to identify the whole  set of 
factors  responsible  for  causing  such  a  Large  proportion  of  humanity  to  live 
in a  state of  poverty  and  remain  there.  Chief  among 'them,  undoubtedly,  is 
access  to  land.  We  find,  in Bangladesh  for  example, that  93%  of  the  rural 
population  with  less  than 0.2  ha  are  poor,  whereas  th~ proportion drops 
to  10%  for  those  Lucky  enough  to  own  more  than  3  h~.'·  In  India,  water  and 
land  are equally decisive;  the  eastern  states  (Bihar  and  Orissa)  have  50% 
more  poor  people  than  the  average,  while .in the  irrigated Punjab,  where 
the  green  revolution was  focused,  the  proportion  is only  40%  of  the average. 
Other  factors  also affect the  issue:  families  headed  by  a  woman  or by 
someone  illiterate are  also  poorer  than  average. 
Up  until  the  eighties,  long-term  trends,  wherever  such  figures are available, 
indicated a  significant decrease  in the  proportion of  poor  people,  usually 
accompanied  by  a  drop  in absolute  numbers1  except'for  India,  where  the 
total hardly  changed  until 1983.  · 
Generally speaking,  economic  growth  has .been  the  main  agent  in  reducing . 
poverty.  The  spectacular  progress  registered  in  the Asian  countries  with 
rapid  growth,  like  Indonesia  (where  the .incidence of  poverty fell  from  58% 
to  17%  of  the  population between  1970  and  1987), Malaysia,  Thailand  and 
Pakistan,  provides  the  proof  of  its prime  importance.  In  Latin  America 
a~ well,  the  period of  rapid  growth  produced  similar results; Brazil  for 
example  saw  its poverty  rate fall  from  50%  to  19%  between  1960  and  1981, 
but  under  the  recession  the  proportion has·now  climbed  back  to  24%.  Other 
than  where  income  shares  have  become  very  unequal  (though  Table  9  shows 
that this is the exception), growth  benefits the entire population,  despite 
the  continuino existence of  oockets  of  oovertv. - 15  - VIII/479/92-EN 
Inversely,  the  recession  which  followed  in  the  eightiei, in Africa, latin 
America  and  s6me  of  the  eastern  European  countries,  had  ah  adverse  effect 
on  the  poorest·sectors  of  society.  The  shrinking  job  ~arket often resulted- .• 
both  in  the  rural  and  urban  context  - in a  fa~ in  real  wages  (particularly 
in  the  informal  sector,  where  there  is  little protection against  inflation). 
In  Africa,  the  poorest  group  in  subsistence  farming  was  protected,  but  the 
·slump  in  export  prices  for  produce  pushed  a  number  of  small-holders  below 
the poverty  th~eshold.  In  Brazil, the  most  serious  case  of all, the 
absolute  number  of.poor  people  climbed  from  23  to  33  million between  1981 
a~d 1987.  Ce~tain elements  of  structural  adjustment  programmes  Like  the 
.reduction  in  public  spending  have  had  adverse  effects on  the  poorest  sections  in 
some  countries;  however,  here  it is mainly  the  middle  classes  who  have  suffered. 
most.  But  other  elements  of  these  programmes,  like  d~~aluation and  re-balancing 
the  terms  of  trade  in  favour  of  agriculture,  have,  on  the  other  hand, 
generally  had  a  good  effect. 
It must  be  added  that  international aid overall  has  not  been  very  effective 
.in  reducing  poverty:  this  is the  conclusion of  the  DAC  study  on  development· 
c'ooperation  as  a  whole  for  the period 1960-85.  Firstly,  in  1988-89, · 
onl-y  60%  of  the  aid  to  developing  countries  went  to  the  41  countries  in 
the  low-income  category.  And  among  these,  the aid  was  hot  always  put  to 
good  use:  in Africa, for  example,  the  largest  amounts  of  aid  in the  last 
10  years  have  gone  to three  countries  .(Sudan,  Tanzani~ and  Zaire)~ 
where  no  progress  has  been  made,  while  othe~ ~ouh~rie~ have  falle~ 
in~o a  state of  dependency  on  aid  which  has  m~rely ~ushed recovery  furthet 
into  the  future.  However,  whereas  programmes  in the  seventies  concent~ated 
on  poverty,  in the eighties, effectiveness  has  now  come. into focus.  This 
new  awareness  of  what  is needed  has  not  yet  been  reflected  in  the  figures 
so  far  available.  .. 
The  phenomenon  of  poverty  cannot  however  be  grasped  or. addressed  correctly 
unless  it is viewed  in  the  context  of  persistent  in~qualities within 
particular  countries. 
Some  of  the statistics on  well-being  are  more  revelatory  of  the  progress 
made  ~n those  sectors of  society which  have  been  clos~ly studied  (e.g.  urban 
eLites>  and  may  therefore  paint  an  over-optimistic picture of  the situation. - 16  - VIII/479/92-EN 
One  important  gauge  of  inequality is  income  distribution.  Unfortunately, 
information  about  this  is very  limited  and  often out·  of  date.  The  following 
table  gives three  indexes,  at  two  different dates,  when  data  has  been  available 
(i)  poverty  measured  by  the  proportion  of  national  income  going  to  the 
poorest  40%  of  the  population; 
(ii)  income  concentration,  measured  by  the  share  going  to  the  richest  10%; 
(iii)  inequality, expressed  as  the  ratio  of  the shares  going  to the top and 
bottom  20%.-
These  three  indicators are  obviously  closely correlated,  but  not  entirely  • 
. For  purposes  of  comparison,  the  figures  for  Japan,  the  US  and  Germany  have 
·.been  included. 
Table 9  also shows  per  capita  income,  calculated in  terms  of  parity  of  . 
purchasing PGwer in dollars  in 1989.  These  figures  combined  with  those  of 
the first  inde:xc  <share  of  income  of  the  bottom  40%),  give  a  rough  measure 
of  the  average  income  of  the  poorest  classes. 
The  fairest distribution in  general  occurs  in  Asia •. This  is the only 
place  where  the poorest  40%  receive  20%  of  the  income  and  where  the 
inequa~ity coefficient  Cas  expressed)  is usually  lo~er then  10.  Latin 
America  is the  region  where  the greatest  inequality exists.  It may  also 
be  noted that, for eight  of  the 10  countries where  surveys  conducted  in 
the  seventies and  again  in  the  eighties  are  both  available,  a  slight 
improvement  in  income  distribution  is observable. - 17  - VIII/479/92-EN 
.Table  9  Indicators  of  income  distribution 
Shares 
----------------------
01. re 1  Bottom I  Top 
----------------------
4(j/.  1 .  1(jf. 
----------------------
I  1 
--·-------·~--- ----------------------
BANGlADESH  73  1  18.2o 1  27.<o 
INDIA  75  I  16.20 I  13.60 
--------------- ----------------------
PAKISTAN  I 
. SRI  lANKA  69  19.20  I  28.20 
--------------- ----------------------
I~SIA  76  I  1(.(0 I  34.00 
--------------- ----------------------
PHiliPPINES  70  I  14.20  I  38.50 
THAILAND~  76  t5.2o 1 34.1o 
'KOREA  76  1  16.90 1  27.5o 
----------------------
f1.11.1..AYSIA  711  11.2o 1  39 .8o 
---------------------
TAIUAN  11  1  21 .9o 1  24.70 
----------------------
1101/C  KONG  1  I 
---------------------- 1 
kENYA  76  1  8.90 1 45.80 
---------------------- GIIANA  1 
C.A.  REP.  75  t6.2o 1 33.60 
ZN-'BIA  T6  10.80 I  46.40 
COTE  D  'IWIRE  I  I 
---------------------- 1  I 
----------------------
·IOTWANA  1 
I 
----------------------
El  SALVADOR  76  1  15.5o 1  29.5o 
20"1. 
6. to 
7>10 
5.80 
7.50 
10.40 
8.90 
7.90 
16.00 
(.50 
23.20 
7.10 
111.00 
8.60 
DATE 
85 
83 
84 
85 
87 
85 
87 
80 
82 
7 
87  ____ , 
8S 
GUATEMALA  80 
·PERU  12  I  7.oo  I  <2.90· 
--------------- ----------------------
MEXICO  n  I  9.90 I  40.60 
COSTA  RICA 
3RAZIL 
·~IIIDr-··· 
11  1  1z.oo 1  39.5o 
----------------------
72  1  1.oo  1  5o.60 
1o  14.1o  1  35.2o 
VENEZUElA  70  I  10.30  I .35.70 
--------------- ----------------------
PANAMA  70  I  7.20 I  ~4.20 
C<l.Q"BIA 
JAPAN  I 
--------------·-------
USA  1 
fRG ..........  . 
32.10  85 
19.90 
16.60 
33.30 
11.40 
18.00  87 
30.90 
88 
79 
65 
&;~:~j--;-~--~T~-211i. 
---------------- -------
-~·  ...  !.~~~--JNffiii 
I  I  20% 
3.70 
2o.<o 1 26.70  1  s.1o 
----------------
19.00 t  31.3o i  s.8o 
----------------
13.30 1  43.ao  I  11.10 
----------------
21.20 1 26.5o 1  4.70 
1s.2o 1 12.10 1  11.70 
I 
.................................. 
I 
13.9o I ·· 34.ao  I 
t6.2o I .  11.10 I 
-~~:~_!  __  ~:~~-~ 
I 
---------------·· I 
I 
11.10 
8.70 
9.60 
. 6.90 
---------------- ---~--- 1 
-~----- u.oo  I  36.3o 1  10.50 
----------------- -------· 
11.50 1 46.70 I  15.10 
---------------- 9.00 1 42.80 I  23.60 
---------------- 1  ' 
------------~--- 1 
t4.  10  1 ·  4o.so 1  1o.oo 
12.90 1 1s.8o  11.80 
16.50 
8.10  f. '46.20  26.10 
. I 
n.9  1  3t..z  10.60 
1z.1o  1 n.1o  13.30 
Iricome., 
p.c  •.  ,., 
s.  1989 
960.00 
980.00 
1700.00 
2160.00 
22110.00 
4190.00 
6120.00 
1070.00 
t7oo.oo 
6030.00 
!390.00 
21.90  1  22.4o  4.Jn 1 
19.50 1  zJ.4o 
15.7o 1  25.oo  ..  ~:~~-1 
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1.3.  THE  INDUSTRIALIZED  COUNTR!ES~  SUPPORT  FOR  COOPERATION  POLICY 
1.3.1.  AID  STATISTICS  :  increased  ODA  and  unaltered  uses 
Offical  development  aid  combined  with  direct  investment  now  accounts  for 
80%  of  all  inward  flows  of  money  to  the developing  world,  whereas  in  1980, 
this figures  was  45%  (see  Chart  1).  ~hese ,forms  of  finance  now  pre-
dominate,  owing  to  the  collapse of  bank  Lending  from  1981  on. 
Chart  1  Total  net financial  flows·  f~om all  source~, 
by  type,  1980-89  ' 
(at  1988  prices and  exchange  rates) 
USD  bil  ljon 
iN  ~----------------------------------~-------------
Total net  inward  flaws 
.  privat~ transfers - 19- VIII/479/92-£N 
The  total  volume  of  Official  Development  Assistance  CODA)  has  more  or 
Less  followed  the  trend  of  donor  countries'  real  income,  at  Least  as  far  as 
members  of  the  Development  Assistance  Committee  (DAC),  who  provide  most  of 
the  aid,  are  concerned.  It  represented  the  same  proportion of  their  GNP 
in  1988  as  in  1970  (0.35%).  The  GOP  of  DAC  memb~rs  h~s  increased  by  an 
average  of  3.1%  over  the  same  period.  Other  suppliers  of  funds  have  not 
kept  in  Line,  however  (in  particu(ar, aid  from  the  Arab  cou~tries, the 
most  generous  donors  while  the  price of  oiL  was  high,  has  dropped  off 
drastically since 1986>.  Total aid,  in fact,  has  only  increased  by 
2.8%  a  year  in  real  terms.  As  the  population  of  the  developing  countries  has 
been  increasing at  just  over  2.1%  a  year,  the  real 'increase  in  ODA 
per  capita, overall,  has  actually  been  considerably  less  than  1%. 
Looking  at  sub-Saharan  Africa  in particular,  we  see  that  total  ODA.has 
also  increased  by  3.1%  a  year  in  real  terms,  but  this falls  slightly 
short  of  population  growth.  The  proportion  of  grants. from  the  DAC  countries 
has  risen,  but  this  has  been  offset  by  the  drop  in  other  contributions. 
There  have  been  major  changes  in the distribution pattern of. DAC  members• 
contributions;  the  US  is  no  longer  as  prominent  a  funder,  while  Japan,-
the  Scandinavian  countries  and  the  EEC  Member  States are all providing 
more. 
Table  10  Breakdown  of  ODA  by  groups  of.  country  Cas  % of  total) 
USA 
EEC(of  12) 
Japan 
Scandinfvian  countries 
Others 
TOTAL 
TOTAL  (USD  billion)2 
Source  :  DAC  Report,  1990 
1970-71 
24.8 
35.1 . 
9.1 
2.0 
29.0 
100 
33.3' 
1988-89 
15.9 
41.0 
16 •  .9 
6.0 
20.2 
100 
55.0 
It may  be  noted  that  almost  30%  of  DAC  members•  aid  ~s applied  via 
multilateral organizations,  with  a  little over  5%  ~hannelled through 
the  EEC.  It  is  clear  that  ODA  is  given  for  a  variety of  motives  - . 
commercial,  political and  cultural -in addition  to  those  that  are directly 
linked  to development. 
1  '  .  Including  the  Arab  countries,  the  USSR,  etc. 
2At  1988  prices  and  exchange  rates.  The  country  figures  include their 
contributions  to multilateral  bodies. Table  11 
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ODA  of  EEC  Member  States 1988-89 
(net  disbursements)  1989  and  1990 
EEC  plus  Member  States'  own  contrib~t~ons 
USD  '000 OOO(a);  as  % of  donors'  GNP(b) 
VIli/479/92-EN 
---~-----------------------------------~------------------------------------------- .  . 
B  DK  DE  FR*  IRL  IT  NL  UK  ESP  GR  POR  LUX  Total  of  w_hi!:h 
EEC-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
(~)  1989  703  937  4949  7450  49  3613  2097  2587  537  38  107  18  23.085  2809 
(b)  % 0.46  0.94  0.41  0.78  0.42  0.31  0.94  0.14  0.14  0.07  0.24  0.29 
{a)  1990  891  1111  6320  9381  57  3395  2592  2647  959  148  25  3237 
(b)  \  0.45  0.93  0.42  0.79  0.16 0.32  0.94  0.27  0.~  0.25  0.28 
--------------------------------------------~----------------~---------------------
*  lncl\J~~s  .Q~T 
· ·  ·: · Onava.-; labW 
Taken  altogether,  the  EEC  Member  States  (and  Denmark  and  the  Netherlands 
in particular)  donate  more  than  the other  DAC  members.  The  multilateral 
component  of  their aid  volume  is higher  than  the  average  (especially if 
France's aid  to its OCT  is excluded)  and  technical  cooperation constitutes 
a  much  bigger element  (especially  in the field.of  education,  where  cultur~l 
interests play  a  particularly  large  role  in  French  cooperation>.  Countries. 
with  previous  colonial  links direct  their aid  predominantly  in this dir-. 
ection, but  for  the  past  20  years  there has  been  a  fairly  general  tendency 
towards  enlarging the  range  of  beneficiaries, without  necessarily neglecting 
the  pre-existing special  relationship.  The  result  of  this is that  the 
bilateral aid of  Belgium,  France,  Italy and  the  UK  is concentrated  heavily. 
on  sub-Saharan  Africa.  This  region also  receives  the  bulk  of  aid.from 
Denmark,  which  pays  great  attention t6 the  poo~est  countries~· 
The  NGOs  play  an  important  role  in Germany,  Ireland  and  the  Netherlands. 
These  countries  seek  to  inform  the  public  that  aid  should  be  of  a  dis-
interested nature;  they  often provide  an  effective  channel  for  distributing 
funds  which  they  collect of  with  which  their  go~ernments entrust  them. 
The  use  made  of  aid  is  fairly  unchangi'ng,  geriera,lly  speaking.  However, 
there has  been  a  slight  fall-off  in  the Member.States'  technical  coop-
eration,  which  used  to  be  heavily  funded  (especially  in  the  field  of 
education,  where  cultural  interests play  a  more  than  average  role).  We 
see  therefore that  in  1970  still, France  and  the  United  Kingdom  between 
them  sent  more  than  55  000  aid  workers  (out  of  a  total  of  some  100  000) · 
into  the  field  in this 5ector alone.  This  figure  has  now  dropped  to 
15  000  (out  of  80  000).  There  has  also been  diversification  in 
Third World  students'  destinations. ·Table  12 
·--..:. ............  _:_ _____ _ 
USD  '000  000 
Education 
Health  and  popln. 
othe·r  social 
Transport 
Energy  and  other 
Agriculture 
Inc;!ustry 
Services 
M..Jl t i sectoraL 
'Progranmed  aid 
Debt 
Elrerg.  food  aid 
Private or non-spec. 
------------·--
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Use  of  ODA  by  sector 1989 
(USD  '000  000  and  as  %) 
-·--------
____ ,. ____ 
---------
...................... 
1"12!!ber  EEC  Total  EEC  Other 
~t~t~L-- --------- --------- 0~~-------
15351  3324  18675  18846 
15.3  7.8  13.9  7.0 
6.0  5.3  5.9  7.2 
10.4  2.6  9.0  6.6 
13.8  17.3  14.4  10.0 
8.0  7.0  7.9  6.9 
11.5  32.7  15.3  11.1 
6.8  1.4  5.8  4.4 
1.5  0.9  1.4  2.0 
4.2  3.5  1.3 
8.1  17.8  9.8  15.9 
1.2  1.0  1.9 
2.9  7.2  3.7  11.2 
10.3  8.4  14.3 
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.. .................. 
AlP 
-··------
4923 
4.2 
6.0 
8.0 
13.4 
18.9 
24.0 
8.2 
5.9 
1.5 
0.9 
... ................. 
IJ'J 
---------
4281 
2.5 
24.8 
7.1 
4.0 
1.9 
27.9 
3.8 
1.1 
11.1 
15.8 
.. ............ ___ 
TOTAL 
...... _______ 
.  ' 
46725 
9.1 
8.2· 
7.8 
'"l 
11.6 
8.1 
15.7 
5.3 
2.1 
1.9 
11.4 ' 
1.2 
7.0 
10.7 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100~0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------~--
OECD,  DAC's  report  for  1990,  Tables  28,  29  and  52 
Notes: 
1.  Totals  cover  grants  and  loans  on  special  terms.  For  the  latter, figures 
refer to  commitments  (not  disbursements). 
z~  Greece,  Luxembourg,  Portugal  and  Sp~iri have  not  been  included  among:the 
EEC  Member  States, si nee  breakdowns  for  them·  are  not  available.  · 
3.  For  EEC  Member  States and  other  countries, bilateral aid only  is  included. 
Table  12  also  reveals  that  the  ODA  of  the  EEC  combined  with  its Member 
States differs  Little  in  its thrust  from  that  ~~ the  OAC  members'  aid as 
a  whole. 
The  Community's  share of  total  world  aid  and  of its Member  States'~aid is. 
expanding.  It  remains  highly  concentrated· on  the  ACP  countries,  especially 
those  in  sub-Saharan Africa, to which  the  EEC  is  the  second  largest  donor 
(after  French  bilateral aid). 
Official  development  aid,  it must  be  stressed,  represents  only  part  of  the· 
resources  made  available  to  the  developing  world.  · 
The  IBRD  and  the  regional  banks  Lend  money  borrowed·from  the  capital ma~ket. 
States  (or  specialized public  bodies)  cancel  debts, offer official  Loans 
and  guarantee  export  credits,while the  private sector  provides  bank  loans, 
direct  investment  and  donations  via  the  NGOs.  In  addition,  many  operations 
are  combinations  of  the  above,  involving  a  miitu~e of  grants,  and  loans  on  · 
special  terms  or  at  market  rates  (Largely  used  for  export  promotion). Tabi.e  13 
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Financial  flows  (in billions of  current  dollars) 
Official aid 
Bilateral 
Multilateral 
Other  official  inflows 
Bilateral 
Mul H lateral 
Export  credits 
Direct  investment 
Private  loans  (banks  and  other) 
NGO  donations 
Total 
(in billions of  1987  dollars) 
Interest  and  dividends 
paid  by  the  d.cs. 
IMF  loans 
Net  financial  transfers 
1980 
30.0 ' 
7.8 
3.0 
4.8 
1.6. s 
11.2 
'52.6 
2.4 
128.3 
(169.4) 
- 63  .• 6 
2.6 
67.3 
Source  :  OECD,  DAC's  report, 1990 
1989 
40.5 
12.6 
9.0 
6.9 
1.2 
22.0 
14.0 
4.2 
110.4 
(103.0) 
- 107.7 
- 3~2 
- 0.5 ' 
Table  13  shows  the  trend  of  net  totals after deduction of  amor~ization and 
repayments. 
.:  : 
,•  ..  ,-. 
The  collapse  of  private  lending  may  be  noted.  On  the  othe~ hand,  direct  invest-
m~nts, which  plun~ed similarly up  until  1985,  have  since  recovered  strongLy; 
mainly  because  of  Japanese  operations  in eastern Asia.  The  result of·these. 
trends  is  that  ODA  now  represents  a  larger share·of  net  inflows,  rising  from, 
29.5%  in 1980  to  48.1%  in  1989.  The  other  category  which  h~s expanded  rap~dly 
is multilateral  lending;  here,  the  mairi  agent  is the World  Bank,  through  the 
co-financing  it has  arra-nged·  (totalling  USD  13  billion  in  1989/90)  for 
operations  that it steers and  manages. 
It  remains  true, however,  that  in  terms  of  overall  financial  flows,_ official 
contributions  scarcely  cover  the  current  costs  of  past  private  borrowing. 
Regional  differences  in this connection  are striking:  sub-Saharan Africa  and 
southern  Asia  enjoy  net  inward  flows,  while  Latin  America,  the  region  with 
the  highest  volume  of  debt,  and  eastern Asia,  are  experiencing  out~ard  flows~ 
TOTAL  ODA  RECEIVED 
(net  disbursements  in 1989) 
Sub~Saharan Africa 
13.148 
'1~:!i te  rranean 
4.195 
5.83 
latin America 
3.094 
Eastern  Asia 
5.833 
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The  Development  Assistance  Committee  has  also  done  a  breakdown  of  ODA  by 
region  and  by  donor,  for  1987-88. 
Table  15  Regional  breakdown  of  ODA  1988-89 
(in  % for  each  donor,  by  destination) 
Stb-Si$aran  N.:'\fric~  .Southern  Other·  L:itin America 
Africa  .and  Middle  Asia  Asian  and Caritbean 
East 
Bilateral: 
DAC,  total  33.1  16.4  14.3  22.2  14.0 
EEC  Member  States  44.8 
Mul.ti lateral: 
EEC  63.2  8.2  10.4  6.7  11.6 
UNDP  etc.  42.6  10.3  19.3  15.8  12.1 
I.F.I.1  37.0  1.7  38.1  14.0  9.2 
Other  13.6  22.0  10.0  41.9  12.6 
Total  2  34.2  14.3  16.8  21.6  13.1 
Source  :  OECD,  DAC's  report  1990 
Compared  with  other donors,  the.EEC  obviously  conc~ntrates more  of  its  ~id 
on  Africa,  but  a  fairly  large  proportion  goes  to other  regions,  especially 
in  the Mediterranean  area  (Egypt). 
TOTAL  ODA  RECEIVED 
(Net  payments,  USD/inhabitant) 
..........................  _.~  ..................  ~"':··.· . 
• • • • • • • ; -.-.-.. ---••  ·.-•  .  .a;....-,  ••. -·· 
:!..:. 
S-S·A  Medit.  S.Asia ~~A~fi'  L.A.· 
(S-S  A =  Sub-Saharan Africa;  Medit  ~ Mediter~anean; S.Asia  = Southern  Asia; 
E.Asia =  Eastern  Asia;  L.A.  =  Latin  America.) 
1nternational  Fi~ancing  instituti~~s - AID  and  special  loan  windows 
of  regional  banks. 
2The  socialist  countries  included  in  the  total  bring  down  Africa's proport-
ion  but  boost  the  eastern  Asia  total  (Vietnam,  N.Korea,  Monqolia). - 24  - ·  VIII/479/92-EN 
Table  16  Breakdown  of  aid,  as  % of  recipients'  GNP 
1980;_81  1988-89 
All  developing  countries  1.2·.  1.3  .. ·  of  which: 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  4.2  11.2 
North  Africa  plus  1.5  1.  7· 
Middle  East 
Asia  1.  2  ·LO 
Latin  America  plus  o.·s  0.4 
Caribbean 
Source  :  OECD,  DAC's  report,  1990 
In· 1988-89,  the  majority of  countries  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  received  devel~ 
opment  aid  amounting  to  more  than  10%  of  their  GNPs  (20%  in  the  case 
of  the  Sah~lian countries).  This  ~id met  more  than  half  of  their .capital 
expenditure. 
1.3.2.  THE  EFFECTIVENESS  OF  AID 
It is hard  to evaluate  aid objectively.  On  the  cre.dit  side,  the  progress 
made  in  controlling major  endemic  diseases  may  be  cited,as may  infrastructure 
development,  "productivity  leaps"  (such  as  the  greeri  revclution  in  southern 
Asia  or  development  generated  by  cotton-growing  in  the  SiJdanese  belt  arid:  'SO 
on).  It  is none  the  Less  clear that  if overall  results  are  compared .with 
the  amount  of  financing  committed,  the  general  impres~i~n emerging  is one 
of  ~asted resources. 
This  can  be  put  down  to  a  number  of  factors.  Whe~i.~overnments are  concerned 
one  may  note  the  absence of  a  clearly-defined development  strategy, admin-
istrative weaknesses  in  programming,  implementation  and  monitoring,  as  well 
as  the  fact  that  regimes,  in order  to  retain control,  are obliged  to cater 
to  their  ever-expanding  power  bases,  by  creating  jobs  and  making  various 
hand-outs  - a  recipe for  inefficiency.  These  governments,  moreover,  have 
not  succeeded  in  coordinating  the activities of.the different  funders  round 
a  consistent  policy.  Instead,  they  have  tended  to·toster  competition 
between  them  in order  to take  maximum  short-term advantage  of  the  situation. 
Insufficient  consideration  has  been  given  to budgetary  implications  (the 
cost  of  counterpart  funds,  recurrent  costs), to  th~ point  where  there  are 
·now  many  ~pcgjects blocked  _because  the  counterpart  funds  have  not •be~n 
forthcoming. - 25  - VIII/479/9.2-EN 
The  development  str~tegies chosen,  often,  we  admit,  on  the  advice  of  the 
Leading  donors,  have  not  always  been  pursued  succes~fully.  In  the  fifti~s 
and  sixties,  the  thinking  at  the  time  placed  emphasis  on  the  central  role 
of  the  state  and  on  import  substitution  industries;  the  strategy still held 
sway  at  the  beginning  of  the eighties, but  it then  started  to  produce 
diminishing  returns. 
While  some  countries  did  manage  to  complete  the  whole  process  and  thereby 
turn their  industries, which  had  initially been  geared  to  the domestic  market, 
towards  a  key  sector  in  export  production,  the  major  pa'rt  of  the  deve~oping 
world  ended  up  with  whole  sections  of  their  industrial  machinery  not  only 
non-competitive  but  also  placing  an  intolerable  burden  ~n their  ~ntire 
economy. 
The  fact  is that  these  over-ambitious  enterprises, with  their  low  profit-
ability, forced  countries  to  follow  a  policy ot transfers, via  subsidies 
or  tax  exemption,  to an  industrial  sector that  was  moving  further  into the 
red  and  leading to  permanent  distortions  in the allocation of  domestic 
resources.  The  closing-up of  the  economy  and  protection of  the  home  market 
·  two  inevitable  corollaries of  such  p6licy- resulted  in go6ds  becoming  less 
:competitive. 
~ further  consequence  was  the marginalization of  th• agricultural  sector, 
despite  the fact  that  for  most  of  the developing  w6~ld's population,  i~ 
. constitutes  the  main  source  of  revenue.  It  had  been.aisumed  that  agricult~ 
.ure  ~as incapable of  leading  the  modernization  process  or of  (generating'· 
surpluses)  sustaining a  process  of  industrialization.  Even  the  success 
stories- the  green  revolution  in  India  for  example- ..  we~e affected by 
this  ideological  view,  according  to  which  agriculture  was  pushed  into a 
marginal  role  in overall  development  policy. 
Cooperation  policies were,  in  reality, directly influenced  by  external 
factors  such  as  the  international  crisis, or  internal  factors  such  as  the 
self-interest of  the  donor  countries.  The  Cold  War,  too,  was  particularly 
damaging,  in that  international  cooperation  came  to be  dominated  at  least 
as .much  by  the  wish  to keep  .countries  in  one  or other  of  the  camps  as  by 
the desire to promote  development. 
This  situation explains  at  least  partially the political nature of  some 
of  the  regimes  and  the  lateness  with  which  democratization  is being  embark-
ed  on  in many  developing  countries  today. - 26  - VIII/479/92-EN 
The  practice of  tying  aid,  commonly  adopted  by  bilateral  cooperation 
agencies,  Led  to  large  cost  over-runs  and  sometimes  compromised  their 
efforts;  the  goal  of  cooperation often became  mixed  with  a  desire  to 
promote  national  interests. 
As  f~r the  international  agencies,  they  were  more  co~cerned with 
promoting  their  image  than  with  bringing  critical  support  to bear 
on  weak  or  muddled  government  policy.  ALL  this, on  the  global  level, 
has  resulted  in  an  aid  situation that  is contradictory  and  rarely 
coordinated  or  consistent.  The  recipien~ countries  tolerate it, or  even 
provoke  it  in  many  cases,  in  order  to  win  support  for  their  Latest  interest. 
Things  are  changing  rapidly,  however,  because  of  the  changes  in  the.pol-
itical  context  (collapse  of  the  Eastern  bloc).  and  the'economic  one  (debt 
crisis,  return  to  financial  orthodoxy)  as  well ·as  through  the  experience 
that  has  been  gained.  Commitments  made  to untie aid, to  ensure  that  donors 
collaborate,  to  adopt  consistent  policy  in  the conception,  follow-up 
··nd  evaluation of  programmes,  are  seen  more  and  more  clearly  as  pre-requisites 
for  effective aid. 1 
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.1.4.  PROSPECTS  AND  MAIN  EMERGING  TRENDS 
·1.4.1 ..  THE  INTERNATIONAL  CONTEXT 
1.4.1.1.  STRUCTURAL  CHANGES  IN  THE  WORLD  ECONOMY 
According  to  a  well-known  correlation,  the  foremost  effect  of  growth  in 
the  industrialized countries  is  an  increase  in  the  demand  for  Third 
World  products.  A second,  though  less  striking,effect  is  that  better 
prices  are  paid  for  them. 
This  way  of  transmitting  the effects of  growth  implies  that  openness  to. 
trade  is  a  more  important  factor  than  actual  growth.  According  to 
World  Bank  estimates,  for  example,1  a  1%  rise  in  the  industrialized 
couniries'  economic  growth-rate  leads  to  a  rise  of  0.7%  in  the  growth 
·of  the  developing  countries  as  a  whole,  while  a  1%  rise  in  world  trade 
has  a  1.3%  effect  on  their growth-rate. 
As  this  rule does  not  apply  equally  to all the developing  countries,  because 
of  their differing structural situations, it  is  only  valid  in  global 
·terms.  However,  these  parameters  are  beginning  to  change,  under  the effect 
of  structural  changes  in  the  world  economic  system. 
(a)  Production  is steadily  becoming  more  "intellectual", i.e., an 
increasing  part  of  its total  value  is  composed  of  inputs  req'uiring  highly-
skilled  labour.  Another  way  of  putting  this  is  to· say  that  goods 
now  contain  larger  amounts  of  services.  As  a  r~sult, the  demand 
·~  for  raw  materials  will  slow  down.  The  same  tend~ncy is  in  evidence 
for  energy  and  food  products,  where  the  income  elasticity of  demand 
is  less  than  one. 
The  effect  of  these  changes  on  the  va~ue of  goods  is  strengthened 
by  long-term  changes  in  relative prices;  because  of  interruptions. 
and  temporary  setbacks,  prices  of  raw  :materials  are  declining  in 
comparison  with  those  of  manufactures  (at  least  as  measured).  The 
implication  of  this for  the  developing  co~ntries is that  the  ones· 
best  placed  to benefit  from  an  improvement  in the  international 
climate are  those  which  have  succeeded  in  switching  their exports 
to  industrial products.  According  to World  Bank  calculations, 
sub-Saharan  Africa  is  the  only  region.where  the  effect  of  trade 
growth  on  production  is  less  than  one •. 
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·'  (b)  A second  factor  is  connected  with  the  increasing  internationalization· 
of  economies,  not  only  on  the  financial  Level  ~ut also as  far  as 
productive  systems  are.concerned.  The  big  multinational  enterprises  are 
now  theatres  for  action  on  a  world-wide  scale.  A UN  analysis,  for 
example,  shows  that  already,  more  than  30%  of  the exports  of  the 
major  industrial  countries are  involved  in  intra-firm trade. 
Technical  progress  in  communications  and  information  handling,  by 
reducing  the  costs  associated  with  Large  organizations, will  accent-
uate  not  only  their  tendency  to  strategic globalization  but  also 
the decentralization of  their activities, depending  on  the  specific 
conditions  in  particular  Localities • 
. In  ari  open  world~ where  free  trade  is  ~uaranteed, production  ten~s 
to settle where  total  costs  are  lowest.  This  is  either  where  the  cost 
of  the  labour  element  (based  on  both  wages  and  productivity)  is 
lowest  or  where  the  market  is near  at  hand  (not  only  to  reduce 
transport  costs  but  also  to  have  direct  contact  with  that  market, 
if this  is necessaryl. 
For  the  multinationaLs;  in  fact,  capital costs  are  the  same  e~ery­
where,  once  the  technical  infrastructure and  services are  adequate. 
Very  advanced  production  can  be  set  ~P in  countries  which  are  not 
advanced  (for  example,  the  manufacture  of  the, ,most  up-to-date  micro-
chips  in Thailand).  Such  a  system  cannot  be.·said  to ·tepresent  a 
true transfer of  technology,  of  course,  sine~ the  host  ~ountry is 
certainly not  capable of  designing  and  perfecting what 
is  being  produced.  Nevertheless, it does  bring  benefits,  bec~use 
of  the  training opportunities afforded .to local  staff - even  more 
significant  when  the  time  comes  for  the  best-qualified to  take  over 
from  expatriate staff.  .. 
More  specialization  is also occurring,  and  this  provides  development 
opportunities  for  small  businesses;  the  proof.of.this is seen  in 
the  growth  of  intra-branch  trade  and  in  subcontracting  in  inter-
national  trade. 
(c)  A third tendency  concerns  the  job  market.  For  the  reasons  just .men-
tioned,  there  is  a  rapidly  increasing demand  for  managers  and  qual-
ified staff.  This  has  t6  a  Large  ~xtent  bee~ met  through  improving 
educational  standards  in  the  industrialized  countries.  Given  that 
business  is becoming  internationalized,  in order  to fill posts, staff 
are  transferred  not  only  between  industrialized countries,  but  · 
between  them  and  the  developing  countries.  However,  future  Labour 
shortages  are still  likely.  In  general,  in  the  developing 
countries,  these  may  result  from  the  supply  of ·people  with  certain 
qualifications still not  meeting  the  demand~:or from  the  local  · 
workforce  becoming  too  expensive.  But  this  i~·~nlikely to  produce 
many  changes  in  present  migratory  flows.  T~~ decentralization of 
industry  itself  will  not  be  enough  to solve  employment  problems  in 
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(d)  Rises  in  interest  rates  currently  seem  to be  another'structural  ~rend. 
1.4.1.2. 
Since  1982,  these  have  been  4%  higher  than  inflation  rates  in  the 
Leading  industrialized countries  (the  average  over  the  previous  20 
years  was  only  2%  above).  This  rise  has  had.~ serious £ffect  on 
the  developing  countries, either directly  (for  Loans  with  f·toating 
interest  rates)  or  in  the  longer  term,  because  of  a  bigger  debt-
-servicing  biLL,  to  be  paid  in  foreign  currency  hence  damaging  to 
growth.  Some  studies  indica~e that  a  rise of  1%  in  real  interest 
rates  reduces  the  growth  rate of  a  developing  country  by  0.2  percentage 
points. 1 
Financial  flows  are  also  affected;  one  of  the  main  explanations  of 
the  high  level  of  real  interest  rates  in  the  eight~es is that  savings 
world-wide  are  insufficient  to meet  the  demand  for  capital.  ·This 
may  well  hinder  money  from  flowing  into  the  dev.eloping  countries. 
POSSIBLE  TRENDS  OF  OFFICIAL  DEVELOPMENT  ASSISTANCE  AND 
DIRECT  INVESTMENTS 
The.  shortage of  savings  can  be  seen  particularly  clea~Ly if  we  look  at 
public  finances.  The  current  deficit  of  the  Group  of  Seven  countries  (who 
together  account  for  more  than  60%~ of  the  wo~ld GOP),  amounted  to 3.2% 
of  GNP  in  1980-89, against  1.7%  in  1970-79  (or  a  rise of  USD  180  billion 
in quantitative  terms).  Official  development·assistance has  naturally been 
affected  by  efforts  to  reduce  this deficit which explains  why  the  US  contri- · 
buti~n has  dropped. 
Support  for  the  Eastern bloc  countries will  have  a less-m'arked  effect  that 
·ii. not  yet  quantifiable.  It will  be  hard  to  increase  real  official aid  for 
countries in the  South,  however,  even  if it does  not  have  to be  d~creased  • 
.  Direct  investment  is  in  a  different  category and  is  chiefly  influenced 
.... 
by  conditions  at  the  receiving  end,  though  what  is  happening  in  the  industrialized. 
countries  providing it will  also  have  some  effect.  Financial  flows  to eastern 
Europe  would  increase  exports  and  hence  growth,  while  high  interest  rates 
would  not  have  a  compensatory  effect on  investment.  But  in  this  case,  the 
effect  of  competition would  be  very  small. 
For  the  third  form  of  financing,  loans  at  ma~ket  rates  would  become  more 
expensive.  It  has  been  observed  however  that  since 1982,  the  private sector 
plays  virtually  no  part.  The  main  cause  of  this  is  risk  assessment  rather 
than  Lack  of  resources.  Again,  the  rise  in  interest  rates  has  had  only  an 
indirect  impact,  in  that  risk  has  become  greater  because  of  the  higher debt-service. 
For  public  institutions,  however,  which  obtain their money  at  market  rates 
·(e.g.  the  World  Bank),  borrowing  has  become  more  expens.:ive  and  so,  therefore, 
have  its  lending  rates. 
1  IBRD  + ref. 
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Another  factor  world-wide  is  the  predictable worsening  of  the  US  budget 
deficit.  At  current  prices,  its GNP  represents  mo~e' than  25%  of  the  gross' 
world  product,  and  were  its budget· needs  to  rise  from  3%  to  4%  of.its GNP, 
.the  new  money  required  would  alone  be  USD  SO':billion- 'more  than  total  ODA. 
This  set  of  forecasts,  in a  context  of  restrictive monetary  pol icy ·and 
taking  into account  the  situation of  many  private financial  institutions 
raising their own  capital,  which  have  been  seriously hit  by  bad  debts,  suggest 
that  todayj  real  interest  rates  shciuld  be  maintained  at  higher  Levels  than  in 
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·1.4.2.  THE  PRINCIPAL  DOMESTIC  CONSTRAINTS  IN  THE  DEVELOPING.COUNTRIES 
-----------------~------------
1.4.2.1.  DEMOGRAPHIC  TRENDS 
The  disparities  to  which  attention  has  been  drawn  in  the  previous  sections 
ne~d to be  borne  in  mind.  Starting  points  - and  hence  problems  - are  not 
the  same  from  one  group  of  countries  to  another.  There  is  not  just  one  Third 
World,  there  are  several.  Any  general  discussion  must  ~t the  very  Least 
make  .broad distinctions  between  the  major  regions. 
Demographic  growth  heads  the  List  of  problem  areas.  There  are  two  distinct 
a~pects to  it:  the  medium-term  outlook,  which  is  releva~t to  education  and 
employment,  and  the  prospects  for  the  Longer  term, .which  relate to  demographic 
policy itself. 
let  us  consider  the  most  worrying  case:  sub-Saharan  Africa.  According  to 
a  recent  ILO  report,  75%  of  the  working  population  were  still in agricul-
ture  in  1980,  providing  31%  of  the  GDP.  Because  of  the  foreign  capital  in 
other branches,  people  engaged  in  agriculture  received  an  average  income 
that  was  less  than  half  of  the total  population's or  less  than  20%  of  the 
non-agricultural  population's.  As  the  number.  employed.  in  agriculture  has 
fallen since  1980  and  the  share of  agriculture  in  the  GOP  has  been  maintained; 
this  Last  figure  has  risen  to  around  25%. 
It  is estimated  that  today  15%  - 20%  of  the  working  population  receives  a 
salary, at  least  half  of  them  from  employment  in  the  public  service~.  The 
modern  sector,  in other words,  provides  less  than  20%  of  employment,  in 
gerieral.  This  starting position must  be  linked  with  demography;  if the 
·working  population  is  increasing  by  3%  a  year  (total  population  increase 
amounting  to 3.2%),  the  modern  sector  needs  to expand  by  more  than  15%  a  year 
to absorb  the  increase.  If, on  the other  hand,  we  assume  that  jobs  in  the 
public  service  sector  remain  roughly  at  the'same  level  through  structural' 
adjustment  reforms,  the  remaining  part  of  the  modern  sector must  increase 
the number  of  jobs  it can  offer by  at  Least  30%  a  year.  The  impossibility 
of  reaching  such  targets  suggests  that  in  the  future,  most  young  people  will 
. have  to  Look  to agriculture or  the  informal  sector for  their  work  and  live-
lihood.  The  phenomenon  of  urban  migration  in  Africa  is  also very  marked; 
the  populat{on of  the  towns  is growing  more ·rapidly  than  the  job market 
there  (over  80%  of  private  employment  in  the  towns  is  in  the  service  sector, 
the  added  value  of  which  is  only  growing  at  the ·same  pace  as  incomes  in 
general). 
A similar  connection  exists  in  the  Large  Asian  countries,  where  the  agri-
'cultural  population  accounts  for  half  of  the working  population,  producing 
25%  of  the  GOP.  Demographic  and  urban  growth  rates  are  lower,  however,  and 
·the  secondary  sector  is  Larger.  Nevertheless,  the  rural  world  will  also  have 
to  provide  millions  of  new  jobs  each  year.  Suitable  policy  on  prices  a~d 
agricultural  productivity are  needed  as  much  there  as  in  Africa. - 32  - VIII/479/92-E~ ~ 
In  Latin  America,  where  rates  of  urban1zation  are  very  close  to  those ·of 
the  industrialized  world,  most  of  the  poor  Live  in  shantytowns  in  the  Large 
cities, which  means  that  priority must  be  given  to  managing  urban  resources. 
·While  the  problems  of -urban  management  are  not  on  the  same  scale  as  in  Latin 
America,  they  crop  up  again  in  Large  Asian  cities, and  more  dramatically, 
in  those  now  developing  in Africa,  where  poor  public  service  management 
renders  them  even  more  acute • 
. The  history of  recent  decades  has  clearly shown  up  the  fragility of  eco-
logical  balances  and  the  risk  of  certain natural  resources  being  exhausted; 
this underscores  the  interdependencies  that exist, both  geographically  and 
in  time,  in environmental  management.  Problems  like deforestation,  soil 
and  water  management,  and  pollution  control~ must  for  the  most  part  be 
tackled  through  government  spending,  with  the  population directly  affected 
.bearing  some  of  the  cost.  The  former,  however,  lack  the  necessary  resources; 
while  the  latter, beset  by  today's  poverty,  are  unlikely  to  worry  about  the 
distant  future.  This  means  that  the  effor~s requited will  have,  primarily, 
to  be  made  by  the  industrialized world,  wh~re the means  exist~ where  the 
discount  rate for  the  future  is  lower  and  where  awareness  of  ecological 
interdependence  is developing. 
The  Long-term  aspect  is  linked  to future  demographic  trends.  It is well-known 
that  mortality rates fall  off first, then  with  a  delay  of  two  or three 
generations,  depending  on  income  evolution, the  urbanization  rate  and  women's 
ed~cation,· falls  in  the birth  rate begin  the  transftion  to  lower  population 
growth.  The  trend  may  be  seen everywhere,  though  the curves  ar~ different 
(e.g.  in eastern Aiia  the  reproductive  rate fell  from  6.2  to 2.7 between.  · 
1965  and  1989;  in  southern  Asia,  from  6.3 to 4.4;  in  Latin  America  from  5.8 
to 3.5).  It is only  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  that  the  rate  has  remained  at· 
the  remarkably  high  Level  of  6.6.  When  this  is  coupled  with  a  drop  in·  . · 
infant  mortality  rates,  an  accelerated  population  growth  is  predict~bl~. 
Here  effective population  policy may  be  ihe  only  available tool  for  improving 
standards  of  living  in  the  long .term.  Wi.thout  it, Africa  wiLl  remain 
trapped  in  a  vicious circle where  low  incomes  beget  high  birth  rates  and 
demographic  growth  hinders  the  growth  of  in~ome •.  As· an  illustration,  .  ' 
if population policy fails  to  be  effective  in Nigeria,  the only  uncert~inty 
'will  be  whether  its population  (currently 115  million)  will  reach  250  million 
o~ 450  million  by  the  year  2050.  It  must  ~lso be  stressed that  although 
the  classical  link between  high  birth  rate~ and  poverty  continues  to  hold 
good  for  the  major  statistical sets, this  does  not 'imply.that  the  situation 
is  inevitable.  Regardless  of  income  levels, attempts  to  provide  schooling 
for  girls and  to  change  societal  attitudes-have  proved  successful  in  reversing 
demographic  trends.  · 
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1.4.2.2.  SHORTFALL  IN  FINANCIAL  RESOURCES 
In  the  medium  term  again,  the other  problem  confronting  most  of  the  develop-
ing. countries  is their external  financing  and/or  import  capacity.  We 
emphasized  earlier that  this  was  already  a  crucial  factor  in  the  eighties. 
Debt  ~harges soak  up  the  trade surplus,  which  means  that  a  country's  capital 
expenditure  has  to be  met  out  of  its savings.  After  the  severe  drop  in  the 
'level  of  imports  in  recent  years,  many  things  are  in  short  supply.  Capital  goods, 
in particular, are  nearly all  imported,  and  before  any  recovery  in  growth 
can  hap~en, higher  levels of  capital  expenditure  are  needed.  Production 
growth,  in  other  words,  is  usual.ly  conditional  on  the. ability to pay  for 
imports.  · 
This  constraint  will  be  especially  hard  on  most  African,  and  some  Latin 
American,  countries.  In  the  case of  Africa,  to which  flows  of  private 
capital  are small, official aid  has  to  provide  most  of  the  financing.  It  will 
. therefore  be  in short  supply,  and  development  opportunities will  depend  on 
its effective use.  For  the  other  regions,  increases  in  financial  resources,· 
whether  resulting  from  lower  debt-servicing,  higher direct  investment  or 
a  growing  demand  and  improved  access  for  their exports, will  produce 
two  ~esults:  countries  will  be  able  to  import .mor~ from  the  indust~i~lized 
countries  and  their domestic  growth  will  be  boosted. 
The  rich  countries•  commercial  and  financial  policy will  therefore constitute 
the  key  to  development  support.  Such  policy should  also not  ignore  the  fact 
that  by  opening  up  to imports,  a  corresponding  expansion  in  exports  will 
be achieved.  For  the developing  world,  a  smaller  share  of  a  rapidly-expanding 
market  is preferable to maintaining  the  same  share  of  a  stagnating  one. - 34  --:  VI I I /4  79/92-EN 
1.5.  POLICIES  FOR  INTERNAL  REFORM 
If  we  Look  at  internal  policies,  we  again  see  that,the  situation varies 
according  to  the  time-scale  we  are  using. 
1.5.1.  SHORT-TERM  POLICIES  structural  adjustment  and 
political stability 
Right  at  the  moment,  most  developing  countries  are  still engaged  in  the 
stabilization and  s~ructural adjustment  phase.  If  one  fact  emerges  ~Learly 
fromthe  past  ten  years  it is that  passage  through  this  phase  is unavoidable: 
restoring  macroeconomic  balances  is  a  pre7condition  for  any  recovery 
in  growth.  This  process  may  well  have  high  social £osts,  calling for  targetted 
operations to  limit  the damage.  It  should  however  be  remembered  that· the 
cost  of  doing  nothing  is  usually  even  higher  and  that  organized  resistance  to 
change  usually  springs  from  the  privileged  classes. 
The  political  aspects  cannot  be  ignored.  In  poor  countries,  governments  are 
very  vulnerable  and  a  coup  d'etat  does  not  only  result  from  poor  handling 
of  th~ economy.  Moves  towards  greater  democracy,  appearing  on  all  sides,are 
not  yet  strong  enough  to  prevent  small  groups  surrounding the  leadership 
from  ousti~g those  whose  policies  clash  with  their own  interests.  Donor 
support  for  refor~ policy  should  include  an  element :at  persuasion  to  ensure 
continuity  in  government  action  and  make  it more  credj~le.  Political stab-
ility and  private sector  confidence- be  it  in  Locally-owned  or  foreign 
businesses - are  in  fact  vital, if the desired  results are  to  be  obtained. 
1.5.2.  MEDIUM-TERM  POLICIES  education  and  democratization 
As  regards  the  medium  term,  priority must  be  given t'l:Pimproving  access  to 
.I' 
·education~  Studies  conducted  over  the  past  thirty  yea~s are  unanimous  in 
showing  that  the  key  to  rapid  growth  is  increased  production  of  those  factors 
·that  incorporate  t ec hn i caL  advances.  This  applies 'equally  to  the  developing 
couritries,  once  the  necessary  riders  have  been  added.  It  was  mentioned earlier 
that direct  investments  are  an  important  - though  not  the only  - vector for 
the  learning  process  in  management  and  technical  fields,  in  the  narrow  sense 
of  the  word. 
The  problem  of  local  businesses  is quite different.·  Industrial  researc.h 
in  the  advanced  countries  is  generally  of  little  intere~t to  them.  Product 
research,  for  example,  is addressed  to different  markets  and  assumes  that 
different  inputs  are  available.  Research  on  produ~tion processes  assumes 
that  different  price  relationships  between  inputs  e~ist.  Technologies  that 
are  suited to other  local  conditions  cannot  generally' he  imported  as  they 
are,  but  need  to  be  adapted.  In  any  case,  theY  are  only  effective  if  l~cal 
staff  can  learn  and  handle  them  to  meet  production  and  management  needs. 
lhis obviously  depends  on  the  educational  Level  of  the  firm's  employees,  and 
also on  the  existence  of  rese~r~h  ~roups  ~ollaborat~ng·with them  ori  the 
necessary adaptations.  It  is  also  important  to~  t~~ining to  include  some 
general  features:  a  research  worker  or  a  technician  will  not  make  much  ~f 
an  impact  if  he  or  she  remains  isolated.  This  is  the  reason  why  countries 
like  Inaia  or Brazil  have  often been  able  to  provide better  solutions 
for  equipment  and  technical  assistance  than  European.countries. - 35  - VIII/479/92-EN 
Studies  covering  60  countries  conducted  in  the  period 1965-87  reveal  the  ~wo 
factors  most  closely  correlated  to  economic  growth.  They  are:  educational 
:l~vel  and  degre~ of  distortion  in  the  price  system.1 
According  to  the  same  figures,  it  is  post-primary  education  which  pla~the 
most  significant  role  in  boosting  the  economy.  In  sub-Saharan  Africa,  53%  of 
the  p·opulation  over  the  age  of  15  were  still iHiterate  in  1985,  as  against. 
40%  in  Asia  and  17%  in  Latin  America  (Social  Indicators  of  Development  1989}. 
There  ~an be  no  doubt  that  the  greatest  effort  is  called for  in  Africa,  and 
i£ is  there  tob  that  potential  benefits  are  greatest •  . .  ,. 
The  Level  of  women's  education  is also  closely correlated· with  other  indicators 
of. social  well-being.  It  is  interesting to  note  the  high  statistical 
correlation  between  educational  levels  and  degree  of ·civiL  liberties and 
political  freedom.  Again,  it  is  countries  with  a  more  democratic  power 
structure  whic~ have  been  most  successful  in  institu~in~ the  necessary aus-
terity measures  and  1n  persevering  with  them  even  when  they  prove  unpopular. 
1.5.3.  THE  DOMAINS  OF  STATE  INTERVENTION 
Another.priority  relates  to  the  function  of  the  stat~.  Current  trends 
~ow~rds the  privatization of  certain activities  should  not  hide  ~he fact 
that  the  state alone  can  act  in  domains  where  social  advantages  are  more 
evident  than  private ones  and  where  the  market  cannot  therefore provide  the 
necessary services.  As  already  mentioned,  this  i~  the  case  for education 
and  the  environment,  but  it also applies  to  the  infrast}u~ture and  many 
public· services  - health,  energy,  transport,  communications .or  rural 
extension  work.  In  addition,  the  legal  and  institutional  framework  fixed 
by  the  state affects all private activity. 
Even  when  states pull  out  of  production  and  the private sector  is  in  theory 
capable  of ne.P,.tlat:iinJJ  them  effectively they still have  to  intervene  in  a  vast 
field;  their management  capability must  therefore be  regarded  as  one  of  the 
rarest  resources  in their economy:  It has  become  app.rent  that  if states 
become  over-ambitious,  they  run  things  badly  and  are  un~ble to direct economic 
de~el6pment in all its details.  In  Africa  and  Latin  America~ their capacity. 
to manage  their own  domain  is ofen  inadequate.  The  suc~ess.of future strat-
egies will  depend  on  improvements  in the  operations  of  government  departments, 
'so  that  they  can  handle  reform  arrangements,  provide  essential  services  and 
re.duc~· business  costs  for  the  private sector. 
Recent  years  have  taught  us  that  successful  development ·.strategies  have  been 
based  not  only on  creating opportunities  for  foreign  trade  b.ut 
also  on  implementing  meas~res  to  belp  prod~ction  to  be 
really  competitive.  This  implies  sensible  exchange  rates,  relative  costs 
ta~rly close  to  those  of  world  markets  and  above  all, effective  support 
policy,  to  build up  a  competitive  and  dynamic  environment  for  local  businesses,· 
rather  than  a  suffocating  burea~cracy.  The  countries  which  are  the  mosf 
successful  today  are  those  which  have  followed  this  type  of  policy  for  a 
L<mg  t  .. ime. 
1The  Challenge  of  Development,  Table  2.4  CIBRD}. - 36  - VIII/479/92-EN 
1.6.  POLICIES  TO  SUPPORT  DE~EL0PM~NT 
Development  cooperation  policies  go  far  beyond  the  realm  of  aid.  The  indust-
rilaized world's  most  effective activities  relate first  and  foremost· 
to  the  general  economic  climate  it  can  help  to  create.  A world  that  is  open 
rather  thari,  split  up  into protectionist blocs,  coupled  with  lower  non-tariff 
barriers are  the  sine qua  non  for  absorbing  developing  countries  into  the 
machinery  of  world  trade,  in  the  broadest  sense.  Emphasis  has  been  placed 
on  the  fact  that  their  growt~ will  go  on  being  Linked  to their potential  to 
import  and  that  the  latter will  depend  on  ~he  penetr~tjon of  their  indu~trial 
exports.  However  they  can  only  achieve  this  if their  i~ternal  economic  st~uc~ures 
are  sufficiently  competitive~ 
For  the  whole  developing  world,  with  the  single  exception of Africa,  the  otd 
·slogan "Better trade  than  aid"  has again become  pertinent. 
Where  Africa  is  concerned,  however,  we  have  seen  that  not  only  has  it failed· 
to create an  export  industry,  but  that  its share of  the  commodities  market 
has  slumped.  It is  currently  the  region  of  the  world  taking  least  advantage 
9f  the  industrialized world's  growing  demand  and,jmproved  access.  Primarily, 
the  future of  these  countries  depends  on  their  domesticp:l:llicies.  On.  the  external 
level,  their  foreign  exchange  requirements  cannot  be  'satisfied ·either by.: 
:~mprovements in their exports Or  by  flbws  6f  pri~ate capital:  they  must; io 
a  large extent,  continue  dependihg  on  official  a~d.  This  brings  us  to ihe 
heart  of  the matter.  The  industrialized world, will' still have  to  concentrate 
its aid on  this continent  and  ensure its  allocation~ as  a  priority, tq  encouraging 
better policies - with all that  this  implies  as  regards  changes  in  the  systems 
of  political  power  and  social attitudes.  This  pr1ority,  more  and  more  widely 
recognized,  finds  its practical  application  in  (ending  support  to  governments· 
in  setting up  reform  programmes  aimed,  ultimately, at  dreating viable  and  comp-
etitive economic  structures.  This  raises the question  of  conditionality and 
of  donor  coordination.  It is  clea~, in  fact,  that  any  policy  to  int~oduce 
conditionality will  only  work  if prior  agre·ement  to 'improve  it is  rea~hed 
among  the various  donors. 
From  this point of  view,  official aid  is  a  rare  factor  which  comes  nowhere 
near  meeting  requirements.  These  arise  in  domains  where  financial  rates  of 
return are  zero,  and  where  economic  and  social  returns,  even  if potentially 
high,  can  only  be  obtained  in  the  long  term.  At  the  present  stage,  there 
is no  way  in  which  grants  can  be  avoided  and  the  level  of  their effectiveness 
will.be crucial.  But  grants  should  be  linked  not  only  to  the  creation of 
viab(e  economic  structures  on  which  genuine  development .can  be  founded,  but 
~lso ~o the  install~tion of  truly  democratic  political  systems. 
It  is therefore  a  matter  of  directing grants of  aid  towards  reforms  the  imple-. 
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AN  INtENSIFIED  COOPERATION  POLICY 
2.1.  NEW  INTERDEPENDENCIES  AND  SOLIDARITY  WITH  THE  SUUTH 
By  reason  of  its history  and  its share  of  the  world  economy~ the  Community, 
since  its inception,  has  played  an  important  global  role·in  management'  of 
the  inter~ational ~c0nonic system.  This  role  is  becoming  even  more  prominent 
in  today's  context. 
Ever  since  the  former  colonial  countries  gained  their  independence,  cooperation 
with  developing  countries  has  been  one  of  the  mo~t  important  constants  in 
the  Community's  and  its Member  States'  foreign  policy.  But  the  profound  changes 
that  are  shaking  the  internationalsystem  in  Europe,  and  the  world-wide  reper-
cussions  of  these, directly affect  the  political  and  structural.framework 
within  which  the  Community's  cooperation  policy is  ~xercised. 
The  geopolitical  map  which  is  currently  being  redrawn  has  so  many  new  features 
that  the  question of  interdependence  is  becoming  increasingly  complex;  uncertainty 
about  the  workings  of  the  international  system  i~ growing. 
In  recent  years,  moreover,  the  general  public's  interest  in development  coop-
eration policy  has  slackened  considerably.  The  sp~ctacle of  fratricidal  war· 
or  corruption  in  some  of  the  countries  of  the  South  has  probably ~een just 
as  responsible  for  this as  the  indifferent  results all·too often  registered 
by  cooperation policy.  · · 
Cooperation policy  itself and  the  financial  commitments  for  carrying  it· out 
have  not  been  lacking.  But  the  remarks  made  by  certain  industrialized  countries 
in public  have  revealed  a  degree  of  Lassitude  which .might  eventually  cause 
aid  volumes  to stand still if not  actually to  diminish~ 
Several  of  our  partners  feel  that  there  is  a  risk of  the  Community  turning 
inwards  on  itself, because  of  the  success  of  its efforts  at  integration. 
They  fear that  Less  attention and  aid  than  hitherto will  be  made  available 
by  a  Community  increasingly  concerned  with  it~ own  development  and  providing 
growing  volumes  of  aid  for  its central  and  eastern  European  neighbours. 
In  the  years  to  come,  there  will  undoubtedly  be  strong objective  pressures 
on  the  Community  Member  States  and  on  other  industrialized  countries  that 
affect  their  capacity  for  financing.  One  of  these  will  be  a  demand  for  capital 
in  connection  with  the  adjustments  and  reforms  necessitated  by  greater  trade 
Liberalization  in  the  industrialized  cou~tries themselves.  (The  problems 
encountered  in  the  Uruguay  Roand  are  another  sign  of.~he ·di~ficulties that. 
~exis~  in  operating  trade  concessions  in  favou~ of  the .d~veloping countries)J - 38  - VIII/479/92-EN 
Traditional  forms  of  interdependence,  which.•  have  prevailed  in  North-South 
relations  for  many  years  and  on  which  the  claims  of  the  "New  International 
Economic  Order"  were  based  have  been  substantially altered or  weakened  1n 
the  Last  few  years. 
Wit'h  the  end  of  the  Co,Ld  War,  the  countries  of  the  South  have  lost  their role 
as  "relay stations"  in  the  super  powers'  confrontation,and  with  it, the  massive 
'ecbnomic  and  military aid  which  was  poured  into  them. 
In  supplying  the ~orth with  raw  materials  (leaving  aside  oil>  the  South. no 
longer  plays  the  same  strategic  role it did  in  the  past.  ·As  trade  outlets 
for  industri~l products,  too,  the developing  world's'markets, especially  in 
Africa,  are  no  longer  as  important  to  the  North. 
Progress  in  recent  years  in  dealing  with  the Third  World  Debt  has,  to a  large 
degree,  reduced  the  risk  of  a  collapse  (which  appeared  a  possibility  in  the 
b~ginning of  ~he eighties)  of  the  international  banking.system. 
But  the  interdependence  of  the  industrialized and  the  developing  world  has 
··revealed  itself  in  new  and  striking  forms  in  the  last few  years,  making  clearer 
what.  is at  stake  for  the  international  community. 
To  start with,  the first  factor  of  interdependence  resides  in  the  fact  that, 
in  almost  all the  sectors crucial  to  economic  development,  in  the  North  and 
South  alike, the  structtiral  framework  for  competitio~ ~ill henceforth  be  one 
and  the  same  for  the  whole  world.  Global  financing  has  become  a  fact  of  life 
for  the  authorities and  financiers  in  every  country.  in all the  leading sectors, 
. thanks  to the  use  of  new  technologies  - electronics, telecommunications,  biote~h­
nology,  new  materials, etc.  - competition operates at  the global  level. 
The  ~ules of  competition applicable  in all  the  world's  markets  make  the phenomena 
of  economic  polarization and  concentration of  power  inevitable.  If allowed 
to  run  wild  or  get  out  of  hand,  these  can  jeopardize  the  opportunities  for 
development  from  within  of  the  countries  with  the  weakest  competitive  advantages •. 
It. is essential that  such  tendencies  towards-structural  imbalance  in  economic 
power  be  taken  into account,  otherwise the  switch  to  free market  economies 
will  simply  reinforce  the  viciou~ ci'rcles  and  imbalances  that  characterize 
the  social  and  economic  systems  currently  in  place. 
To  be  considered also are  other aspects  of  the  interdependence of  the  Community 
and  the  countries  of  the  South  which  are bound  to assume  growing  importance. 
in  the  next  decade  in  th~ management  of  the  system  of  international  relatidn~ 
and  the  development  of  the  world  economy. - 39  - VIII/479/92-EN 
One  such  aspect  is  the  problem  of  population already  referred  to.  Growth 
in  world  population overall,  which  is  set  to  rise  from  5.3 billion  in  1989 
io  about  10  billion  as  2050  approaches,  cou~led with  the  dramatic  demographic. 
surge  in  the  developing  world  (where  94  out  of  every  100  births  occur)  constitute· 
a  challenge  for  the  whole  international  community,  especially  becaus~ of  the 
pressure  that  these  trends  will  exert  on  natural  resources  and  ecological 
balances. 
Large  numbers  of  people  from  the  developing  world  have  migrated  to our 
territories for  economic  or  political  reasons.  The  threat  is  that  there 
could  be  a  spillover of  the  violent  demands,  politically or  religiously 
inspired,  being  witnessed  in  some  developing  countries.  Thus,  a  feeling 
of  anxiety  prevails  in  our  own  society  that  the  instability and  unrest 
besetting some  of  the developing  countries  could  have-repercussions  in Europe. 
The dan3ers.  of  ecological  balances  being  upset  in  the  developing  countries 
through  under-development  is  increasingly being  perceived  as  a  threat  to 
the  whole  of  humanity  and  this explains  why  the  environment  is  now  firmly 
on  the  agenda,  in  North-South  cooperation. 
Generally  speaking,  whether  we  are _considering  damage  to  ecological  balances, 
migratory  p~essures, an  epidemic  such  as  AIDS,  or drugs,  all of  which  are 
phenomena  linked  in  some  way  with  poverty and  confusion  in developing  countries, 
as  well  as  in our  own  societies, signs  of  interdependence are  now  often 
viewed  as  a  threat  to ourselves. 
The  causes  of  these  phenomena  are  complex,  but  it is clear that -their  commoh 
denominator  in  nearly all  cases  is that  they originate in under-development, 
in  a  major  part  of  the  world. 
The  upsurge  in  such  pressures  calls for  eve~ greater efforts on  the  part 
of  the  Community  to  prevent  the  appearance. of  irreperable  bre~ks or  antagonisms,· 
for  the  construction of  Europe  can  only  continue within  a  stable international 
framework.  This  does  not  simply  mean  striving  to_overcome  the  effects  · 
of  pressures  on  and  threats to our  environment;  it also  means  acting  to 
entarge  the  economic  space  inside  which  the  Community's  own  economic  develop-
ment  can  take place.  · 
However,  it would  be  unwise  to give  the  impression  t~at the  thrust of  coop-
eration  policy  is  towards  safeguarding  the  economic  security and  dynamism 
·of  a  privileged  section  of  the  international  community  against  threats 
connected  with  instability among  other  ~emb~~s of this  same  community. 
Solidarity  is  one  of  the  key  values  on  which  the  European  edifice was  built 
and  it  is  inconceivable  for  it not  to be  exercised  as effectivley outside 
as  inside  the  Community,  with  only  lip servite being-paid to  it beyond 
its own  frontiers.  . 
In  the  same  way,  the  democratic  principle~ cin  which  bur  civil society  is 
'based  should· cause  us  to  reject  a  world  where  oppression  and  loss  of  freedom  -
as  often  the  cause  as  the  effect  of  under-development  - continue  to :exist. 
. '\ 
This  array  of  vital  interests,  based  on  political, ec6nomic,  and  humanitarian 
considerations  requires  that  a  Community-level  plan  for  development  cooperation 
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This  strategy  must  reflect  the  Community's  progress  towards  integration,~ 
the  single market,  economic  and  monetary  union  and  political union- which 
give  it a  Leading  role  on  the  world  stage.today.  The  heavy  responsibilii{es 
inc~mbent on  it are  going  to  be  still more  important  in  years  to  come. 
The  objectives  of  this strategy are  of  two  kinds:. 
(a)  global  objectives,  by  which  it will  ~ttem~to meet  the  challengei  alread~ 
mentioned- the  environment,  security  re.quirements- posed  by  the. various 
terms  of  interdependence; 
(b)  objectives  connected  with  geography,  which. will  call  for  changes  in 
the  instruments  and  volumes  of  contributions,  according  to  the  part  of 
the  world  in  which  cooperation activities are  ~aking place. 
Two  other features  of  the  .cooperation  policy will  be: 
(i)  a  global  approach  covering  Community  activities in multinational 
,organizations; 
(ii)  a  bilateral approach,  which  by  means  of  a  set  of  instruments  such 
as  financial  and  technical  assistance, trade,  economic  cooperation, 
etc.,  (policy  mix),  will  provide  support .tor countries'  own  development 
strategies. 
It  is naturally difficult  in practice to draw  these distinctions;  certain 
activities  conducted  at  the  world  level,  like  major  trade negotiations, 
will  have  a  direct  influence on  cooperation  policy  conducted  inthis or 
that  part of  the globe,  whereas  other activities, particularly in  connection 
with  the environment,  may,  while  being  carried out  in a  specifi~r.  country, 
bear directly on  global objectives. 
This  having  been  said,  an  attempt  will  be  made  first  of  all to  frame  the,:. 
global  aspects  of  Community  cooperation policy,  after which  the  broad  themes 
of  cooperation strategy  intended to  be  applied more  specifically to.  the 
different  developing  countries  will  be  defined. 
2.2.  GLOBAL  APPROACH  :  the  guidel1nes .·· 
The  first  thing  to notice  is the  gap  between  the  Community's  importance 
as  an  export  market  for  the  developing' countries  and  as a  donor  or official 
development  assistance on  one  hand  and  its still modest  role. in  the  management 
of  the  international  economic  system  on'  the  oJher. - 41  - VIII/479/92-EN 
The  Community,  in  fact,  imports  the  same  volume  of  developing  world  products 
as.  the  US  and  twice  as  much  as  Japan.  Together  with  i~s Member  States 
it  provides  much  more  official  development  assistance  CODA)  than  the  US  and 
Japan  combined.  In  the  Bretton  Woods  institutions,  if  it totals  up  the 
votes  of  its Member  States,  it  re~r!s~nts  29%  of  ~he 1MF  (against  19%  for 
"the  US  and  4.5%  for  Japan)  and  th~  same  figure  for  the  World  Bank  (where 
the  US  has  15%  and  Japan  9%). 
However,  by  not  always  acting  together  in  the~e· institutions,  the  Member 
States  and  the  Community  frequently  pass  the  initiative to  the  US.  At 
the  same  time,  Japan  is  intending  to  play  a  larger  role  in  them,  firstly 
in  financing  and  guiding  Third  World  development  strategies  and  secondly, 
in m:>naging the  international  econpmic  system. 
On  .the  other  hand,  the  Community  is  playing  an  increasingly· signi.ficant 
role  in  some  international  forums  where  discussions  take  place  on  the  major 
themes  relating  to  international  economic  cooperation  (summits  of  Western 
leaders),  to  development  (UNCTAD)  and  to  the  environment  (UNCED). 
When  in  these  settings,  to meet  the  expectations of  its partners  in  the 
South,  the  Community  should  promulgate  its own  ideas  on  world  development; 
these  should  be  compatible  with  its  values  and  interests and  should  ensure 
that  the  developing  countries  are  given  a  fair and  effective  role  when 
new  balances  ~re being  struck. 
The  first  pillar of  the  new  order,  which  shoul8  be  ~he business of  the  UN, 
'is respect  for  international  law  and  abandonment  of  the  use  of  force  for 
solving  conflicts. 
Encouraging  de~ocracy and  respect  for  human  rights  i~ the.developing,  countries 
paves  the  way  for  peaceful  behaviour  and  respect  for  international  Law, 
both  essential  to  the  development  process. 
The  prevention of  conflicts  can  - and  indeed  must  - lead  to  arms  reduction, 
so\that  resources  can  be  switched  to  development  targets,  both  in  deveLOping 
countries  and  the  industrialized  world. 
A second'pillar of  the  new  international  order.sho~ld, as  far  as  the  Community 
i~  concerned,  consist  of  the  South's  developme~t.·  · 
The  third pillar must  be  management  of  the  world's  environment.  The  UNCED 
summit  (Rio,  June  1992)  should  Lay  the  foundations  for  this. 
The  first  pillar falls  within  common  foreign  and  security policy and  the 
.third  within  international  cooperation  on  environmental  matters.  Development 
i~  its.:wider  meaning  however  is most  directly  influenced  by  the  Community's 
external  economic  policy,  especially  in ·the  three  aspect"s  of  internati·onal 
.economic  cooperation,  trade  and  financial  flows  (which  includes  ODA). - 42  - VII I/4  79/92,-EN 
*  2.2.1.  INTERNATIONAL  ECONOMIC  COOPERATION 
As  mentioned  at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter,  on  one  hand  the  interdepe~d~nce 
Df  various  economies  is  strengthened  as  trade  develops  and  as  international 
capital  markets  become  integrated,  while  on  the  other  hand  the  relative 
weight  of  the  various  actors  alters  as  i.nternal  transformations  occur  (e_g. 
European  integration,  Japanese  growth,  emergence  of  newly  industrialized 
countries  in  Asia,  opening  up  of  Latin  America,  the  entry  of  the  former 
Communist  countries  in .the  multilateral  economic system). 
Today,· there  is  an  increasing  tendency  for  economic.  coopera~ion to  ~o beyond 
the  frontiers  of  monetary  and  budgetary  policy.  Firstly, within  the  c6ntext 
of  its surveillance mission,  the  IMF,  with  the  support  of  the  World.Bank,  · 
has  ·enlarg~d its field  of  action  to  encompass  a  whole  array  of  structural 
elements,  which  sometimes  have  a  crucial  bearing  on  th~ conduct  and  effective-
ness  of  macroeconomic  policies.  Secondly,  the  maj6r  ~ndustrialized couhtries 
have  reached  agreement  on  matters  such  as  the  action  to  be.taken  concerning 
Poland
1s  debt  and  the  joint  strategy  they  should  use  tow~rds Brazil,  the 
world
1s  largest  debtor.  ·  ' 
But  the  cooperation  achieved  among  the  Group  of  Seven  members,  who  are  . 
de  facto  leaders  of  the  world  economy,as  welt  asthe.mult~lateral surveilla-nce 
exerc1sed  by  the  IM~ fail  to  produce  satisfactory results  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  developing  countries. 
* 
1.  The  developing  countries  are· more  or, Less  excluded  from  inter-
national  economic  cooperation;  the~ feel  its  effects~ both  · 
bad  and  good,  and  find  that  their  own  policies  are  dictated 
by  the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank.  To  da~e, they  have  only  played 
a  very  minor  role  in  dra~ting the  policies  which  concern 
them.  ' 
2.  The  results  obtained  in  terms  of  world  growth  and  tranier 
of  resources  from  the  North  'to  the  South  are  insuffi ci:ent 
to  sustain the  reforms  taking  place  in  the  developing  countri~~, 
especially  in  the  highly-indebted  ones  of  Latin  America  and 
Africa. 
The  e'xpression  "international  economic  cooperation"  in  use  in  the  G7 
and  the  IMF  refers  to  cooperation  on  macroeconomic  and  structura~ policies. 
It must  therefore  be  distinguished  from  "economic  cooperation",  6'ne  of  ., 
·'the aspects  of  Community  development  policy. - 43  - VIII/479/92-EN 
Where  financial  flows  from  the  North  to  the  South  are 
concerned,  although  there  have  been  recent  improvements, 
they  are still  inadequate  because  of  the  savings  deficit 
in  the  ~ndustrialized world,  in  particular  in  the  US 
where  the  budget  deficit  this  y'ear  is  equiv::o.lr!~t  to  the 
GDP  of  all of  southern  Asia. 
The  European  Community,  for  its part,  has  been  mak1ng  a  solid contribution 
to  wbrld  growth  since  1985. 
Internal  growth  factors  within  the  European  Community  have  a  tendency, 
in  fact,  to  reinforce  each  other~ the  creation  of  the .internal  ~arket 
(through  its  effect~ on  efficiency  and  resource  allocation),  economic 
and  monetary  union  (which  will  emphasize  price  stability  and  ensure 
the  coordination  of  budgetary  policies)  and  the  strengthening  of  the 
economic  and  social  fabric  (which  increases  the potential  for  growth) 
have  all  resulted  in structural  improvements  in  the  Community's  economy. 
Can  the  Community  do  more? 
First  of  all, the  Community  is  well-placed to  play  an  expanding  role 
in  international  economic  cooperation  and  can  contribute  two  major 
trump  cards:  firstly, its economic  and  political  weig~t, and  secondly, 
.its special  experience  in  relation to  integration  and  coordination, 
~specially their  monetary  aspects. 
But  in order  to play this  role, it has  to go  further  along  the  road 
of  economic  and  monetary  union  and  its activities within  the  Group  of 
Seven  and  the  IMF/World  Bank  must  be  coordinated  so  as  to  reflect  this 
progress. 
Despite  its present  instit~tional handicap,  ~he  Commu~ity must  attempt 
to attain three objectives. 
(i) It must convince  its partners, the  US  and  Japan,  that  the structural 
imbalances  in their  respective  economies  have  to be  corrected, 
which  implies.the  reabsorption  of  the  budget  deficit, clearing. 
the  way  for  an  increase  in domestic  saving~ in  the  U~and· the 
opening  up  of  its economy  to  inputs  of  manufactures  and  services, 
in  the  case  of  Japan. 
(ii)  It  must  see  to it that  the  developing  countrfes  play  a  p~rt  in 
the  management  of  the  world  economy,  as  they  progress  towards 
fuller  integration  in  the  international  economic  system  (GATT, 
the  IMF/World  Bank). 
(iii)  It must  promote  regional  integration among  the·developing  countries 
with  more  vigour,  so  that  their  economies  become  more  competitive  -
·and  so  that  they  are better prepared  ~o enter  fully' into  the  world 
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2.2.2.  THE  MULTILATERAL  FRAMEWORK  OF  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES'  FOREIGN  TRADE 
For  most  of  the  developing  countries,  foreign  trade  constitutes  the 
largest  source  of  their external  financing.  It  is vastly  more  important 
than official  development  aid  i~ helping  the  development  process.  As 
a  result,  access  to  the  markets·of  the  industrial  world  is  a  pre-condition 
for  their  future  development. 
Trade  with  the  developing  countries  must  move  on  from  a  mere  inter-industrial 
exchange  (their  raw  materials  for' our  manufactures)  which  was  the .feat~re 
of  trade  in  the  colonial  epoch,  and  which'now  seems  to  have  a  limited 
role.  This  inter-industrial  type  of  trade  gives  some  scope,  it is  true,. 
for  the  comparative  advantages  of  the  developing  countries  (tropical, 
energy  and  mineral  pr0ducts;  extensive agricultural  and  livestock  farming); 
but  intra-industrial  trade  (a  straight exchange of  ~anufactured goods) 
based  on  on-the-spot  processing  of  commodities  or  an  abundant  labour 
supply,  must  expand  along  with  development.  It is  in  the  interest of 
the  industrialized countries  to accept  and  encourage  this evolution, 
which  represents  a  better  allocation - from  both  the  economic  and  the 
environmental  standpoints  - of  resources  on  the  world  level,  even  ~hough 
this  change  may  not  be  brought  about  without  some  costs. 
the  Community  gives  thedeveloping countries  ac~ess to  the biggest  ~arket 
in  the  world.  Its Third  World  imports  are  similar  in  volume  to  those 
of  the  US.  Although  they  are  growing  rapidly,  manufactures  account 
for  a  smaller  share of  the  total  in  Europe  than  in  th~ US,  however. 
The  present  trade  policy  of  the  industrialized countries generally, 
which  includes  the  Community,  as  regards.~mports from  the  developing 
countries~ poses  two  problems .for  North-South  t.rade:  protectionism  Levelled 
against  the  developing  countries,  on  one.hand,  and  the  formation  of 
regional  blocs  on  the  other. 
(i)  While  proclaiming  their  readiness  to  open  their  respective 
markets  via  unilateral  preferences :(either generalized  or 
regional),  the  industrialized  world  has,  in practice,  maintained 
substantial barriers to developing  countries'  exports  (quant-
itative restrictions  on  agricultural  products,  textiles, 
shoes, etc.;  or tariff  peaks  and  escalation). 
For  their  part  the  developing  countries  have  gone  along  with 
this policy  and  have  tried  to  take  advantage  of  unilateral 
preferential  systems  operated  by  industrialized  countries, 
without  liberalizing their own  trade  practices.  The  result 
has  been  that  they  have  often  not  been  sufficiently  competitive 
to  make  the  most  of  the  preferences  granted  them  and  they 
have  deprived  themselves  of  a  negotiating  tool  in  multilateral 
discussion,  the  only  sure  ratite  towards  real  and  permanent 
access  to  the  markets  of  the  industrialized world. - 45  - VIII/479/92-EN 
(ii)  The  regional  preferences  granted  by  the  Community  (to Mediterra-
nean,  eastern  European  and  ACP  countries)  and  the  US  (the  · 
CBI,  NAFTA  and  Enterprise  for  the  Americas)  tend  to  strengthen 
the  integration of  the  developing  countries  round  the  dominant 
poles.  Japan,  without  resorting  to  regional  trade  prefe~en~e 
measures,  uses  its efforts  to  strengthen ·integration  round 
the  south-eastern  rim  of  Asia,  via  investments  and  the  technology 
used  in  its enterprises. 
·Consequently,  the  risk  that  regionaliiation will drift  towards 
the  formation  of  trading  blocs  can  no  Longer  be  ignored~ 
In  order  to  co~rect these  two  tendencies,  the  Community  must  see  to 
it that  the multilateral  trade  system  is  strengthened;  this.could  be 
achieved  by  fully  involving  the  developing  countries  in  GATT  (imposing 
rights  as  well  as  duties  on  them).  Parallel  with  current  attempts  at 
regional  liberalization,  the  Community  should  also strive  for  progress 
with  multilateral  Liberalization  moves. 
Trade  preferences,  which  will  gradually 1ose their  importance  and  their 
justification for  the  major  part  of  the  developing  world,  once  it benefits 
from  and  takes  part  in  the  progress  towards  multilateral  Liberalization, 
should  therefore  be  reserved  solely  for  the  assistance of  the  less  develdped 
countries. 
The  Uruguay  Round  today  offers an  exceptional  opportunity  for  improving 
North-South  trade  and  consolidating  the  move  towards  trade  liberalization 
embarked  on  by  a  growing  number  of  developing  countries  in  their own 
interest.  It  is  far  and  away  more  important  for  the  countries  of  South-
East  Asia  and  Latin  America  than  the  oppo~tunities provided  und~r  bila~eral 
instruments  (aid  and  generalized preferences).· - 46  - VIII/479/92-EN 
2~2.3.  FINANCIAL  FLOWS  TO  THE  DEVELOPING  COUNJRIES 
It  is  certainly vital  for  the  economic  po{icies  of  ~h~ developing  countriei 
to  aim·  at  producing  growth  largely  through  mobi~zing. their  potential 
inte~nal  resources.  But  inflows  of  foreign  capital,  in  the  form  of 
ai~,  loans,  or  investments  can  make  significant .contributions  to  relaunching 
their  economies  and  can  provide  support  in  the  difficult  stages  of  redirecting 
econo~ic policy  and  implementing  structural  reform~,  in  which  many  countries 
are  now  engaged. 
After  declining  continuously  between  1980  and  1987,  when  they  reached 
especially  low  levels,  net  flows  of  resources  to  the  developing  countri~s 
have  improved  in  recent  years  (see 1.1.4). 
The  flows  nevertheless  remain  tar  below  t~e needs  of  a  Large  number 
of  c.oun.tries. 
(a)  Encouraging  fairer  sharing  of  the  aid  burden  ~nd more  effective us~ of  it 
In  1990,  official  development  assistance  from  the  member  countries of  ~he 
DAC  reached  USD  54  billion  (in  nominal  terms),  representing  0.35%  of 
their  GOP  (and  still substantially  below 'the  0.7%  target  to  which  most 
of  them  are  committed).  Any  increas~ should  therefore  come  first  and 
foremost  from  those  countries  whose  volume  of  ODA  is  below  the  mark. 
The  Community  for  its part  allocates  almost  0.5%  of  its GNP  to  aid for 
the developing  world,  thereby  providing  more  than  40%  of  the  aid  they 
receive. 
This  contribution  is  considerably  higher  than  that of.the other  major 
donors- the  US  and  Japan- which  contribute 0.18%  and  0.32%  of  their 
GNP  respectively. 
Given  the  weight  of  its contributions  to  the  developing  countries, the 
Community  could  legitimately  request  its two  main·  partners to .take  on 
a  bigger  share  of  the  aid  burden. 
It  could  also  encourage  certain other  countries  to  make  a  greater  effort 
in  providing  development  aid. 
Several  countries, the  newly-industrialized or'the more  successful  devel-
oping  ones,  adopt  policies  which  are  increasingly affecting- for  better 
or  for  worse  - other  developing  countries. VIII/479i92-EN 
To  date,  ho~ever, these  countries'  contributioffi to  ODA,  or  even  to  th~ 
debate  ondev?Lopment  issues,have remained  very  small.  Taiwan  devotes 
a  mere  0.02%  of  its  GNP  to~~v~Lopment aid,  while  Greece  and  Portugal, 
with  much  Lower  GNPs,  manage  to  set  aside  almost  four  times  ~s  m~ch. 
The  newly  industrialized  countries  and  the better7off developing  countries 
could  and  should  give  more  aid, quantitatively  and  qualitatively,to 
less  successful  developing  countries. 
These  countries  and  the  industrialized world  could  get  together  to  work 
out  aid policy  that  is more  systematic  and  formaliz~d. 
In  some  cases,  for  example,  more  practicaG and  specific  triangular  aid 
arrangements  could  be  worked  out  between  the  industriilized  countries, 
thed~veloping countries  and  the  more  advano:d-among  the  Latter.  The 
Last  group  could  provide  their  Less  successful  partners  with  certain 
benefits,  for  ~hich the developed  countries'  aid  would  provide 
the  counterpart. 
Development  cooperation  provided  by  the  eastern bloc  countries  has  disappearec 
suddenly  from  the  internatibnal  scene;  at  the  same  time,  the  crisis 
they  are  facing  has  meant  that  their  foreign  trade  has  declined.  The 
Community  could  try to  find  ways  of  helping  them  to  recover  their  capacity 
for  cooperation,  particularly where  technical  cooperation  is  concerned; 
its good  relations  with  both  thedeveloping  and  the eastern  bloc  countries, 
could,  for  example,  be  put  to  use  to  encourage  trade  between  the  two 
groups.  (The  possibilities for  triangul~r operations  should  also be· 
studied). 
In  any  case, the  Community  would  be  a  more  convincing-advocate of  a  new 
sharing-out  of  responsibilities if it were  to  show  ~t~elf  ready  to  step 
up  its own  efforts  (and  especially those  of  some  of  ~ts Member  States) 
to assist  the  developing  world. 
Overall  development  aid efforts also ought  to be  spread  more  uniformly 
round  the  different  parts of  the  globe. 
Each  of  the  three  major  donors  has  concentrated  its efforts on  one  area 
of  the  world,  where,  for  various  reasons,  it  has  assumed  special  respons-
ibility.  The  Community  concentrates  on  sub-Saharan Africa  (to which 
just  under  half  of  EEC  aid goes),  Japan  Looks  to Asia  (to  which  it allocates 
70%  of  its aid)  and  the  US,  if its aid to  Israel,  Egypt  and  Pakista~ 
is  ignored, turns  its attention,  though  to  a  Lesser  extent,  to  Latin 
America  (which  receives  20%  of  the  US  total). 
This  is clearly  an  unbalancedsituation,  whi·ch  springs  into greater  relief 
when.  viewed  from  a  slightly different  angle.  In  Asia,  the  Community's 
aid  foLlows  Japan's,  in  good  second  place,  since  it amounts  to  four 
fifths  of  it.  Japan's  commitment  to  sub-Saharan  Africa,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  fa~ below  the  backing  it  receives  from  the  EEt  in  Asia, 
and  only  amounts  to an  ei9ht~ of  the  EEC  total. - 48  - VIII/4  79/92-EN 
The  sharing  of  responsibilities  with  t~e  US  is  scarcely  more  equitable: 
th~  Community's  aid  to  latin America  is  about  70%  higher  than  US  ~id, 
:Whlle  the  latter's aid  to  sub-Sahara'n  Africa  is ·o:nly  one  el-eventh  of 
the  Community's.  · 
No  similar  imbalance  exists  between  US  and  Japanese aid,  it  may  be  noted. 
These  figures  are  very  revealing  on  .several  counts.  Fijstly,  they  show 
the  very  uneven  way  in  which  the  aid  burden  is shared.  The  fact  that 
the  Community  as  a  whole  is  responsible  for  almost  all  the  aid  to  the 
Less  developed  countries  means  that  it will have  to  continue this  support, 
given  these  iountries'  needs.  But  it would  be -fafrer  if  the  responsibility 
for  these  countries,  whose  economic  development  js _unlikely  in  the  medium 
. term,  were  shared  out  m6re  fairly  between  all  the  donors. 
In  the  same  context  of  a  gl6bal  approach  in  its cooperation  policy, 
the  Community  needs  to enlarge  the  scope  of  its  economic  cooperation, 
by  involving,  to  their mutual  advantage,  private  and  public,  as  well 
as  European  and  local  enterprises, especially  in  investment  promotion, 
joint ventures,  technological  transfers, etc. 
Finally, with  the  aim  again  of  ensuring  that  aid  is  made  more  .effective· 
overall, the  process  of  graduatli untying it, currently  under .examination 
by  Community  and  OECD  authorities,  should  be  seen  through  to  its end. 
- (b)  Policies on  the developing  countries'  foreign  debt 
The  Community  should  also  a)  pay close attention  to  the  way  in  which 
the  developing  countries'  debt  is being dealt  with,  especially  in  relation 
to  low-income  countries,  b)  support  proposals  in  the  Club  of  Paris  for 
cancelling part  of  their  public  debt,  and  c)  took  closely at  the  initiatives 
proposed  by  the  Member  States to  this end. 
The  development  of  a  secondary  market~for the  developing  countries' 
debt  may  be  seenasan  important  instrument  for  facilitating  swap  operat1ons 
and  debt  repurchasing.  For  the  highly-indebted  middle-income  countries 
(e.g.  Chile),  such  operations  could  make  a  significant  contribution 
to  Lightening  the  debt  burden.  The  effect  of  debt  swaps  in  improving  . 
the  external  financial  situation of. a  debtor  country  must  not,  however, 
be  over-estimated,  since additional  external  financial  resources  are 
not  necessarily brought  into play.  But  this  type  of  instrument  is  useful 
in exerting  Leverage  on  invested  resources. 
For  the  middle-income  countries,  principally  in  debt  to  commercial  b~nks, 
the  application of  the  Brady  proposals,  since  1989,  has  produced· good 
results  for  certain countries  (Costa  Rica,  Mexicd;  Venezuela,  ~tc.). - 49  - Vlll /4  7'>1/9l-EN 
This  strategy  needs  to  be  pursued  more  actively,  and  here,  support  for 
the  IMF  and  th~ World  Bank  is of  prime  importance.  The  Community  sho~ld 
pay  special  attention  to: 
(a)  the  difficult  question  of  Linking  debt  redu~tions to  the  granting 
of 'new  loans; 
{b)  the  n~cessary conditionality  of  support  for  debt· burden  relief 
operations; 
(c)  the  need  for  dealing  with  the  debt  in  a  coo~dinated manner 
in  the  various  forums,  in  particular between  the  ?aris  and 
London  Clubs. 
(c)  Direct  investment  in  the  developing  countries 
While  noting  that  private. investment  dep~nds'in the  first  place  on  fa2tors 
relating to  the  country  receiving  it  (regulatory  and  administrative 
~ramework, confidence  in  reforms,  economic  policy), the  Community  should 
try,  in its  cooperation policy,  to encourage  a  flow  of  private capital 
towards  the developing  countries, by  stepping  up  economic  cooperation. 
In  the  period 1980-88, direct  investment  in the  developing  countries 
by  Community  investors  amounted  to  USD  42.7 billion,  with  US  and  Japanese 
investors  advancing  USD  38.3 billion and  USD  30.5 billion  respectively. 
2.3.  THE  BILATERAL  APPROACH 
The  Community  has  entered  into  relations  with  all the  developing  countries; 
although  these  relations are with  individual  countries,  a  Community-region 
~  dialogue  between  it and  various  institution~ - the  ACP  Gro0p,  ASEAN, 
the  Rio  group,  Central  America  and  the  Gulf  Coope~ation  Counc~l- has 
been  developed. 
As  a  result  of  the diverse nature  of  the  developing  countries  and  the 
'bilateral interests of  the  Community,  a  feature  of  such  reLations  is 
that  for  each  partner,  objectives  and  actions  are weighted  (policy 
mix)  in  a  manner  that  is  specific. 
2.3.1.  THE  OBJECTIVES 
A balance  between  political objectives  and  ~conomic and  social  ones 
is  aimed  at. 
·Among  the objectives,  the  ones  which  must  be  mentioned  at  ~nee are! 
the  prevention  and  solution of  conflicts,  respect  f~~  human  rights, 
support  for  the  process  of  democratization  and  liberalization of  the 
ecoriomy,  and  regional  i.ntegration or  cooperation.  Each  of  these  is 
critical  to  development.  The  Community  can  speak  on  these matters  with 
authority  in the  international  arena,  since it has  no  hegemonic  aspirations. - 50  - VIII/479/92-EN 
It  should  nevertheless  be  mentioned  that  other  objectives  than  the  purely 
economic  ones  generally  considered  as  basic  to  cooperation  policy  may· 
be  added. 
When  this  or  that  specific  operation  is  being  carried out,  for  example, 
the  Community  could  seek  to  relocate  some  of  its  act~vities  (investment 
policy)  or  create effective alternatives  to  stem  the  flow  of  illegal 
immigrants  to its shores. 
T6d~y, however,  the  most  important  objective,  perhaps,  is  environmental.· 
protection.  Activities  connected  with  tropical  fore~ts  in  certain 'cou~tries 
may  help  to  counter  anxiety  in  the  Community  in  relation  to  biodiver~ityc 
or  the  greenhouse  effect,  while  specific  projects  on  say,· fresh  water 
utilization, marine  pollution or  erosion  control,  may  have  an  effect 
at  the  regional  level. 
2.3.2.  THE  INSTRUMENTS 
Wh~defining the  instruments  by  which  it  can  achieve  its objectives, 
the  Community  should,  _ac~ording to the principle of  subsidiarity,  make 
optimum  use  of  its specific potential:  the  concessional  nature  of  its 
:.funds,  its greater  cancer~ for  the  Long  term,  and  its  ~tatus as  the 
world
1s  leading  commercial  power. 
The  instruments  of  development  policy are  not  therefore  restricted to 
classical aid  and  the  commercial  (regional  or generalized preferences) 
or  financial  (project  and  non-project  aid)  instruments  by  which  it is 
implemented.  More  and  more  frequently,  new  instruments  are  coming  into 
play  or old  ones  are being  revamped.  Among  these  we  can  mention  the 
following:  · 
(~)  technical  assistance,  particularly for  the  institutions,  in  training,iri 
transfers of  technology  and  in  cultural activities; 
(b)  humanitarian  aid,  including  assistance for  refugees;  in  1992,  the  Com-
mission  opened  a  European  Office  for  Urgent  Humanitarian  Aid,  designed 
to  make  relief operations  more  effective; 
{c)  political  dialogue  (Lome  Convention,  Rio  group,  San  Jose,  ASEAN, 
Gulf):  this appears  to  be  a  very  effe~tive tool  for  bringing exter-
nal  political  support  to  the  solution of  ~egional  conflict~, to 
the  democratization  process  and  to economic  reforms.  When  countries 
take  part  in  such  forums,  from  which  they  risk  .. expulsion  should 
they  return  to  policies  which  have  been  condemned  there,  political 
dialogue  can  start  to  exert  pressure  for  peace.,nd  good  development 
policies; 
(d)  economic  cooperation  of  mutual  interest:  training,  institutional 
support  (particularly  in  connection  with  privatization, trade  and 
investment  policy,  research,  energy  and  export  promotion); - 51  - VIII/479/92-EN 
Such  cooperation  could  turn  out  to  be  very  useful  in  helping  the  develop{ng 
couhtries  to  take  advantage  of  international  marketing  ~~~ortunities, 
especially  in  the  Community's  domestic  market.·  It  ~ill mean  motivaiing 
private  and  public  enterprises  on  the  European  ~nd  local  si~es through 
an  appeal  to  their  mutual  interests.  Because  of  it~ decentralized  nature 
·and  its effect  as  a  catalyst,  economic  cooperations is  a  powerf~L  tool· 
in  development.  It  is  particularly  im~ortant  in  t~o differing  developing 
country  scenarios:  firstly,~~ Large  cou~tries  wi~h technological  ~otential 
and  a  big  domestic  market,  despite  low  per  capita  incomes  (e.g.  India, 
China  and  Brazil),  and  secondly,  middle-income  C9Untries  that  are  ineligible 
for  or  not  interested  in  traditional  project  ~id; 
(e)  drug  traffic  control; 
(f)  assistance  for  environmental  protection measures. 
There  are still more  instruments,  connected  with  the  Community's  internal 
or  external  policy,  which  could  have  a  substantial effect  on  relations  with 
the developing  countries: 
(i)  ~olicies with  external  effects:  reform  of  the  CAP,  standardization policy 
Linked  with  the  int~rnal market,  common  policies  on  industry,  research 
and  the  environment; 
(ii)  the  common  immigration  policy  which  is to be  adopted. - 52-·  VIII/479/92-:-EN 
3.  MEETING  THE  CHALLENGE  OF  DEVELOPMENT:  THE  NEED  .FOR  AN  INTENSIFIED 
AND  DIFFERENTIATED  COOPERATION  POLICY 
3.1.  THE  MOVEMENT  AWAY  FROM  NATIONAL  CtiOPERATION  POLICIES  TOWARDS  JOINT 
COOPERATION  STRATEGY 
'The  Community  as  a  whole  cannot  confine  ifself  to  managin'g  or  consolidati·ng 
what  the  Member  States'  and  Community's  cooperation  policies  have  achieved 
in  the  past,  even  though  recent  years  have  seen  many  successes  and  improve-
ments. 
Important  as  they  are,  these  improvements  on  their  own  cannot  provide 
an  adequate  response  to  the  scale  and  the  complexity  of  the  developing 
world's  needs.  It is  only  a  united  Community  which,  thanks  to  the  size 
of  its world-wide  commitments  (amounting  to  40%  of  all ODA),  the  variety 
of different  instruments  at  its disposal,  its technical  capability and 
~t~  experienc~oan effectively  confront  the  problem  of·under-development. 
To  do  this, it needs  to  overcome  three  major  handicaps  which  have  servecl as 
barriers  in  the  past  to truly  common  measures.  The~e handicaps  are: 
the "coordination shortfall" between  national  and  Community  development 
policy;  the  "linkage  (or  cohesion)  shortfall".between  cooperation  policies 
and  other aspects  of  the  Community's  integration ·p/ocess,  and  lastly 
the  shortfall  in  voicing its policy  and  in  provid{ng  ~mpetus  ,  which 
Europe  has  suffered  from  in  international  forums  or  vis-a-vis  other 
·providers of  funds. 
These  shortfalls  can  only  be  made  up  through  the'definiti6n of  a  common 
development  policy  able  to  respond  to  the  challenges  posed  by  the  ~l~t 
of  the  South.  To  define  such  a  pol icy a consensus  must  first  be  reache'd 
on  a  set  of  common  principles  and  objectives,  which  can  be  used  as 'the 
foundation  for  the development  cooperation effort  of  the  Community  and 
its Member  States. 
Defined  jointly, these  principles  and  objectives  must  constitute  a 
"logical  framework"  within  which  to  formulate  our  policies  and  implement 
our  support. 
Constraints  to be  taken  into  consideration,when defining  a  strategy 
for  cooperation 
3.1.1.  HOW  CAN  AVAILABLE  AiD  RESOURCES  BEST  BE  "MANAGED"? 
Fo~ most  of  the  poorest  countries,  ODA  ~ill  continue~to be  a  decisive 
component  in  the  flow  of  resources  from  outside;  on  which  their  development 
will  depend  in  the  coming  decades.  This  is  the  inevitable  result  of 
both  the  constraints  weighing  on  their  capacity  to  export  and  the  fact 
that  they  hold  no  attraction for  foreign  (private)  investors. -53- VI II/4  79/92-EN 
In' the  coming  years,  however,  the  developed  economies  will  have  innumerable 
·calls  on  their  financing  capacity:  the  needs  of  the  poorest  developing 
countries  will  swell  the  demands  for  capital  to· finance  reforms  in  eastern 
and  central  European  countries  and  the  former  Soviet  Union~  Capital 
will  also  be  needed  by  the  developed  economies  themselves  to  pursue 
:their own  adjustment  efforts, made  all  the  more  urgent  by  trade  liberal-
ization  following  upon  the  conclusion  of  the  Uruguay  Round. 
The  relative  shortage  of  capital  flows  on  concessionary'terms  must·  lead 
to  a  concentration  of  financial  resources  and  to  a  re-focusing  of  objectives 
within  the  Community. 
~s a  priority,  financial  resources  m~st  be  directed to supporting  vital 
~ctivities that  will  act  as  a  motor  forth~ dev~lopment process,  e.g. 
o~timizing human  resources  or  overhaulin~a country's  administrative 
or  executive  services. 
3.1~2.  HOW  CAN  DIVERGENCES  IN  THE  DEVELOPING  WORLD  BE  "MANAGED"? 
The  growing  differences  in  economic  and  social  performance  in  countries 
.of the  South  is  one  of  the  most  striking features  of  the  past  thirty 
·years of  development.  Enormous  divergences  in per  capita  income  among 
developing  countries  is  perhaps  the  most  noticeable of  these.  Simplifying 
the  situation to  its extreme;  we  can  say  that  the  countries  in.the  South 
are  now  running  at  three different  speeds.  There  are  the  so-called 
succe~sful countries  like  the  newly  industrialized Asian  ones,  capable 
of  developing  under  theit own  steam;  there are the countries  whose  potential 
for  development  is good  but  who  are  heavily  caught .up  in  the  process 
of  economic  restructuring,  for  example  mahy  Latin  American  countries; 
and  finally  there are  the  countries  lagging  far  be~ind~whose· 
dependence  on  a  handful  of  raw  materials  is  as  strong  as  ever.  The 
latter group  contains·  almost  all  of  the African  and  the  Less  developed 
category  of  countries  (as  well  as  some  in  Latin  America,. 
This  growing  diversity  in  the  situation of the  de~eloping  countrie~ 
means  that  they  have  differing  needs.  For'the better-off  among  them, 
greater access  to  the  industrialized countries'  markets  and  a  new  framework 
for  economic  cooperation  - which  would  promote  joint  investment,  the 
expansion of  scientific  research  and  transfers of  technology  - should 
be .the principal  aim.  For  others,  whose  problem  is  a  disruption  of' 
inward  flows  of  money,  priority should  be  given  to obtaining  financial 
contributions  on  special  terms,  so  that  the  mounting  debt  burden  can 
.be  Lightened  and  support  can  be  provided ,for  the  economic  reform  process 
in which  they  are  engaged.  For  others  again,  because  of  their  chronic 
inability to  satisfy their needs,  they  must  be  giv~h assistance  in 
the  provision  of  the  most  elementary  necessities:  food  and  health  caie, 
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The  final  goal  of  cooperation,  however,  with  whichever  category  we  are 
:concerned, will  still be  the  same:  to  bring  them  gradually  into  the 
mainstream  of  the  world  economy  so  that  the  phenomena  of  marginalization 
and  exclusion,  in  evidence  today,  can  be  eliminated. 
3.1.3.  HOW  CAN  THE  COMPLEXITY  OF  THE  RELATIONS  WITH  THE  DEVELOPING 
WORLD  BE  MANAGED? 
The  scope  of  development  policies  has  .been  con~iderable· broadened:in 
past  year~.  Integrated  programmes  ha~~  replaced  the  financin~ of  individual 
projects.  Other  forms  of  support  have  gradually  been  added, ·tor  exa~ple 
assistance with  the  balance  of  payments,  or.direct·a~d for  budge~s 
in the  framework  of  stabilization and ·macroeconomic  or  sectoral. adjustment 
programmes. 
In  addition to  the  need  for  managing  these more  complex  types  of  support, 
it is now  imperative  to  include  new  dimensions  in  our  cooperation  arrange-
ments,  like the :environmental  connection  or  matters  relating  to  migr~tion, 
corruption,  security or  defence • 
. In  the  past  two  years,  moreover,  political issues,  in  particula~· as 
to  whether  or  not  any  form  of  democracy  exists,  have  been  added  to the 
strictly economic  or  financial  conditions  hitherto employed  by  the  IMF 
and  the  World  Bank.  More  recently still, a  consensus  has  emerged  on 
the  world  stage to  supplement  demands  connected  with  democratization 
by  others more  specifically  relating to the operations of  the  state 
and  the  public  service.  There  is a  tendency,  therefore,  towards  encouraging 
a  state of  law,  which  would  guarantee genuine  transparency  and  prevent 
government  high-handedness,  as  a  pre-requisi~e for  the effectiveness 
of  the  reforms  to  be  undertaken. 
As  a  result, the attitude of  the  recipient  count~y will  in future  be 
one  of  the  deciding  factors  in  the allocation of  development  cooperation 
resources. 
3.2.  COOPERATION  STRATEGY:  PRIORITIES  AND  OBJECTIVES 
3.2.1~  BASIC  PRINCIPLES 
The  development  efforts  harnessed  by  the  devel~ping countries  themselves 
(and  by  their partners)  are  designed  ultimately  to  instigate,  encourage 
or maintain  a  sustainable  process  for  improving  the  conditions  under 
which  entire  populations  live.  Their  minimum  ai~ is  the  provision 
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Development  also  implies  that  a  greater  number  of  freedoms  exist  and 
can  be  enjoyed.  It  should  aim  at  a  fairer distribution  of  the  fruits 
of  growth,  better  individual  and  collective security,  wider  access  to 
··educational  and  health  services,  and  the  promotion  of  cultural  values 
and  the  heritage  of  each  country  or  community  within  that  country. 
The  plurality and  complexity  of  the  dimensions  of  development  must  be 
taken  into account  in  formulating  development  cooperation  policies. 
Development  is  a  global  process  of  transfo~ming societies.  As  it gathers 
.  pace,  a  complex  interaction  between  the  various  elements  of  the  social 
··fabric starts up. 
Development  can  only  continue  if all  of  these  eleme·nts  evolve  harmoniously. 
During  the  process,  some  of  them  may.have  to be  profoundly  altered. 
Since all  development  activities  have  a  place  in  this  interactive· network, 
they  cannot  be  designed  independently  of  these structural  elements~ 
which  during  decades  of  development  efforts, deployed  with  more  or  less 
success,  have  been  shown  to  play  a  decisive  role. 
If  the  scope  of  cooperation  policies  is to be  extended,  in  particular 
to  political  and  institutional areas,  profound  chang~~ must  be  made 
in  the  way  that  dialogue  between  the  develop{ng  count~ies and  their 
developed  partners  is  conducted. 
The  definition of  development,  Like  its  implementation, .is the business 
of  the  country  concerned.  Ye~ it is  also  logical  and  legitimate  for 
providers  of  funds  to define  their own  cooperation  ~trat~gie~, i.e., 
the  pur~ose of  their actions,  the  scale  of  their  commiiment  and  the 
instruments  they  intend  to  employ.  · 
Once  this process  is  complete,  the  political  and  economic  conditions 
Likely  to ensure  the  success  of  the  Community-supported  ~eform programmes 
and  development  activities can  be  defined and  agreed  upon. 
Each  party  must  make  specific  undertakings  and  th~n abide  by  the  contract. - 56  - VIII/479/92-EN. 
Consequently,  in  its  cooperation  policy,  the  Community  must  ensure  that 
the  promises  made  by  the  recipient  countries  are  really  kept,  for  this 
~ill  deter~ine the  effectiveness  of  its aid.  If  the  commitments  ~re 
not  met,  the 2c~i?n itself will  inevitably  be  jeopardized. 
The  Community  is  not  just  a  partner  Like  all  the  rest  for  the  ~eveloping 
countries.  In  our  cooperation  with  them,  the  special  nature  of  our 
relations  with  our  partners,  founded  on  confidence,  mutual  undertakings 
and  an  on-going  dialogue,  must  be  safeguarded.  We  must  take  care  that 
the  country  in question  carries  out  the  necessary  reforms,  and  that 
these  are  not  merely  imposed  from  without. 
In  every  country  receiving  aid,  it  is  the  responsibility  of  t~e various 
donors  to  see  that  the  set  of  conditions  ~ttached .to  their  contributions 
is  consistent  with  those  of  ot~er donors.  Thii  requirement  has  become 
increasingly  important  since,  with  the  passage  of. time,  assistance  now 
takes  very  different  forms,  and  is  increasingly  associated  with  conditions 
affecting  whole  areas of, or  even  the entire, economy  of  the  country 
assisted  (if  the  conditions  relate.  to macroeconomic  objectives or  protect-
tst  policies).  · 
3.2.2.  MAJOR  THEMES  OF  A DEVELOPMENT  COOPERATION·  STRATEGY 
A political situation blocked  by  a  state which  does  not  provide  itself 
with  the proper  means  of  ensuring  economic  and  social  justice, structural 
disorder  in  the  economy  often  accompanied  by  an  intolerable  level  of 
debt,  the  absence  of  competitive  economic  structures, a  poor  position 
in  world  trade  in  products,  services, capital, technologies  and  information, 
all  in  a  variety of  forms  and  differ~iwl in  intensity  from  one  country 
to another:  these  phenomena  may  be  seen in atmost  every  developing  country. 
·Development  strategy  therefore  needs  to  be  designed  around  four  major 
themes:  reform  of  the  state and  the  political  system,  stabilization 
and  reconstruction of  the  economy,  encouragement  for  new  competitive 
economic  structures, and· acceptance  of  countries  from  the  South  ·in 
international  trading. 
Each  of  the  developing  countries  has  some  way  to  go  in at  least  one 
of  these  four  directions.  Many  need  to  advance  in all  four.  The  action 
'to  be  taken  towards  this goal  will, of  course,  have  to be  adapted  to 
the  specific  situation of  each  of  them.· 
A.  Democracy,  human  rights  and  effectiveness  of  the  state 
Since  its  mission  is  to  ensure  economic  and  social  justice  in  the  common 
interest, a  government  plays  a  vital  role  in  the  development  process. - 57  - VIII/479/92-EN 
In  a'number  of  developing  countries,  the  government  is  not  equal  to 
this  task. 
This  question  must  nolon~er  be  skirted  around  in  cooperation  policy if 
it  appears  that  political  and  institutio~ar  fa~tors are  proving  detriment-
.al  to  development  efforts.  The  ability of  a  government  to  c~rry out 
economic  reforms  dependsP  .in fact,  on  the  credibility it enjoys  among 
its people.  When  the  state  is  headed  by  an  elite or  a  particular ethnic 
.group  or  clan,  it  is difficult  to  expect  p~rt  of  the  population,  den~ed 
th~ fruits  of  growth,  to  use  its efforts  a~d to  work  for  the  sole benefit 
of that elite, with  which  it  cannot  identify. 
But  beyond  reasons  of  an  operational  nature  such  as  these,  the  promotion 
of democracy  and  respect  for  human  rights  is  an  ~ssential  aim  of  the 
Co~munity's development  policy  in  itself. 
This  human-orientated  policy  aims  just as  much  at  relieving  the  misery, 
and  improving  the  physical  well-being  of  the  population  assisted  as 
at  ensuring  that  rights,  freedoms  and  the dignity  of  each  and  every 
member  are  respected. 
Which  reforms  and  political  changes  can  be  encouragedin  the  developing 
countries  and  how  can  they  be  supported? 
The  keyword  here, democratization,  describes  a  process,  not  a  state. 
It covers  several  minimal  demands:  respect 'for the  fundamental  freedoms 
of' expression,  movement  and  association;  the~ equality of  all  people 
before  the  Law;  freed  om  of  the  press  and  pluraLism. of  politicaL  expression; 
and  above  all, the  separation of  powers  and  a  me~hod of  choosing  leaders 
that  renders  them  fully  responsible  to the national  community  and  provides 
for  alternance.  It is via  political  reform~ that  a  fairer distribution 
~f national  incomes  and  greater  social  justice will .be  achieved~ 
If  the  international  community  wishes  to.~ncourage democratization  in 
the developing  countries  and  to  obtain  lasting progress,  it  must  make 
itself quite  clear  and  apply  its "conditionality" deliberately,  remaining 
quite  firm  on  its minimum  demands,  but  remaining  neutral  as  to  how  demo-
cratic  life should  be  organized  (since  the  choice  of  their  institutions 
must  reflect  the  will  of  the  people). 
Political  pluralism and  universal  suffrage truly  reflecting .the  popular 
will cannot,  in  all probability,  be  installed rapidly  or  easily  in all 
the  developing  countries,  and  in  any  case, even  if  they  are,  they  do 
not  guarantee  that  a  state of  democracy  will  henceforth  exist.  Without 
them,,though,  it  is  plain  that  there  can  be  no  democr~cy. - 58  - VI II  I 4  79/92-EN 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  impossible  for  the  democratic  process  to start 
up  or  persist  until  an  effective  "economic  fabric"  is  in  place.  The· 
creation. of  this  should  be  sought  through  active  support  for  any  ~lans 
which  place  responsibility  on  the  shoulders  of  the  recipients  by  involving 
them  directly  in  the  management  of  aid  <&veloPnent·  through  participation). 
One  further  point  to  be  taken  into  consideratidn·when  the  Community's 
aid  policy  is being  drafted  is  the  proportibn  df  the  re~ipient  governmenti' 
budgets ipent  on  arms. 
By  Lowering  their  aid  volumes,  donors  could  persuade  recipients  to  cut 
their arms  purc~ases down  to  reasonable  levels  compared  to,  say,  their 
spending  on  health  or  education. 
This  is  not  the  place  to  go  into details  on  the  positive  measures  the 
Community  could  introduce  to  encourage  democraiy, ·or  on  the  sanct~~ns 
that  could  be  used  in  cases  of  human  rights  violations  or  any  interruption 
in  moves  towards  greater  democracy.  These  matter-s  have  already  been 
the  subject  of  a  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council.1 
What  is  important  is  to stress  the  Community's  need  to  engage  in  a  thorough-
going  dialogue  on  institutional  and  political  reforms  with  the  developing 
countries,  whenever  this  appears  necessary. 
The  improvement  of  political  structures .must  be ·carried  out  in ·parallel 
with  a  serious  reform  of  states•  administrative  structures  and  management 
methods. 
Several  measures  could  contribute to this: 
(a)  a  review  of  the state's tasks,  so  that  it concentrates  on  its essential 
functions; 
(b)  a  simplification of  administrative  structures  and  procedures,  so 
as  to  leave  room  for  business  to  exercise initiative; 
(c)  a  decentralization of  decision-m~king and  administrative  machinery, 
to  improve  contacts  between  administ~ative services  and  th~ public 
and  facilitate democratic  controls; 
(d)  on-going  effor~to train and  motivate  public  servants; 
(e)  greater  transparency  in  the  activities  of~the authorities,  ~hich, 
by  assisting  democratic  controls  to  operaie,  would  hel~ in  the  fi~ht 
against  corruption. 
\ee· the  Communication  from  the  Commission  on  human  rights,  democracy  and 
development  cooperation  policy  (25  March  1991);  Council  Resolution  of 
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B.  Rebuilding  the  economy 
The  second  imperative  is  to  rebuild  the  economic' bases  for  growth. 
This  means,  first  of  all,  restoring  the  major  balances,  via  a  stabilization 
phase,  the  length  and  cost  of  which  are often  under-estimated.  This 
should  be  followed  by  more  profound  reconst(uction  of  the  economic  fabric. 
Final(y,  constant  attention must  be  paid  to  the  Long-term  conditions 
f~r sustairiable  development. 
1.  Macroeconomic  stabilization 
Still  today,  the  majority  of  the  developing  countries  need  to  restore 
their macroeconomic· balances,  if  they  are  to  experience  healthy  and 
·tasting growth. 
It  is nearly  always  the  crushing  effect  of  their debt  and  the·cost  of 
their  imports  that  have  convinced  them,  with  or  without  IMF  support, 
to  engage  in  the  reforms  that  can.  re-esta~lish ~h¢ir macroeconomic 
balances,  and  more  particularly,  to  overhaul  the'mahagement  of  their 
public  finances. 
Such  reforms  have  not  always,  by  themselves,  managed  to  remove  the  con-
straint of  a  balance-of-payments deficit,  which  for  som~ ·countries, 
acts  as  a  powerful  brake  on  growth. 
An  inflow  of  adequate  external  resources,·in  the  form  of  export  earnings, 
ODA,  commercial  loans  and  direct  investment  is essential  for  restoring 
the bases  of  healthy  and  lasting  economi~  g~owth.  In  this context, 
measures  to alleviate  the debt  are  vitally important • 
. Such  refo~ms must  be·~ept in  place~for a  long·tjme·b~fore_success can  be 
guaranteed. 
Support  for  restoring  the  balance  of  payments  and  for  an  appropriate 
budget  should  be  provided  for  countries  embarking  on  stabilization measures; 
it should  take  account  of  the  time  needed  for  the effects of  reform 
to be  felt. 
The  experience of  countries  which  have  implemented:structural  adjustment 
programmes  has  shown  that  bringing  the  economy  under  control  can  have 
significant  economi~ and  social  costs  wh~ch  may  deit~bilize the  governments 
·which  introduce  them,  especially  since  th~ir positiveceffects  may  take 
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The  costs,  social  ones  in  particular, of  stabilization programmes  are 
no;w better appreciated.  Restructuring  conducted  in  appropriate  stages 
spread out  over  a  period,  aid  in  finding  employment  for  public  employees. 
and  workers  whose  jobs  are  lost,  operations  targeted·  towards  the 
most  vulnerable  groups,are all  ways  of  cushioning  the  social  and  economic 
costs of  adjustment  and  of  making  restructuring  and  budget  restrictions 
more  acceptable. 
2.  Restructuring  the  economy 
liberalization of  economic  activities  is  the  main  ~Lank of  structural 
reform.  This  must  be  carried  out  rationally  on  both  internal  and  external 
Levels.  Within  the  country,  the  removal  of  unnecessarily dirigiste 
or  petty  regulations,  the  reduction  of  administrative controls,  Lower 
and  more  rational  taxation,  price de-restriction, and  more  flexible 
em~Loyment codes,  are  all  vital  in order  tore-inspire businessmen  with 
a  "taste for  investing"  and  "the  power  to manage",'a.ll:too often destroyed 
b~ suffocating  bureaucracy.  On  the  external  Level,  adj~sting  exch~nge 
rates  to  more  realistic  and  flexible  levels,  more  Liberal  trade policies, 
overhaul  of  investment  codes  and  financial  regulations  which  make  capital 
movements  easier, are  so  many  methods  of  .opening  up  a  country's  economy 
to competition  and  encouraging  an  inflow of  foreign  resources. 
Reforming  the  public  sector  is  indispensable,  but  it  i~ sometimes  risky 
for  shaky  or  poorly-equipped  governments. 
The  major  moves  towa~ds privatization at  the  start of  the  eighties  ha~e 
shown  their  limitations  in  most  of  the  developing  countries,  because 
of  the  absence  of  a  private sector  on  the spot  able to substitute  rapidly 
for  the state.  A more  gradual  approach  has  often  had  to be  adopted, 
whereby  the  productivity of  certain  publicly-owned  enterprises  has  had 
to  be  stepped  up  before  the  state  can  hand  them  over  to  the  private 
sector. 
Although  the  state has  often  been  called  upon  to  withdraw  progressively 
from  its  role  of  direct  investor,  successful  restructuring is nevertheless 
dependent' on  its  continuing  support  for  productive  investment.  Via  the 
rehabilitation of  infrastructure  and  essential  services,  reform  of  the 
banking  system,  the decision  to  impose  less  draconian  taxation  on  businesses, 
the  state must  rapidly  create the  material  and  regulatory  conditions 
needed  by  businessmen  in  order  to  invest.  · - 61  - VIII/479/92-EN 
When  demands  for  capital  expenditure  are  bein~ made~ the  rural  world 
must  remain  a  priority.  Agriculture  in  the  developing  countries  is 
not  an  economic  activity  with  a  high  growth  potential  or  even  on~ that 
bringsc~~varative advantages.  But  in  countries  where  the  rural  population 
and  agric~ltural production  predominate  i.e. ·the  majorit~ of  developing 
countries,  efforts  to assist  them  must  be  -~ontinued for  reasons  of  social 
progress  and  equity.and  to  prevent  a  drift of  the  rural  poor  towards  · 
the  towns.  · 
Given  the  rapid  increase  in  urbanization,  donors  should  also  be  aware 
of  the  major  social  and  economic  changes  taking  place  in  urban  society. 
In  the  short  term,  social  tension  resulting  from  economic  reform  programmes 
is  more  Likely  to be  produced  in  towns.  The  situation calls  for  targeted· 
operations  on  groups  of  urban  dwellers  who  are  cut  off  from  the  benefits 
of  growth  or  who  are  victims  ot,adjustment  programmes.  But  above  all, 
support  should  be  given  to  active  policies for  strengthening  the  economic 
~omplementarity of  town  and  countryside. 
Over  and  above  such  targeted ·  support,  it is  clear that  a  genuine  incomes 
policy  is  also needed  to  complete  the  viable  restructuring  of  the ·economy. 
In  most  developi~g countries,  »spontaneous''  income  distribution continues 
to over-reward  speculative operations  and  people  with  administrative 
power  or  real  assets  (e.g.  foreign  exchange,  Land),  at  the  expense 
of  businesses  and  productive  Labour.  Access  to public health or  educational 
services  is only  available to  some,  and  worse,  it is  very  unevenly  divided 
between  towns  and  rural  areas, and  between  social  groups  in  the  towns. 
Measures  and  reforms  to  encourage  greater  fairness  and  social  justice, 
especially as  r~gards land  and  agrarian ownership,  income  tax  and  access 
to  loans  should  therefore  be  supported. 
3.  Laying  the  foundations  of  long-term  development 
·one  of  the  major  weaknesses  of  the  structural  adjustment  programmes 
of  the eighties  was  precisely to  make  the developing  countries.- and 
donors  as  well- concentrate  their energies  on  short~term results  (i.e. 
18-36  months),  in  line with  six-monthly debt-servicing  payments  or  ann4al 
reviews  of  macroeconomic  performances.  · 
The  short-term outlook is  correct  when  sta9ilization policy  is at  work, 
but  it is  unsuitable  for  development  strategies, where  long-term  factors 
(demography,  introduction  of  qualifications,  sluggish  markeisl  have· 
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In  the  developing  countries  it  is  advisable  to encourage  a  return  to 
.. a  certain type  of  programming;  medium-term  programming  of  public· expendit1.1re 
(which  is  ~lready used  for  programming  p~blic  investment  programme~ 
negotiated  with  the  World  Bank),  the  preparation.of  multiannual  budgets 
for  education  and  training costs,  the  design  or  urban  and  regional  develop-
ment  schemes,  and  plans  for  managing  natural  resources  (forests,  fisheries, 
catchment ·areas)  are all  ways  of  mobilizing  forces  and  providing  guarantees 
for  businesses,  while  leaving  them  room  tb exercise  the  freedom  they 
nee.d. 
Where  donors  are  concerned,  efforts must  be  made  to  provide  long-term 
programming  of  aid  and  cooperation,  both  in  terms  of  the  volumes  of  · 
resources  to  be  contr,jbuted  and  their geographical  or  sectoral  allocation. 
c.  Encouraging  new  competitive  economic  structures 
It would  be  unrealistic,  and  in  fact ·dangerous,  to  recommend  policies 
of .international  openness  and  Liberalization without  attempting  to  implement 
prior policies  aimed  at  encouraging  new  competitive  economic  structures. 
One  of  the  fundamental  aspects,  therefore; of  any  development  cooperation 
~olicy must  be  the  in~lusion of  objective~  involving  the  creation of 
. such  structures,  to enable  businessmen  in  the developing  countries  to 
compete  in the  conditions  prevailing  in  the  international  markets.  An  an-
alysis of  successful  economic  development  during  recent
1
decades  shows 
that  success  stems  from  the  creation at  national  level,  of  a  climate 
favourable  to  competition  between  enterprises, since  in  a  market  economy 
the  capacity  for  initiative and  the  responsibility for  business  a~tivities 
must,  in  the  first  place, lie with  firms  themselves. 
In  the  specific  context  of  the  developing  countries,  state intervention 
should  stimulate  and  support  the  creation of  open  and  competitive  conditions 
for  business,  by  setting  up  machinery  to  encourage  the development  of 
efficient  factors  of  production.  This  will  enable  the enterprises to 
build  up  dynamic  competitive  advantages. 
·It is essential  for  each  country  to  create  a  competitive  domestic  context, 
after  which  its  enterprises will  be  stimulated  into acquiring 
competitive  capacity. 
1 or  regional,  according  to  the  country's  situation and  position. - 63  - VI II /4  79/92-EN 
It  is  possible  to  identify  some  of  the  prior  conditions  for  creating 
a  suitable business  environment  and  hence  improving  the  chances  of  a 
developing  country's  enterprises  becoming  competitive. 
Real  competitive  capacity  that  can  be  easily  mobilized  must  exist  in 
a  country,  in  fact,  if its enterprises  are  to survive  and  even  more 
importantly,  if  they  are  to  benefit  from  the_potential  which  the  open-' 
ing-up  of  the  country's  economy  to  international  competition  produces. 
These  prior  conditions  are:1 
(a)  the  existence  of  competitive  structures  in  the vicinity .of  the 
enterprise  (i.e.  in  its  own  sector  or  the  sectors  upstream  or-
downstream  from  it); 
(b)  the  existence  of  a  Legal  and  institutional  framework  that  Leaves 
businesses  free  to  take  initiati~es; 
(c)  the  existence of  an  adequate  technical  infrastructure  (transport 
and  communications);  · 
(d)  the  existence  of  a  satisfactory  educational  level  in  the  sectors 
of  society  which  are  Likely to become  involved. 
Comparative  factors  of  competitiveness  are first  and  foremost  built 
up  through  powerful  pressure  in  Local  competitive  circles.  Such  ~ressJre 
can .then  produce  positive  knock-on  effects,  via  the  stimulus  they  exert 
on  ~)  the  demand  for  specific qualification-orientated training  and 
b)  the  need  to  improve  technological  capacity  and  develop  specialized 
infrastructure  rapidly. 
If this  path  is followed,  a  country's  domestic  competitive  situation 
can  soon  become  a  real  Lever  for  promoting  progress  and  economic  developmen 
The  success  of  dynamic  enterprises  in  the  developing  countries  in  condition 
of  an  open  economy  is of  necessity·  dependent  o~ their  having  become 
competitive  in  their  own  economic  environment.  Competitive  pressure, 
both  from  outside  and  at  home,  can  therefore  provide  the  motor  by  which 
enterprises  develop  competitive  advantages,  and  through  them,  the  country 
as  a  whole.  ·  · 
As  the  recent  history of  countries  whose·economi~s have  succeeded  in 
taking  off  has  shown,  the  secret  for  gaining  competitive  advantage  is 
to  pract~se real,  healthy  economic .competition.  When  the  Latter  is 
'allowed  genuine  free  play,  vital  lessons.can  also·be  Learned  by  the 
other actors  whose  participation  in  development  is necessary. 
1Michael  Porter,  "The  Competitive  Advantage  of  Nations". - 64  - Vlll/479/92-EN 
D.  Increasing  the  participation of  the  South  in  the  world  economy 
i.  General  approach 
One  of  the essential  objectives  of  the  structural  adjustment ·policies 
implemented  by  the  developing  countries is to  enable  them  to  become 
an  integral  part of  the  world  economy,  participating  in  expanding 
activ~ty  and  trade  and  the  attendant  economic  and  technical  progress. 
For  the  newly  industrialized  countries  and  those  following in  their 
wake,  like Thailand,  Malaysia  or  Mauritius,  successful  insertion  in 
trade  in  goods,  services,  capital  and  information,  which  are  the  mainsprings 
of  the  world  economy,  has  provided  an  essential basis for  and  a  clear 
indication of  the  success  of  their development  efforts.  For  most  of 
the other developing.countries,  the  route  to  similar  integration seems 
to be  full  of  pitfalls. 
These  growing  disparities  threaten  the  least  successful  developing  countries 
with  marginalization.  The  idea  of  introducing  a  new  fn1ernational  economic 
order  under  which  imbalan~es  ~nd  diffe~ences ~ould be  managed,  is  no 
. longer  an  attractive one.  While  it is certainly possible to  introduce 
arrangements  that  would  take better account  of the needs  and  possibilities 
.of different  groups  of  developing  countries,  into the  internat  .. ional 
trading  system,  the  imperative  of  competition must  apply  to  them  all 
and  ins~ire their  developme~t strategies, as  we  have  shown  in the  pre~ious: 
sub-chapter. 
The  requirement  of  competitiveness  can  obviously  not  be  achieved  through 
the  same  political and  adjustment  policies everywhere.  Penetrating 
the European  or  Japanese  market,  finding outlets.with  substantial  added 
value  or  invigorating  technology are, of  course,  nottargets  that all 
developing  countries  can  reasonably  aim  at. 
In  this context,  the  Community  could  lend  its support  to  the  establishment 
of  appropriate  institutional  framework,  and  to actions  aimed  at  ·imp~oving 
'productivity, developing  Local  capacity  for  innovation or technological 
adaptation, adjusting domestic  or  regional  demand,  changing  ~reduction 
techniques  in  line with  modern  advances,  and  creating  conditions  that 
· are more  attractive to foreign  investors. 
The  acquisition and  exploitation of  information  is also subject  to  intense 
·competition,  the  factors  of  which  range  from  the  identification of  commercial 
outlets or  the  cheapest  methods  of  transport  to  the  choice  of  the most 
s~ccessful technologies.  ' 
The  transition from  the  national  to the  regional  dim~nsion may,  for 
many  developing  countries,  be  the  first  step  in 'enl·a'rging  their econo"!ic 
space.  Regional  cooperation  and  integration  are  also  important  instruments 
for  fo~tering economic  development.  In  additio~, they  mjy  help  to  reduce 
political  and  military tensions  in  the  region  and  provide  support  for 
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With  its  own  wealth  of  experience  in  this  domain,"the  Community  should 
·pursue  and  broaden  the  initiatives it has  already  taken,  ~hen: it  renews 
agreements  or  cooperation  programmes  (Lorn~,  ALA  developing  countri~s;· 
and  so on)  or  acts  in  various  forums  (World  Coalition  for  Africa  - pbst 
Maastricht  exercise;  special  programme'to  assist  sub-Saharan Africa; 
the  OECD's  Development  Assistance  Committee). 
A favourable  macroeconomic  background  is  the  first  of  the  conditions 
for  hel~ing to  make  the  South. an  integral  paft  of  the  international 
economy.  The  pace  and  succession of  measures  for  organizing  trade ·access 
are also vital  to  the  success  of  restructuring  policy.  Exchange  rate 
management  also  plays  a  decisive  role  in  implementing  these  policies.· 
!~perfections in  the  labour  market  may  also  push  ~~ the  economit  and  soci~t 
cost  of  adjustment  resulting  from  more  open  t~ade.,  Finally, distortions 
in  the  price  system  may  lead  ~bGsinessmen off  in  f~lse di~ections. 
In  some  cases,  the  provision of  export  incentives  ... and  measures  to  prom·ote 
labour mobility  (training, fiscal  measures  affecting amortization  of 
capital .costs)  may  be  vital  in  helping  to  reallocate  the  factors  qf 
production- one  of  the  aims  of  a  policy  of  gr~ater openness. 
The  composition  and  timetable of  the  programme  6f  trade  liberalization 
must  be  defined  carefully, with  attention being  paid  to  the  characteristics 
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More  generally,  the  reason  for  the  developing  countries  to  open  up,  and  the 
extent  to which .they  do, will  vary  from  one. to  another.  It  is  clearly 
desirable  to  b~eak down  protectio~ist walls  behind  which  wasteful  uses 
of  product ion  resources  have  been  able  to  flourish •. · • It ,is  obv.ious  that, 
'if a  particular economy  wishes  to  enjoy  the  dynamic  benefits  of  the 
world  economy,  the first  obstacles  t'o  de,v.elopment  which  must  be  removed 
are  those  in  sectors  with  export  potential. 
But  in  many  countries,  poor  training,  a  weak  technological  base,  inadequate 
infrastructure  and  a  shortage  of  capital and  sometimes  of  nat~ral  resour~es, 
all of  which  are  pre-requisites  for  creating  competitive  economic  structures, 
may  seriously  compromise,  at  least  in the  medium  term,  the  chances  of 
success  of  any  opening-up  policy.  These  factors  may  restrict  the  prospects 
for  diversifying  the  economy  and  may  be  the  sources  of  severe  competitive 
handicaps .that  are difficult  to overcome  even  in  the  home  market  once 
·it has  been  opened  up  to  strong  competitors,  let  alone  in  third  country 
markets. 
A systematic  assessment  of  the  size of  the  gap  in  competitiveness  between 
countries  like these  and  their  rivals, and  an  analysis  of  the  various 
factors  at  the  root  of  handicaps  of  this  type  must  be  the  first  step 
in  any  reform of  trade policy,  to  assess  the  goals  and  the  reforms 
and  adjustments  needed  ,  before  the  potential  advantages  of  opening 
up  can  be  realized. 
2.  Technological  development 
Technology  is  a  determining  factcr  in  competitiveness,  whichever  economy 
is under cons ide  ration. 
Disparities  between  the  developing  cou'ntries  in  their.' capacity  for  techno-
logical  advance  are  growing.  They  indicate the conditions  which  produce 
technological  dynamism  and  the  fields  to whiih  they  relate:  economic, 
institutional, technical  and  culturaL.· 
Adequate  transfers of  technology  are  obviously one  of  the  most  important 
of  such  conditions,  but  they  only  occur  if there  is sufficient  local 
capacity  for  applying,  disseminating  and  adapting  them  locally.  Training 
must  continue  to  receive  attention as  a  priority, both  in  the  programmes 
of  the  developing  countries  and  in  the  technical  assistance  provided 
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Technological  cooperation,  South-South  as  well  as  North-South,  should 
also  be  stepped  up.  For  countries  experi.ericing  the  same  needs,  South-
-South  cooperation  is  a  way  of  sharing  R&D  costs,  which  are  on  the  increase, 
and  of  finding  very  profitable  synergies  in  terms  of  technological  develop-
ment.  This  is  exactLy  what  initiatives  Like  the Bdlivar  programme, 
recently  launched  in Latin America,  hope  to achieve. 
The  experience  of  counuies  which  are  slightlr e;h-·ad  in  this  an~a  <:r.d 
~<~hich  hzve  recer,tty  solveti  simi lerr  problems,  can· be  drawn  on  to  ht:-lp 
other  developing  countries  in  their  technolo~ical and  d~velo~ment  choices. 
Appropr·iate  tech.,cl::>Jies  a!.Jesigned  to  meet  the  n-:!<:ds  of  the  lel>s  d.::veloped 
countries  can  be  passed  on  to other  developing  countries,  and  not  necessarily 
by  the  industrialized ones • 
..  If. the developing  countries  are  to  be  incorporated  into  networks  for 
the exchange  of  technologies,  many  of  them  will  need  to  be  better  informed 
about  the various  technologies  available,  where  they  can  be  found,  how 
they  can  be  acquired  or  ways  in  which  technological  cooperation  can 
be  undertaken. 
3.  Commodities 
The  long-term downward  slide  in  demand.  for  and  prices of  most  of  the 
Third World's  products  has  exacerbated structural  problems  in  these 
countries,  many  of  which  are  among  the  world's  poorest.  Though  to  a 
less  marked·extent  since 1982,  commodity  price  inst~bility still  cau~es 
fluctuations  in export  earnings  on  a  scale that  poses  one  more  obstacle 
on  the  road  to development  in  the  countries  affected. 
The  'positive  results obtained  through  diversification  in  the  more  advanced 
developing  countries,  synonymous  there  with  expanding  income,  investment· 
and  productivity  in all sectors,  including;commodities,  has  only  added 
to the problems  of  the  less  developed  exporting  countries.  The  Latter 
have  often  lost  part  of  their  share  of  the market  to  more  competitive 
rivals with  better knowledge  of  marketing  channels.  Their declining 
share of  the  market  has  even  benefited  the~loped countries  on  some 
occasions. 
'The  basis  for  actions  which  seek  to  improve  conditions  for  the production 
of  commodities  in  the  countries  which  depend  most  heavily on  them  is 
a  foreaast  -which  unfortunately  leaves  Little  room  for·doubt- that 
they will  continue  for  several  years  to  come  to.derive  most  of  their 
income  from  such  products.  For  them,  diversification,  which  Lies  at 
the  heart  of  the development  process,  will  require  a  long  period  of' 
effort.  Any  activities aimed  at  increasing  ~he developing  countries' 
profits  from  their share  of  the  international  commodities  market  ~ust 
take  into  account  the  growing  competitive  dispar~ti'es  among  commodities 
exporters.  Such  activities  must  be  designed  with  the  following  key 
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(i/ to  provide  countries  that  are  most  heavily  dependent  on  commodi-
ties, as  well  as  donors,  with  the  cleare~t possible picture. 
of  the  market. situation, especially  as  re~ards competition;, 
(ii)  to  support  the  attempts  of  these .countries  to  export  to  certain 
markets,  particularly  in  central·and eastern Europe,  the  CIS, 
and  a  few  other developing  countries; 
(iii)'to pursue  and  support  measures  to diversify  and  to  improve 
competitiveness  in  the  commodities  sector; 
(iv)  to  limit  the negative  effects  on  their development  etforts. 
of  fluctuations  in  commodities·e~port earnings; 
(v)  to  see  that  product  agreements  are  again  working  properly 
and  that  they  continue  to do  so',.  since  these  help to  limit·  "'' 
eitessive price  fluctuations. ·  , 
3.3.  THE  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  POVERTY 
The  campaign  against  poverty,  which  may  take  many  forms,  cannot  be .viewed 
as  a  particular theme  or  isolated element  of  development  strategy.  'It 
is true that  poverty  may  be  the  result  of  physical  constraints  in  a 
sometimes  hostile natural  environment,  but 'it stems  much  more  frequently 
from  a  badly-managed  economy  putting  a  brake  o~ growth  than  from  a  struct-
ural  deficit of  technical ability.  It is also brought  about  by  political 
and  social structures that  accentuate  in~~ualiti~i in the  distribution 
of  a  country's  wealth. 
'Three  items  in  any  strategy designed  to  lessen poverty,  currently  ~ffecting 
more  than a  third of  the  world's  population,  are  the  restoration of 
growth,  the  installation of  viable economic  s~ructures and  the  femo~a\ 
of  inequalities. 
Pov-erty,  in  any  case,  is  not  onlY  a  phenomenon  of  th'e  poorest  countrie~ 
(defined as  those  with  less  than  USD  530  of  per  ca'pita  income).  It also 
affects  a  section of  the  population  in  quite a lot .of  middle-income 
countries  in  the South.  Such  groups  must  also be  provided  for  in  any 
·~ooperation policy  intended  to alleviate ~ensions· and  restore  balan~es 
·  on  the global  level.  · 
The  specta~ular progress  registered  by  rapid-growth  Asian  countries 
such.as  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Thailand,and Pakiitan is  proof  of  the  prime 
role of  growth.  In  Indonesia,  for  example,  the  proportion  of  poor  people 
fell  from  58%~o17% between  1970  and  1987 •.  In~ersely, the  recession 
that  has  hit  Africa,  Latin  America  and  some  of  the eastern  European 
~ountries in  the  eighties  has  clearly  had·  adverse  effects  on  the  poorest 
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Although  a  major  influence  ori  a  country's  growth  ii the  international 
economic  situation, it  can  also,  to  a  great  ~xtent, be  affected  by  policies 
it  has  itself  implemented,  in  particular  how  it has  adapted  its production 
conditions  to  changes  provoked  by  the  crisis.  The  spectacular  recoveries 
made  by  countries  such  as  Brazil  and  Mexic9  recently  readily  prove  this. 
Recovery  of  this  type  is not,  however,  capable  of  being  reproduced  everywhere.· 
In  countries  with  structures  which  have  never  really  been  able to generate 
.a  sustained  and  self-sustaining development  process,  it will  be  necessary 
.to adopt,  first  of all, a  st·rategy  for  overhauling.outmoded  economic 
.str~ctures  lacking  in  competitive·viability,  in  order to  build ~he very 
foundations  on  which  growth  can  be  based. 
Side  by  side  ~ith macroeconomic  improvements,  efforts will  be  needed 
to  remove  inequalities ,and  by  so  doing,  poverty  will: be  reduced.  As 
an·  illustration, Brazil, which  is a  comparatively  rich  country,  has 
a  per  capita  income  of  USD  2  500.  But  the  poorest  20%  of  its people 
have  an  average  per  capita  income  of  only  USD  300 •.  In  such  ~ases, the 
inequalities  mainly  stem  from  Land  ownership  structures  and  the  system 
of  income  distribution.  Specifically,  the  latter is  the  result  of  the 
fiscal  legislation, which  sets the  volume  and  form  of  taxes .due,  and 
hence  determines  which  social  categories  shall  pay  tax  and  which  shall 
receive  state benefits funded  from  the  country's  budget. 
Institutional  reforms  are  therefore  an  important  element  in  any  programme 
to  combat  poverty.  Until  govern~ental machinery  and  political  systems 
become  genuinely,democratic,  it will  be  impossible  to  ensure  that  income 
is distributed  any  more  fairly.  · 
The  reforms  we  have  mentioned  will  only  bear fruit g~adually,  in  the 
long  term.  They  must  be  supplemented  by  targeted operations  to  relieve· 
certain  kinds  of  suffering  and  to offset  the  social  costs  of  reform 
policy  and  economic  restructuring.  · 
The  extension or  even  merely  the  maintenance  of  basic  services,  part-
icularly  education  and  health services,  is  a  priority,  sine~ in  real 
terms  expenditure  on  the  social  sector  has  slumped  by  26%  in  sub~Saharan 
Africa  and  by  18%  in  Latin  America  between  1980, and:1985. 
Clearly,  donors  should  not  confine  their efforts  to  merely  providing 
financial  contributions.  The  situatfon provides· an.opportunity  for 
helping  governments  to  restore  these  public  sectors, which  are  seldom 
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In  addit.ion  to  chronic  poverty  and  the  social  hardships  caused  by  ·economic 
reform,  there  are  other  forms  of  poverty  of  an  "accidental"  nature, 
li.nked  to  armed  C:A'1ftict or  the  oppression  of  certain  population  groups 
·(~~g.  the difficulties  in  the  Horn  of  Africa, the  Kurdish  question)· or 
td natural  disasters  (e.g.  floods  in  Bangladeih>.  AL~  these  ad~ considerably 
to  the demand  for  emergency  aid  for  humanitarian.purposes. 
Given  the  volume  and  variety  of  requests  for  humanitarian  aid, ii is 
necessary  to  define  some  objectives  and  principles,  followed  by  some 
prior1t1es.  Gifts of  aid are useless  unless  the  gift  is  "managed". 
It  is  therefore essential  to  see  that  humanitarian operations  are  properly 
conducted.  Moreover,  such  emergency  measures  should  also  be  carried 
out  within  a  logical  framework  so  that  any  possible  conflict  with  the 
demands  of  the  necessarily  longer-term  development  process  are  reduced 
(e.g.  the  possible  clash  between. food  aid and  agricalt~rat development' 
strategy). 
In  addition,  where  a  particular group  of  people  is suffering acutely, 
the  Community  should  be  able  to  contribute its humanitarian  aid directly, 
even  if the authorities  in  the  country  concerned  are  opposed  to  such 
an  initiative  (the  right  to  intervene  f6r  humanitarian  reasons). - 71  ...:.  . VIII/479/92-EN 
4.  OPERATIONAL  DEFINITION  OF  PRIORITIES,~BY REGION 
The  tendency  observed  during  the  past  decade  has  amply  illustrated the 
willingness  of  the  Community,  supported  by  its ~2 Me~ber States  and 
all  the  instruments  it  t'!a~  created  (financial  machinery,  trade  policy, 
investment  aid), to  cooperate with  the  whole  of  the  ~eveloping world. 
4.1.  DIFFERENT  APPROACHES 
Each  developing  region  has  individual  characteristics, described  below, 
which  justify an  active  role  on  the  part  of  the  Community. 
1.  Sub-Saharan Africa is deserving of  very  special  attention because 
of  Eur~pe's historic ties with  the  region;  this~ attention .needs 
to be  reinforced, owing  to the  acute effects there  of  the  absence 
of  order  and  the  extent  of  poverty. 
2.  The  Mediterranean,  whose  geographical  proximity means  that 
events  there  can  influ.eric·e· the  stability of.our  own  environment; 
like the  countries of  central  and  eastern Europe,: it therefore 
·requires an  immense  amount  of  support  going  far  beyond  the  simple 
demands  of  solidarity.  Our  aid must  be  based  on  clearly  formulated 
mutual  interests. 
3.  Latin America,  because  of  our  very  close cultural ties with 
this continent  and  the  enormous  potential it represents  as  regards 
trade, investment~ and  transfers of  technology  and  know-how,  calls 
for  a  policy which  must  be  innovatory,  especially  since possibilities 
of·cooperating with  it have  so  far  been  under-exploited. 
4.  Asia,  with  its serious  problems  of  poverty,  needs 
enhanced  measures  of solidarity; .but  at the  same  time,  a  framework 
for  broader  economic  cooperation  w~th the  more  advanced  countries 
in the  region  could  prove  beneficial to Europe  <e.g.  joint ventures, 
research  agreements,  transfers  of  know-how). 
Because  of  growing  disparities between  developing  countries,  a  greater 
.diversity of  needs  is emerging.  This  makes  it necessary  ~o encourage 
the  implementation of  varyin~: and  selective  supp~rt  strategie~. 
In  terms  of  development  cooperation,  however,.the  extent  to which  Community 
policy has  the  power  to exert  real  influence  on  development  varies  from 
region to  region.  ·The  degree  of  influence  is determ.i.ned  by  the "weight" 
of  the  Community  and  its Member  States  in the  aid  total  (the "relative. 
mass"  of  Community  aid),  and  the  scale of  the  aid  in  relation  to·major 
macroeconomic  indicators,  parti~ularly the  GOP  and  the  budget  of  the 
recipient  countries or  regions. - 72  - VIII/479/92-EN 
Our  ability to  influence  the  development  process,  even  in  regions-where 
the· Community's  direct  contribution does  not· reach ·the "critical mass", 
·will be  much  great~r through  a  rational  and  coordin~ted fusion  of  Community 
.and  Member  States'  resources. 
The  European  Community  will  be  more  effective  if it  also  includes  other 
instruments  for  cooperation.  Among  these,  we  tan point  to trade,  invest-
ment  policies  (e.g.  joint ventures)  a·nd  the creation of  a  framework  for 
economic  cooperation  aimed  at  encouraging  technological  transfer,  research 
development  and  scientific training,  as  well  as  cooperation on  education.-
4.1.1.  PRIORITIES  FOR  SUB-SAHARAN .. AFRICA 
'•  .,  (•  ;,  (J  .·  •••• 
--~-----~--------
Africa  has  made  plenty  of  progress  towards  development:  health  conditions 
have  steadily  improved,  many  now  have  access  to  educa~ion, a  fairly  sub-
stantial  infrastructure network  has  been  created.  Al.ong  with  these achieve-
·ments,  however,  especially  in the  past  decade,  there  have  been  a  number 
of  serious economic  errors which  have  unfortunately weakened  Africa's 
position vis-a-vis  the  rest of  the developing  world~. 
The  downward  spiral  in  the  continent's economic  performance  is impressive. 
Proof  of  it is everywhere:  in the  low  economic  growth  rate, the  drop 
in  per  capita _income  and  deterior_ation  in-so,l!.i_al  ..  ~evet_s, and  in  __  t~.e  con-
stant  dwindling  of  its share in world  trade or world  income.  In  many 
cases, this crisis situation has  been  brought  about  directly by  regional 
or  internal  conflict. 
It. is also taking noticeably  lon~er for Africa  to  acquire and  ass~milate 
·,  new  technologies  and  to  manage  information and  communications  sy~tems. 
The  same  holds  for  its progress  towards  greater democracy  in its societies. 
The  gaps  between  this continent  and  most  other countries  (including developing 
ones)  are,  in fact, getting wider • 
.  The  serious  situation  in  which  the major  part  of  Af.rica  finds  itself may 
give  the  impression  that  everything  is a  p~iority.  ,suc~ a  view  can  only 
lead  to a  dispersal  of  financial  resources which  will  become  increasingly 
unequal  to the  task. 
Yet  past  experience has  shown  that  the. main· reason  why  aid  has  failed 
to  live  up  to  its promise  is  that  the  economy  - too  highly-centralized, 
run  by  inefficient  state  institutio·ns, and  undermined  by  corruption  -
is badly  managed. - 73  - VI II  /479/92-EN 
·It  is  because  of  this  that  European  and  international  cooperation  should, 
in African  countries,  be  used,  as  a  priority,  to  support  policies  ~o~ 
restructuring  the  economic  fabric  and  for  introduting  democrati~  r~forms, 
.which  have,  in  any  case,  started  up  spontaneously  in  many  of  them. 
Policy  like  this  is  already being  implemented  in  many  African  countries. 
They  have  taken  the  road  to  reform,  with  difficulty but  often with  courage 
and  determination.  However,  restructuring  can  only  be  carried out  slowly 
and  it therefore  calls  for  a  real "contract" of  partnership between  the 
Community  and  Africa  - the  African  countries  making  a .commitment  to  follow 
the  road  to  reform  and  the  Community  promising  to  support  them  for  the 
time  it takes,  while also  financing  short-term measures  to  relieve  the 
immediate  effects  of .the crisis. 
This  framework  for  improving  the  situation has  one  or  two  major  drawbacks, 
from  the  institutional  point  of  view.  The  first  of  these  concerns  coor-
dination,  not  only  between  the  Member  States of  the  Community,  but  also 
with  the  World  Bank  and  the  IMF,  the  institutions most  closely  involved 
in  rstructuring operations.  It is quite clearly  impossible  to make  headway 
in this  sector of  cooperation  by  following  divergent  routes;  therefore 
the Community  should  step  up  its dialogue with  these  institutions,  in 
order both  to  avoid  taking decisions  that  are  not  fully  compatible .with 
the objectives  of  each  of  them.  and  to  make  known  its own.ideas  on  how 
African  countries  can  evolve,  based  on  its experience,  its compassion 
and  its concept  of  development.  · 
Another  problem  is  posed  by  the degree  to which  ihe. tommun(ty
1s  existing 
instruments  for  implementing  such  a  policy can  be  adapted.  The  Lome 
Convention  already allocates  considerable  sums  to  s~ructural adjustment. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Convention's  current  machinery  is only  partially 
suitable for  the  type  of  negotiations  with  governments  which  now  seem 
to be  necessary  in order  to make  aid  really effective - and  this as  regards 
both  structural  adjustment  support and more  specific operations. 
Benefits,  like the opportunity  for  calm  dialogue  between  partners,  have 
definitely accrued as  a  result  of  fixing  in  advance,  in the  programming 
framework,  the  amount  of  money  to be  allocated.  But  there  have  been 
drawbacks:  the  fixed  sums  laid  down  make  it difficult  to  be  adaptable 
when  circumstanc-es demand.  A more  flexible· system,  with  room  for  manoeuvre~ 
would  make  this  instrument  a  more  effective one. 
Another  difficulty arises  because  the  sole  interlocuter, the  bnly  partner 
in discussions  on  cooperation,  is  the  state.  It  i~ questionable  whether 
this  is a  situation that  should  be  maintained,  in  the ·context  of  progress 
towards  greater decentralization and  more·importantly,  from  the  viewpoint 
of  liberalization measures,  which  are  bound  to  reduce  the  role of  the 
·state  in  the  economic  sphere.  Is  there  not  need,  perhaps,  to  find  and· 
deal  directly  with  other partners, particularly  g~assroots communities 
and  the  private sector,  instead of  with  governments  alone? - 74  - VIII/479/92-EN 
It is also clear·that, parallel  to  restruct~ring measures,  other  c~operative 
. operations  of  a  different  kind,  aimed  at  coping  with  serious  long-term 
problems,  should  also  be .mounted.  Food  security  policy  needs  to  be  relaunched 
because  of  the  forecasts  of  growing  deficits.  The  issues  of  biodiversity  ~nd 
environmental  protection,  and  problems  connected  with  population growth 
are·all areas  for  study,  calling  for.much  Larger-scale  ·responses. than 
'  .  . 
in  the  past. 
For  most  of  the  African  countries,  incorporation. in  the  world  economy 
is  a~ objective that  can  only  be  contemplated  in  the  long  term.  Right 
now,  regional  integration would  seem  to  be  an  area  where  cooperation 
could  be  brought  to  bear with  quicker  and  more  sure  results. - 75  - Vlll/479/92-EN  ~ 
4.1.2.  THE  MEDITERRANEAN 
'Two  questions  more  than  any  others,  colour  the  Community's  relations 
with this  region.  They  can  be  framed  as  follows. 
(a)  Given  the  gap  in  Living  standards  between  the  Community  and  its 
southern Mediterranean  neighbours  and  given  their demographic  growth 
and  the  internal  tensions  that  are  a  permanent  fact  of  life there, 
how  may  the  Community  reduce  the  gap  so  that  these  neighbours  become 
more  prosperous  and  so  that  migratory  pressu~es to our  shores  are 
lessened? 
(b)  How  can  the  Community  lend  more  effective support to the  peace  process 
-between  Israel  and  the  Arab  countries? 
.In attempting to answer  these questions,  the  Community  should: 
·  (i)  support  economic  reforms  and  regional  cooperation  to  render  the 
M~ghreb and  Mashreq  as  attractive to private European  investment 
as  central  and  eastern  Europe  are  set  to  become;' 
.Cii)  contribute on  a  targe scale to these  countries'  existing family 
planning  programmes. 
To  achieve  these ends,  the  following  will  be  needed: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
a  large  jump  in financial  resources; 
the  allocation of  funds  only  to  countries  capable of  carrying  out 
the  political, economic  and  social  reforms  (including demographic 
policy)  necessary  for  development; 
,•· 
directing  funds  towards: 
.technical assistance with  the  running  of  their  institutions  (the. 
technical  condition  for  successful  reform>; 
.the  social  element  in  reform  programmes  (the political  condition 
for  making  reforms  acceptable to the population}; 
.encouragement  for  private  investment,  for  the transfer of  expertise 
and  technology,  and  for  local  exports  (business  to  busin.ess>; 
4.  substantial  support  for  regional  cooperat~on both  in the  Maghre~ 
and  the Mashreq  (Israel  and  its neighbours  in  the peace  proces~ - 76  - VIII/479/92-EN 
4.1.3.  LATIN  AMERICA 
While  the  Community's  relations  with  Latin  America  should  be  viewed  ~s  . 
a  whole  (in  wh~ch respect  political  dialogue  with  the  Rio  Group  a~d ~ll 
the Latin  American  countries  is extremely  important),  it is also  nece9sary. 
to  rem~r·the wide  variety of  situations  in  the  various  regions  comprising 
this sub-continent. 
The  main  issue is  how  to strengthen  politic~l;~cult~ral and  econo~ic. 
relations on  all possible  levels,  with·a part  of  ·the.world  whose  history 
and  culture  are entirely bound  up  with  Europe.  · 
The  principal  challenges  in  the  Community's  relations with  the  various 
sub-regions  of  Latin  America  are: 
(a)  for  Central America,  consolidation  of  the  peacei~rocess and  s~pport for 
modernizing  their  economies  in  order to ensure  the  sub-region's take-
off; 
(b)  for  the  Andean  countries,  support  for  economic  reforms,  combined 
with  active development  cooperation measures  in an  area  that  is still 
highly  vulnerable;  ' 
(c)  for the  most  advancedcountries  in  tne  region,'(the  southern tip, 
Brazil  and  Mexico>,  encouragement  for  forms  of  cooperation  that will· 
persuade  more  European  businesses to set  up,  so  that  an  enormously 
promising  area  can  really take off, while  tangible efforts  at  integration· 
are  under  way  (MERCOSUR). - 77  - VIIl/479/92-EN 
In  order  to meet  these  challenges,  the  Community  should: 
(i)  encourage  both  political  and  economic  dialogue  in all  possible 
forums  (Rio  Group,  Central  America,· organizations  for  integration, 
etc.)  and  contribute  to  strengthening  the  democtatic  process; 
(ii)  refine  its  cooperation  policy,  both  in'  financial  and  technical 
areas  (rural  and  urban  sectors,  health  and  new  technologies)  and 
in  economic  ones  tpartnership  in  enterprises; industry); 
(iii)  lend  support· in  finding  solutions  to' acute environmental  problems 
(tropi~al forests,  urban  pollution>; 
(iv)  provide  humanitarian and  emergency  aid  when  called  upon  (cholera 
epidemic,  resettlement  of  refugees); 
(v)  back  econ~mic reform  processes  by  pr6viding  better  access  to  suitable 
financial  sources  (ECIP,1  EIB),  so  as  to  off~r greater  incentive~ 
to  European  investors,as  well  as  the  implementation  of  cooperation 
.·of mutual  interest,  in all  domai~s where  the  C6m~unity's  experie~c~ 
could  be  fruitful  (especially  scienc~. and  tec~nology); 
(vi)  consider  ways  of  providing  Latin American  products  with  improved 
access  to the Community  market • 
. Adopting  this  course  would  have  the  following  implications. 
(a)  It would  not  be  necessary  to  make  any  sign~fica~t  increase  in  the 
financial  resources  allocated,  even  though  a~cciont  would  have  to 
be  taken  of  the  essential  part nf  the  coo~eration  agreements  which 
now  cover  all  countries  in the  region  (with  th~. exception of  Cuba), 
(b)  Different  forms.of  cooperation  would  have  to  be  devised  to meet 
different  situations  (Central  America,  the Andean  countries, the 
southern tip, Brazil  and  Mexico>;  · 
·(c)  As  a  priority,  support  would  be  needed  forth~  arrangements  to foster 
regional  integration,  in  view  of  the  beneficial effects these  produce 
and  the  Community's  own  experience  in  integrati6n efforts. 
1  E  .  .  conom1c  Commun1ty  Investment  Partners. - 78  - VIII/479/92-EN 
ASIA 
While  geog raph i caL  cons ide rations  have  Led  us  to  rete  r  to ·Asia  as  one 
developing  region,  it  is  in  this  continent  that  we  find  the  widest  divergences 
·in  development  Levels  among  the  various  sub-regidns  and  countries  composing 
it  (ranging  from  one  of  the poorest  - Cambodia  - to .one.  of  the  richest  -
Brunei- in the  world). 
fo~ this  reason,  when  considering  its relations  with this  continent, 
the  Community  must  use  different  approaches  for  the virious  sub-regions,  .. 
··  .·even  though,  in  the  Longer  term,  its overall  goal  is essentially to safeguard 
. and: enhance  the  economic  presence  of  Europe  (investment  and  exports) 
in"a  part  of  the  world  whose  growth  rate  is, and  will  remain,  the  most 
dynamic.  ·  · 
(a)  ASEAN  countries 
in addition to  the goal  mentioned  above,  which  is of  particular  relevance 
to this sub-region,  the  Community  should  concern  itself with: 
(a)  safeguarding  the  tropical forest,  which  is the world's  most  valuable, 
economically  speaking,  as  well  as  being  the ·one_,.most  at  risk  from 
over-exploitation; 
(b)  Lending  weight  to  the  region's  very  tentative·efforts at  regional 
cooperation,  in the  framework  of  GATT~ to'which  th~ possible alternative 
might  be  the  creation of  a  trading  bloc  embracing  other world  powers; 
(c)  supporting  the  international  effort to  hasten  reforms  in  Indonesia. 
(whose  population has  reached  ~Lmost half  of  the  ACP  countries•,  · 
and  whose  develo'pment  level  is still very  Low,  despite the  country's 
natural  weatih).  · •,r' 
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(b)  CHINA  (and  Mongolia) 
The  Community  should  set  itself the foll:owing specific objectives: 
(i)  the  gradual  political evolution of  t~e regime  ~nd: the  rapid  expansion 
of  its economy,  in order  to prevent  the  country  from  disintegrating, 
with  the  serious  effects of  this on  its  internal. and  external·security; 
Cii)  the  transfe~ of  European  expertise  in.agriculitirat,·environmental, 
social  and  industrial  domains,  together  with  a  small  amount  of  ODA 
both  to  underpin  such  transfers  (via  pilot  schemes)  and  to stimulate 
growth  in  the  poorest  parts of  the  country. 
(c)  INDIAN  SUB-CONTINENT 
The  specific objectives are: 
(i)  to  combat  dire  poverty and  participate in the  international  aid 
effort, for  both  humanitarian  and  security reasons,  given  the  grave 
risk of  disintegration  (particularly  in  India)  and  of  armed  conflict; 
- Cii)  to encourage  more  liberal  internal. and  externai  trade  arrangements, 
so  as to trigger off  growth  mechanisms  and  safeguard  Europe's  economic 
presence,  which  still outstrips that of.Japan or the  US; 
• (iii)  ~o provide  support  for  better environmental  pr,citection  policy,  as 
regards  both  industrial  pollution connected  wjth  energy  use  and 
the  exploitation of  natural  resources .(especially water)  ~nd the 
liimalayan  forest. 
(d)  INDOtHINESE  PENINSULA 
This  region's  historic ties with  Europe,  its  long  political  and 
trade isolation, its extreme  poverty.,  and  its human  resources, 
make  it  incumbent  on  the  Community  to play a  significant  role. 
The  specific objectives are: 
Ci)  to  provide  huma~itarian aid  for  res~ttling  ref~gees and  for  providing 
rural  inhabitants with  vital  needs; 
(ii) to make  a  contribution  towards  economic  reconstruction; 
(iii) to  lay the  foundations  of  a  European  bridgehead  into South-East 
Asia. 
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In  order  to  achieve its  objecti~es, the  Community,  should: 
(a)  take  the  interests of  Asian  developing  countries  into  account  when 
working  out  its trade policy- general  or  preferential -vis-a-vis 
other  parts of  the  world,  and  when  setting up  consultation machjnery, 
which  would  enable  countries  in  this  region:  · 
•  to be  duly  informed  of  any  measures  the  Community  intends  to  take; 
•  to  be  consulted  on  their specific  needs  and  problems; 
(b)  support  econo~ic  reform  in  countries wheri·the  economy  is still 
to  some  degreee  run  by  the  s~ate  (I~dian sub-continent,  Indonesia); 
'·  '  .  .  ' 
(c)  contribute to  a  flow  of  ODA  to the  poorest  countries,  concentrating 
on  the  most  disadvantaged  regions  and  populations  as  well  as, environ-
mental  protection measures,  but  also  providing  support,  in  exceptional 
cases, for  international  structural  adjustment  efforts; 
(d)  enlarge  the  scope  of  European  expertise transfers,  in  the  mutual 
interest,  in  order firstly,  to maintain  and  increase  each  other's 
knowledge  about  potentialities in all areas,  secondly  to  encourage 
growth  and  stronger trade  flows,  and  thirdly  (and  most  important), 
facilitate  European  investment  and  joint ventures; 
Adopting  this  course  would  have  the  following  implications. 
1.  A largeincrease would  be  needed  in the number  of  officials  assigned 
to Asia  (even  were  greater  synergy  to be  developed  as  a  result  of · 
bilateral activities on  the part  of  the  Member  States). 
2.  Thereafter  ,  a  larger allocation of  financial  resources  would  be 
required. 
3.  At  the  level  of  the  Commission's  departments,  staff  responsible 
for  defining  and  applying  trade policies  should  work  more  closely 
with  those with  responsibilities towards  a  geographical  ar~a. 
4.  .It might  become  necessary to set  up  a  European  financing  agency 
Cor  a  pool  of  Member  States•  agencies)  to provide  selective and 
partial  financial  support  for  European  investments  in Asia. - 81  -.  VI 11/479/92-EN  ·' 
V.  STATISTICAL  ANNEXES 
1.  Unequal  economic  performances 
2.  The  developing  world 
3.  The  challenge of  poverty 
4.  The  international  community's  development  aid effort - 82  - VIII/479/92'-EN. 
1.  UNEQUAL  ECONOMIC  PERFORMANCES 
~  (a)  Annual  average  growth  rate of  GOP,  in  constant  dollars 
65-73  73-80  80-89 
OECD  members  4.7  3.0  3.0 
Developing  countries  6.5  4.7  3.8 
of  which: 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  4.8  3.2  2.1 
Eastern Asia  8.1  6.6  ·7 .9 
Southern  Asia  3.6  4.2  5.1 
latin America  and  the  Caribbean  6.5  5.0  1.6 
Source:  World  Bank,  World ·Development  Report  1990  and  1991 
(b)  Per  caE!ita  GNP  (in  1989  dollars) 
Annual. average  GNP/inhab. 
growth  rate 
65-:-73  73-80  80-89  1980  1989 
OECD  3.8  2.3.  2.4  10  750  19  090 
Developing  countries  4.2  z'. 5  1.5  700  800 
of  which: 
· Sub-Sah.  Africa  1 •  .7  0.6  - 1.2  380  340 
Eastern  Asia  5.2  4.7  6.3  310  540 
Southern  Asia  1.2  1.9  2.9  260'  320 
latin"America  4.7  2.3  - 0.5  2  000  1 950 
Source:. World  Bank,  World  Development  R_eport  1991 - 83  - VIII/479/92-EN 
2.  DISPARITIES  IN  A DEV_ELOPir:!_G  UORLD  -
(a)  Per  caeita  income  1n  the  former  Soviet  republics 
Population  Per  caeita  income 
'000  000  Rbl  USD  (rate  at  11/90) 
Latvia  2.6  1209  2176 
Estonia  1.4  1187  2137 
Byelorussia  10.4  U76  2117 
Russia  148.0  1154  2077 
Lithuania  3.7  990  1782 
Moldavia  4.3  990  1782 
Ukraine  51.8  896  1613 
Armenia  3.2  809  1456 
Georgia  5.5  781  1406 
Kazakhstan  16.7  733  1319 
Azerbaijan  7.2  673  1211 
Turkmenistan  3.5  577  1039 
Kirghizia  4.3  '  527  949 
Uzbekistan  19.9  '473  851 
Tadzhistan  '5.  2  440'  792 
TOTAL  (average)  288  -990  r  1782  Source: 
If-ljF 
Inco~e is  measured  by  Net  Material  Product,  which  ignores  certain  services 
.such  as  the  administration. 
Figures  are  in  current  1988  prices. 
In  November  1990,  the  official  exchange  rate  was  _Rbl  1  =  USD  1.8, the 
-average  for  the  table  being  USD  1  780.  Controversy  over  the  ruble's  actual 
purchasing  power  is  strong;  it  probably  vari~d trbm  one  part  of  the  country 
to  ano-ther. 
(b)  Per  capit~ income  (1989  dollars) 
·Eastern  European  countries 
. Potand 
Bulgaria 
Hungary 
·Yugoslavia 
Czechoslovakia 
.-Romania 
1  790 
2  320 
2  590 
2  920 
3  450 
Newly  industrialized  countries 
South  Korea 
Hong  Kong 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
EEC  (excepting 
Portugal 
Greece 
Ireland 
Spain 
United  Kingdom 
ItaLy 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
-France 
Ge17many 
.Denmark 
4  400 
10  350 
10  450 
(1988)  6  160 
Luxembourg) 
4  250 
5  350 
B  71~ 
9  330 
14  610 
15  120 
15  920 
16  220 
1l 820 
20  440 
20  910 
Groups  of  countries 
Low- or  medium-income 
economies 
Low-income  economies 
Medium-incomE:·. economies 
Heavily  -indebted  medium-
income  .economies 
Sub-Saharan  Africa 
Eastern  Asia-
Southern Asia 
Europe,  Middle  East  and 
800 
330 
2  040 
1  720 
340 
540 
320 
, Nor: t h  A  f r i c  a  2  180 
Lati~ America  and  Caribbean  1  950 
High-income  economies  18  330 
OECD  members  19  090 
Other  economies: 
ALL  economies  3  980 
Oil  exporters  (excl.  USSR) 3.  THE  CHALLENGE  OF  POVERTY 
L i'fe  expectancy 
at  birth* 
1960 
1990 
;Daily  calorie 
intake1  * 
1965 
1985 
Irifant  mortality 
per  thousa,nd* 
1960 
1989 
r.  of  popln.  with 
access  to  health  care 
r.  of  popln.  with 
drinking water  access 
1975 
85-87 
r.  of  poptn.with 
access  to  sanitation 
Enrolment  in 
primary/secondary 
schools  OD* 
1970 
1987 
Adult  literacy 
<X  of  over-15s) 
1970 
1985 
r.  of  popln.  below 
the  poverty  LineZ  ** 
1985 
1  as  X of  normal  intake. 
lndustr. 
count r i.e s 
114 
132 
45 
18 
- 84  - VII II  4  79/92-EN 
O.cs.  S-S  A.  Eastern  Southern  Latin 
4(, 
(,J 
90 
107 
233 
116 
61 
35 
ss 
32 
55 
'10 
43 
60 
33 
40 
52 
92 
91 
284 
179 
45 
24 
37 
26 
45 
26 
48 
47 
Asia 
47 
!ifl 
86 
112 
198 
57 
75 
48 
,, 
51 
65 
81 
67 
71 
20 
Asia 
44 
SB 
88 
100 
279 
151 
56 
32 
54 
11 
45 
60 
31 
41 
51 
America 
56 
67 
100 
115 
157 
12 
61 
58 
73 
60 
'68 
'84 
72 
83 
19 
2 the  poverty  line  is  fixed  at  USD  370  per  capita. 
Sources  Without  asterisk,  UNDP  Human  Development  Report  1990 
* - UNDP  Human  Development  Report  1991 
**  - World  Bank,  world  development  Report  1990 - 85  - .  VIII/479/92~EN 
4.  THE  INTERNATIONAL  COMMUNITY'S  DEVELOPMENT  AID  EFFORT 
(a)  Sharing  the  overall  aid effort  ·(1988-89  figures) 
· in  as  %  I 
per  capita 
llSD  'OO!l  000  of  GNP  GNP  (1989 
dollars) 
'I 
Community  22.157  0.50  14. 777 (.1) 
excl.  OCT  19.929  0.45  -
France  7.289  0.75  17.820 
excl.  OCT  5.061  0.52  -
FRG  4.947  0.40  20.440 
Italy  3.384  0.40  15.120 
U.K.  2.640  0.32  14.610 
Netherlands  2.229  0.96  15.920 
Spain  241  0.07  9.330  .. 
Belgium  663  0.43  16.220 
Portugal  83  0.21  .4.250 
Greece  38  0.07  5.350 
Ireland  54  0.18  8.  710 
Luxembourg  18  0.29  18.203(1) 
us  8.749  0.18  20.910 
Japan  9.312  0.32  23.810 
Total  DAC  47.739 
S.  Korea  20  0.02  4.400 
Taiwan  26  0.02  6.160(1) 
Israel  17  0,04  9.404(1) 
India  63  0.03  343( 1): 
China  98  0.03  346(l)i 
1  1988  figures - 86  - VIII/479/92-EN 
The  sharing  of  responsibilities  with  the  US  is scarcely  more  equitable: 
.the Community's  aid  to Latin  America  is  about  70%  higher  than  US  aid,  while 
·the latter's aid  to  sub-Saharan  Africa  is only one  eleventh  of  the  Community's. 
No  similar  imbalanc~ exists  between  US  and  Japanese  aid,  it  may  be  noted. 
Several  issues are  revealed  by  these  figures.  They  not  bnly  show  up  whether 
the aid burden  is evenly  shared,  but  also, to  some  extent,  suggest  whether 
it  is being  used  efficiently. 
By  redeploying  some  of  their  aid,  these  donors  could  lay  the  foundations 
for  more  stable cooperation. - 87  - VIII/479/92-EN 
(t)  Aid  of  main  donors  broken  down  by  destination 
Weight  cf  each  region  1n  various  donors•  total  aid  (as  %) 
Destination  Donors 
Community  Japan·  .US  All  donors 
Sub-Saharan  47.9  14.6  13.7  34.2 
Africa 
Southern  Asia  11.5  20.3  I  13.9  16.8 
I  l 
Other  Asian  12.9  50.7  8.2'  21.6 
countries 
·-
N.  Mrica and  12.7  -'n1 
''  43.2*  14.3 
Middle  East  c 
.,. 
Latin  America  14.9  7.2  21.1  13.1 
and  Caribbean 
Source  OECD,  1988-89  figures 
*  Israel  receives  12.5%  of  US  aid, and  Egypt  9.5%. - 88  - VIII/479,192-EN 
(c)  Weight  of  the  Community,  Japan  and  the  US  in  development  aid 
Weight  of  various  donors  in  totaL  aid  received  by  ~~ch region 
as  % 
Region  Donor 
Community  Japan  us 
Latin  America  45.8  9.3  25.6  '·  ., 
Asia  and  Oceania  25.6  31.3  9.1 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  56.4  7.2  6.4 
N.  Africa  and  35.8  8.4  48.0 
Middle  East 
All  developing  40.0  14.3  14.4 
countries 
Source  OECD,  1988-89  figures - 89  - VIII/479/92-EN 
2.  Weight  of  the  Community,  Japan  and  the  US  in  the totaL  aid  received 
by  a  few  developing  countries, as  % 
Weight  of  ODA  in,  Weight  of  aid  received 
country's  GNP  '•from: 
Community  Japan  ·us· 
All  less devel- i  40.3  8.6  6.4 
oped  countries  I' 
Madagascar 
I  17.7  57..5  4.8  1.5  : 
Rwanda  I  11.4  49~0  7.0  3.8  ,, 
Somalia  46.0  58.2'  4.2  6.6 
. Mozambique  76.1  42.4  6~6  4.4 
ZairiO'  11.0  52~5  12.0  8.3 
Bangladesh  9.3  21.7  20.5  7.7 
;~· 
· Nepal  15.4  20.5 
.,.  15.7  2.8 
Sri  Lanka  8.5  20.1  33.9  7.9 
Pakisatn  3.6  17.1  23.8  16.1 
Indonesia  2.4  21.3  62.3  1.  7 
Bolivia  10.7  28.8  21.1  15.7 
Source  OECD,  1989  figures 